

TRADE MORALS

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TRADE MORALS

THEIR ORIGIN, GROWTH
AND PROVINCE

BY
EDWARD D. PAGE

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
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PREFACE

This book is the outgrowth of a course of lectures delivered to the graduating class at the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale University in the spring of 1911. Their object was to show in some consecutive form the growth of trade morals from the social and mental conditions which form the environment of business men, and to illustrate their meaning and purpose in such a way as to clarify if not to solve some difficulties by which the men of our time are perplexed. The lecturer took for granted a basis of knowledge such as is possessed by undergraduate students of the natural and social sciences, and the effort was made to carry minds so prepared one step further along toward the interpretation of some of the problems with which they would soon be compelled to cope. Nearly all of them were shortly to come into contact with business—to engage in it, in fact—and he felt that it was important that they should make this start with some definite notion of the values and problems involved in the business side of their vocational career.

My object, as I explained to the class, in the impromptu introduction to the first lecture, was to paint with a broad brush, in bright colors and maybe with rough outlines, an impressionistic picture of the



interrelations of society, morals and mind in their effect upon the conduct of the business man. The artist who essays this object has never been over-concerned with such details as he considers unessential to the production of his effect, and his materials he endeavors so to manage that they shall compose at a glance into a truthful portrayal of the whole scene or subject. In like spirit I have essayed to treat the ever vital question of human activity, its evolutionary progress and the co-ordinate development of morals—with especial reference and application to the business problems of our time.

Originally composed in the intervals of pressing business demands and away from books of reference, the lectures took a somewhat didactic form, which I have not been at pains to alter. Their object was to instruct, and to lead average men to think, rather than to be the medium of original work along lines of scientific discovery. So far as they lean upon the sister sciences of biology, sociology and psychology I have tried in them to restate in a simple and concise form, but sometimes from different angles of vision, the results arrived at by competent investigators in these fields. If there is anything original in the point of view here taken, it must lie in such results as may be derived from a comprehensive rather than an intensive scrutiny of the conditions which underlie the entire fabric of business life. And business acts, to paraphrase Matthew Arnold's famous generalization of conduct, may make three fourths of civilized

life in our day and generation. Under modern conditions of exchange nearly everybody in society is engaged in business, and upon its results his welfare largely depends.

Under the circumstances above outlined, it was impossible to supply the text with footnotes of acknowledgment to the various authorities upon whom I have so liberally drawn. And so I have been obliged to refer the reader to my sources in a more general way by annexing, at the end, a list of the works on which I have depended for my material.

If in this presentation a partisan view anywhere has been adhered to, my conclusion may, of course, be questioned by those holding different tenets; in which case I shall hope either to be able to give a good account of, and support for, my contentions, or have the sense to make some alteration in my viewpoint. But I believe that the conclusions here presented will well stand the test of experience, being founded, in the main, upon induction from observation, and tinctured to no considerable degree with unwarranted inferences from imaginary situations. They do, however, summarize the results of a personal experience and observation of the ethical relations of men of business to the community extending over many years, of which I may hope sometime to make a more adequate presentation.

I acknowledge with gratitude the kind suggestions of my friends; particularly those of Prof. Albert G. Keller of Yale, who revised the proofs of the

first five chapters; and of Dr. Stewart Paton of Princeton, whose criticism led to greater clarity in a part of the seventh.

EDWARD D. PAGE.

Oakland, N. J., November 3, 1913.

TO THE READER

Two preliminary thoughts, if you please, before we commit ourselves, unrestrained, to the mazes of impulse and intellectation through which human conduct is determined, with the trust that at the end we shall have emerged successfully into a clearer light of understanding and decision.

The first is this; that it is necessary to remember always that the definite and distinct classes, grades, modes, levels, etc., of which we shall be obliged to speak, while aiding the clear comprehension of series of events or natural phenomena, do not in fact exist in the exact sense with which they are described; and are not separated from each other by clear-cut boundaries or lines of demarcation. In all the sciences having to do with life, classes, genera, species and varieties are in outline more shadowy than distinct. There is a twilight zone or penumbra between neighboring varieties, in which one shades off more or less gradually into the other, with more or less mingling of their features. We must not forget that the classification of the sciences is only an approximation made imperative by that imperfection of the human mind which demands halting places from which to survey its work.

An effort of the finite to realize the infinite

The natural state of all things is a state of motion. The rate may be very slow, as in the building up of geological strata, or very rapid, as in the case of what

men in their ignorance have called the "fixed" stars, but there is always motion except perhaps in death. Nature progresses by the gradual and insidious methods of evolution and never halts. But a human sense finds great difficulty in observing objects in motion. It cannot readily comprehend them; and so, instantaneous photographs of the postures actually assumed by so familiar an object as a running horse seem unreal, unless taken at some stage of comparative rest that can be easily recognized by the eye.

The artifice
of classifi-
cation

To overcome this difficulty, in the study of the sciences, men have devised classifications, that is to say, convenient but artificial stopping places, where the mind turns away, as it were, from the constant survey of motion and looks backward for a moment to inspect what has gone before. The divisions or categories by which it reviews the facts of observation are only stages wherein certain characteristics have become more salient than in others; and so lend their name, for the purpose of convenient recognition, to a zone through which sequential changes are nevertheless constantly passing at greater or lesser rates of motion.

Decline of
formal
religion

The second thought is less difficult of statement. In the decline of formal religious influence which has marked the course of civilization during the last forty years there is a gap left where once there was a keen impulse to right living, and right living more than anything else is dependent upon right think-

ing. In default of the rise of another great Moral Master, we must found our hope on an ethical progress fashioned by and of the people itself. So that from a democratic consideration of conduct we may hope to see principles arise with whose assistance we may make moral rules to fit the new modes of action into which we have been forced by the technical and scientific advances of the times. If this progress is to be aided by the study of ethics its conclusions must be expressed in words derived from the vernacular. Dissertations which only college professors can understand without effort, are of very little value in leading people generally to think about conduct. And so, the terms used must be those which English-speaking people may understand so natively that they will not shy at the effort of thinking in them. Having experienced the ease of comprehension which went with the reading of Professor Sumner's massive but undigested treatise on the folkways, I have ventured to follow his example, and to form such new terms as seemed necessary from words already current in English use. To do so is no easy task and I shamefully admit one or two lazy departures, which, in case it is ever necessary to reprint, I shall endeavor to correct. For the reader's convenience I have prefixed to these papers the definitions of all terms used in special or definite senses therein; and now commend myself to his most charitable indulgence.

Democracy in morals
Value of the vernacular

DEFINITIONS

Agent—the doer of an act of conduct or behavior.

Antagonism—the general principle of mutually resisting forces which underlies all nature, whose expressions are discord, conflict, competition, individualism, radiation, centrifugence, etc.

Anthropology—the system of knowledge relating to man.

Behavior—involuntary action moulded to ends through natural forces acting according to natural law.

Business—human activity in the exchange of services, commodities or money.

Character—the combination of qualities in any person arising from his disposition, temperament and habits of conduct—an expression for the sum of the natureways and nurtureways of a person.

Civilization—the aggregate expression of the life of a nation in its arts, sciences and modes of conduct.

Clan—a folkgroup of families held together by the sentiment of descent from a common ancestor.

Class-custom—(see group-custom).

Commerce—the exchange of commodities, between different peoples or folkgroups.

Commodities—goods destined to be exchanged.

Concurrence—the general principle of mutually co-operating forces which underlies all nature, and whose expressions are attraction, gravity, harmony, co-operation, combination, socialism, centripetence, etc.

Conduct—voluntary action adjusted to ends (Spencer).

Custom—habitual conduct, common to a group, consciously recognized as conducive to welfare.

Disposition—the sum of all the instincts and acquired habits of using or controlling them of any person.

Economics—the system of knowledge relating to conduct involved in the production of wealth.

Ethics—the system of knowledge relating to moral conduct.

Family—a group of two or more individuals of different sexes; essentially parents with their children; held together by the instinct of reproduction.

Fear—a sentiment derived from the instinct of flight—a motive to conduct through (a) fear of the environment, men, outgroups, wild beasts, disease or (b) fear of the folkgroup, of ancestors or gods.

Finance—(human activity in) the exchange of money or the written representatives of money value.

Folk—(in combination) pertaining to the folkgroup.

Folk-custom—a uniform mode of conscious folkgroup conduct; derived from folkways recognized as conducive to groupal welfare [“one of the mores” (Sumner); “*Sitte*” (Wundt)].

Folkfaith—the religious belief of a folkgroup.

Folk-feeling—social sentiment, public opinion of a folkgroup.

Folkgroup—the largest number of human groups who at a given time and place feel that they are held together for the satisfaction of common interests;—the prevailing social group.

Folklaw—the common law; folk-custom methodized and declared by courts of law.

Folkspeech—the language of a folkgroup.

Folkways—a uniform mode of conduct practiced by men in group or mass conditions, under the stimulation of common interests; usage, social habit [*Brauch* (Wundt)].

Folkweal—the welfare of the folkgroup.

Folkwill—the will of the folkgroup (*Volkwille*).

Group—any number of individuals thinking and acting together for a common purpose.

Group-custom—a uniform mode of conduct, common to a group or class, and consciously recognized as conducive to its welfare.

Habit—a uniform mode of acting established by a person in the effort better to adjust himself to his environment [*Gewohnheit* (Wundt)].

Hetererthonic—of other groups.

Humanistics—uniform groupal modes of conduct arising from pity or compassion for individuals.

Hunger—a feeling derived from tropisms, the stimulus of the alimentary instincts.

Industry—human activity in the production of commodities.

Instinct—a faculty motivating behavior in animals and man; reflexes co-ordinated by a central nervous ganglion or brain.

Instinctive act—a uniform mode of behavior motivated by instincts.

Institution—an organized and formal artifice for the promotion of folk-custom or humanistics.

Law—a rule of external human action, affirmed and enforced by the folkgroup.

Love—the emotional expression of the reproductive instinct.

Market—a group of buyers and sellers (Emery).

Morals—the rules of right conduct recognized as valid at any given time by any group.

Nation—a folkgroup of families or tribes held together by the necessity of peace.

Natureways—modes of behavior; uniform unconscious modes of action, produced by the natural environment.

Nurtureways—modes of conduct; uniform conscious modes of human action produced by education under group conditions.

Personality—the self-expression of a person as determined by his self-consciousness.

Pity—sympathy for the sufferings of others, together with a desire to relieve them.

Psychology—the system of knowledge relating to neuro-mental phenomena.

Reflexes—uniform modes of behavior, the indirect effect of environment on the organism through nervous ganglia; tropisms co-ordinated by a spinal cord.

Self-consciousness—the sum of knowledge, at a given time, possessed by a person of himself, his feelings and desires.

Sociology—the system of knowledge relating to men or animals living together in groups.

Subject—one who is subjected to an act done by another.

Temperament—mental expression as influenced by bodily organs and nervous system.

Trade—the exchange of commodities between markets (Emery).

Transportation—the conveyance of persons or commodities from one place to another.

Tribe—a folkgroup of families or clans held together by the need for efficiency in war.

Tropism—a mode of behavior which is the direct response of an organism to its environment.

Vanity—the expression of the instinct of positive self-feeling.

Volition—conscious choice between motives.

Welfare—a state or condition, arising from the adjustment of an organism to its environment.

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TRADE MORALS

I

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

On the granite block which forms the corner stone of one of the largest manufactories in New England—the first mill successfully established in this country to spin and weave flax into linen cloths—there is carved in strong letters these words:

“All was others,
All will be others.”

In this rude phrasing is expressed a thought that has dominated and guided the intellectual development of the last half century. With the issue in 1859 of Darwin's Origin of Species, began the conception, now grown to a conclusion, that everything within our ken, instead of being at rest or in fixed or stable equilibrium, is really in a continual state of motion or change; that what today is, is the issue of something that was yesterday and is the source of something else that will be tomorrow—“All was others; All will be others.”

Darwin's great discovery answered the question: Are there causes in Nature for the differences which we observe between the many varieties of living animals and plants? With additions and subtractions it remains today the accepted doctrine account-

The
Doctrine of
Evolution

Its
Biological
application

Its
extension
to the
Physical
Sciences

Evolution
in
Psychology

ing for the development of all the different living species which exist upon the face of the Earth. Upon this doctrine is based the theory of the biological sciences, Botany, Zoölogy, Physiology, Geology and all their kindred branches of knowledge. More recently this doctrine of continual change and development has made its way into the physical sciences, Chemistry, Physics and Mineralogy, and we may now more than suspect that the metals themselves, once a type of stability and inertness, are like living beings subject to their own laws of orderly and sequential change. Modern study of the phenomena of radio-activity has led to the conclusion that like plants they have a period of growth, and possibly of decay—measured indeed by eons instead of by years. Before long the philosopher's stone may have become a reality.

Firmly established as the interpretation of the observed sequence of facts with respect to the origin and growth of physiological structure and function, the theory of evolution is now extended to the explanation of the problems presented by the more newly observed assimilations between the mental processes of men and beasts. And so, Psychology is learning not only that the active instincts of man originate in the lower animals, but that intellectual ideas which have been classed as self-evident—axioms which Euclid or Plato used as the starting point of their logical arguments—are by no means intuitively inherent in the natural constitution of the

human mind. Rather do we now regard those fundamental notions in mathematical and logical sciences which we call axioms, aphorisms, maxims, precepts or proverbs, and with which people start their reasoning as postulates or self-evident truths, as growing out of the observation and inference of many generations over an immense period of time. It follows that two and two make four, that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, that the whole is greater than its part, are propositions universally accepted without argument, not because of any inherent incapacity of the mind to question them, but because centuries of observation have proven them to be statements of fact, whereby an unconscious and universal habit has been formed of regarding them as self-evident and necessary truths.

If, then, the facts, of which we have taken a brief survey, advancing from the more elementary of inert matter to the more complex of the human body and brain, may all be generalized as nothing else than particular phases of the universal phenomena of change and growth, how is it when we come in contact with the yet more complex aspects of mankind in combination—the moral, economic and political relations which they assume to each other in society? Evolution in Sociology Are there the same problems of change and growth to be solved in the sphere of the mutual relations of man to man? And does the theory of evolution play the same part in the solution of these social

problems as it does in the other less complex fields of inquiry? For it is plain that the relations of man to man in social life depend upon the conduct of each man toward the other, considered first as individuals, and then as bound together by some tie of association, as in a state, or as in a common employment, and that this conduct, being both intangible and diffuse, is a matter of much greater complexity than any of those previously considered. Intangible because unrecorded, except as to the infinitesimal fraction which is of contemporary interest; diffuse, because so widespread that it is beyond the power of any observer to perceive more than another small fraction of the whole.

Conduct

Its laws
found by
abstraction

Conduct, "voluntary action adjusted to ends,"¹ follows apparently the caprices of the human will, and at first blush would seem to be a subject incapable of appraisal and classification by the scientific methods which have classified the more fixed and settled phenomena of nature, recognized their inter-relations and established the laws of their uniform sequence in action. Nevertheless, through the method of segregation or abstraction, that is to say, by considering a certain class of conduct by itself, men have made some progress in formulating the uniform correspondence and sequence of conduct, and have reached some definite scientific conceptions of common modes of human action shown in reasoning, as in Logic or Mathematics; in the accu-

¹ Herbert Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, p. 2.

mulation of wealth, as in Economics; in talking, as in Linguistics; and in the ways in which human beings live together, as in Sociology. Each of these sciences has succeeded in some degree in its quest for laws or universal ways by which men act when reasoning, when earning, when speaking or when associating in a society.

Society, in the general sense in which I have here used it, is not the little fellowship of congenial people in a neighborhood who take themselves seriously as the self-appointed guardians of etiquette or courtesies, to appraise exactly the value of various styles of dress, or the strict obligations of mutual entertainment. On the contrary, what I refer to is the largest body of persons who feel that they are held together for the satisfaction of common interests. A common political organization is not of necessity the tie; for three quarters of a century prior to the Civil War two distinct societies were united in the Federal Union, yet with such diverse interests as to eventually rend them asunder. Except by force, Ulster and Kerry can hardly be held together on their common island with their common speech and with their common king. Nor should we say that Austria and Hungary, though joined by a common rule, and contributors to a common war chest, are anything but two distinct societies. Common language is not the tie; quite different in social customs and aspirations are Canada and New Zealand. The bond that unites men into a society is

one of common thought and feeling, and centuries of political separation as with the Poles in Austria, Germany and Russia, or with the Greeks in Crete and the Archipelago, are powerless to destroy it.

Ethics the science of right and wrong conduct

Not all conduct is moral or immoral

Ethics is the science by which we endeavor to discover principles governing human conduct when appraised as either right or wrong. Its method is similar to that of its sister science of Political Economy, which has to do with the principles guiding human conduct toward gainful or wasteful ends. In the one, conduct having moral effect, purport or implication is segregated for the time being from all other conduct for study and classification; just as in the other, conduct having a bearing on the acquisition of wealth is segregated for the same purpose. Not all conduct must of necessity be moral or immoral; often it has no moral significance whatsoever and is therefore simply unmoral. We should not think of attaching moral consequences to ordinary eating or drinking, the wearing of a coat or the drawing of a check for money. And yet we must admit that under circumstances gluttony or excessive drinking of stimulants may be immoral because of its consequences to our families or business associates; we should quickly find ourselves in jail were we to venture on the street naked, and were we to draw a check on a bank in which we had no account we would subject ourselves to the charge of fraud, and to criminal prosecution. The essential difference between the acts to which we are in the habit of

attributing moral significance and those which have no implication of right and wrong lies in the fact that the former are good or bad for *others than ourselves*, that is to say, they affect either the feelings or welfare of our families, or of our neighbors, or maybe of the whole society in which the acts are performed and of which the actor is a part.

If we could consider man as an isolated individual In isolation we can understand why it is necessarily impossible no morals for him under such circumstances to pursue an immoral course of conduct; for in his case there is no other person to be injured or benefited by his conduct. So long as Robinson Crusoe remained alone on the island of Juan Fernandez his acts concerned no one but himself and hence were neither wrong nor right. They might only be wise or foolish so far as they were correctly or imperfectly adjusted to his own survival in the environment by which he was surrounded. But from the moment that he found in the sand the footprints of the man Friday some part of his conduct was adjusted with reference to this other person and thus was in the way of being compared with some standard, to agree with which would be right, or to differ with would be wrong. Conduct may have a variety of qualities; it may be wise or imprudent, thrifty or wasteful, sensible or foolish, healthy or morbid; and yet neither right nor wrong. Or it may be several of these and also right or wrong.

Like a bargain or a quarrel, it takes two to make

Moral conduct a social matter

moral conduct. It therefore follows that the science which deals with right and wrong conduct is essentially one of the sciences of society. It assumes and is dependent upon that aggregation of men and women, leading a common existence, and depending to a greater or less degree upon each other for the amenities of life, which we are in the habit of calling a community, people or society.

Sociology

Society being the fabric upon which is traced the embroidery of moral conduct, it will be necessary briefly to inquire into its raw material and texture as shown by the researches of the biological and anthropological sciences.

Social traces in fossil life

Looking backward by the aid of these departments of knowledge to the earliest known manifestations of the existence of man, we can find no conditions under which even the most primitive of mankind are devoid of some form of association. Paleontology even teaches us through fossils preserved in early geological strata that the roots of social life are to be found in the most primeval animal history. In the Paleozoic Age the compound nature of many polypozoan fossils points clearly to the existence of societies in lower forms of life, whose individual members were dependent upon each other and upon the entire group or colony for food, propagation and protection from the enemies that might otherwise have destroyed them.

What little we know of the habits of living animals confirms the same general principle of a rudimentary

social or collective activity which permeates and pervades almost the entire range of animal existence. Many Polyzoa, like corals and sponges, cannot exist independently of others of their kind. Insects, like ants and bees, dwell together in orderly swarms. Fishes are found together in schools or shoals. Birds consort in broods, coveys and flocks. Among the higher mammals, flocks, herds and droves of wild sheep, deer and cattle show a like social organization; a tendency which seems to weaken only in the case of a few carnivora and birds of prey, and even with these there is never less than a pair.

What are the causes that underlie this tendency to animal association? In the lower forms, scantily provided with motive capacity, it would seem to arise from a need of greater self-protection than an individual can furnish—a co-operation, so to speak, in building a barrier, such as a shell, against the assaults of more alert and food-seeking enemies; and this structure by reason of its weight assists in the capture of sea-borne food which floats more rapidly in the current than do the heavy protective tissues which the colony secretes. It is quite apparent that an individual escaping from such a colony would have a comparatively slight chance of survival wherever foes were plentiful and food scarce. In the higher animals a flock or herd will better escape beasts of prey by the warning or even by the sacrifice of one of its outlying sentinels; and the group survives where stragglers perish. A group, too, gives

Social traits of the lower animals

Of the higher animals

Causes of animal society

greater opportunities for sexual commerce and for the protection of the young, so that it can reproduce a larger number of its kind, in whom a habit of association, become instinctive, will strengthen with each successive generation.

Causes of
human
society

Hunger
Love
Vanity
Fear

Society, as Sumner points out in his *Folkways*, is the result of an effort to satisfy interests growing out of four motive forces common to all mankind, tersely stated as Hunger, Love, Vanity and Fear.² These may be called the primitive motives, because even across the vague boundaries which part humankind from animalkind we find them efficient causes of social formation, in which the brutes participate as well as our good selves. Hunger, the need of sustenance; love, the need of reproduction; are biotic motives common in some form to all life, be it vegetal or animal. But only beings possessing a centralized ganglionic nervous organization are susceptible to the motives of fear and vanity, important, as we shall see, to survival in the more complex environment of all higher types of organisms. No being without some form of mental development can experience them, and therefore they may be called psychic motives. For centuries they have been recognized in literature and language as per-

² It is quite possible that this, as a classification of motives, is by no means exhaustive, for all of the instincts seem to be more or less involved in the production of folkways. On the other hand it is the essential part of a fundamentally true picture, and by its vividness will be the more easily recalled to the student's mind.

taining to the brutes as well as to ourselves. Has not the peacock always been the symbol of vanity, and "chicken-hearted" or "pigeon-hearted" a type of timidity when applied to man?³

After the recognition of the germ of society throughout the animate life of the ages, however remote, it is easy to surmise that in the most primitive form of human living some kind of social structure will be found. And so, as a matter of fact, except as a sport, or abnormal exception, the isolated individual man does not exist; and incapable of self-propagation, his type cannot survive. Go back as far as we can in anthropological research we can find no time nor place in which mankind was not organized in groups. It seems reasonable that the fundamental group is the family, consisting of parents and their children during their period of helplessness.⁴ To borrow an illustration from chemistry, the family may be looked upon as the sociological atom, the hypothetically indivisible group recognized by the science of mankind.

But this family group, the social atom, is itself

³ It is true that Sumner attempts to restrict his definition of fear to that inspired by ghosts and spirits—too narrow, I believe, for that fear of consequences inspired by a living enemy or by social punishment, of which animal instinct as well as human intelligence affords so many illustrations.

⁴ Mindful of the fact that the family is not necessarily monogamous nor even monandrous, and that pre-marital promiscuity is known to exist along with a subsequent fixed ideal of marital fidelity, I think there is ground to agree with Westermarck's conclusion as to the non-survival of the horde or herd in human society.

The Clan
or Kinship
Group

A
sociological
molecule

only exceptionally capable of independent or isolated existence; and like the physical or chemical atom can effectively persist only in combination with other similar atoms, forming a larger social group, just as groups of atoms form the larger chemical molecule. The earliest form of a larger social group of which we have positive knowledge is composed of two or more related families, and may be thought of as the sociological molecule, the smallest portion that is capable of prolonged or permanent separate existence. In the formation of such social groups anthropology shows that everywhere and always a common line of evolution has been followed; that the clan, or kinship group, composed of a number of families and founded upon some fact or theory of blood relationship, is the original form of molecule into which all primitive races have first compounded themselves for political or social purposes. Universally, therefore, the original coherent force that held together a combination of similar family atoms in the larger molecule of the clan was the sentiment of descent from a common ancestor.

An interesting expression of this sentiment is found in the words which are used in the languages of nations far beyond the stage where the former existence of clan groups is even remembered. And so each citizen of Rome called his country *Patria*—fatherland—long after the feeling of descent from a common ancestor which had held together the clan of Romulus and Remus on the seven hills had passed

from the realm of fact to that of fancy. To this day a relic of common descent can be seen in the Scottish clan surnames, whose prefix Mac is the Gaelic word for son. There are numerous instances where words indicative of common ancestry have survived the extinction of the clan through its absorption into a greater group. And pioneer colonists, settled in isolation under primitive conditions, often revert in their group structure to clan formations—a process not uncommon in the mountains of our Middle South.

In its general formation a primitive clan group follows out with great similarity the group method of anthozoans and other polyzoans. Each human family, like each sponge or coral insect, is similarly constituted, and in either case the molecule is composed of aggregations of equal or similar atoms, be they families or insects. Human families under these conditions are no more self-sufficing and independent than those of their insect analogues, and when several families are brought together into one community, they find it easier to protect themselves against the aggressions of men or of wild beasts; to mate without incest or inbreeding, and to co-operate in the pursuit of game, in the management of flocks or in averaging the risks of tillage. Combined recognition of personal efficiency, of group prowess, fostering family and clan pride—both gaining added force from the reaction of one mind upon another—satisfies better in clanship the interests flowing out

Clan
conditions
satisfy
Fear
Love
Hunger
Vanity

Clan
formation
subcon-
scious

of self-esteem. And so all of the primitive interests are better satisfied by the social grouping of the clan, and fit it better to survive in the struggle for existence in proportion to its strength and efficiency. Although it is unconsciously brought together by common parentage, common breeding and common pursuits, it is none the less man's first object lesson in the economic advantages of combination. Being a simple aggregation of similar parts, it tends toward democratic equality and decentralized authority, its territory is conditioned by the boundaries drawn about by human enemies, by wild beasts and reptiles, by rivers, mountains, deserts or swamps. It must be compact; for kin-feeling is killed by severance; and its size is limited by its available food supply.

The competition between clan groups for food in seasons of scarcity, and the aggressions incident to the capture of women, lead to reprisals, aggressions and rivalry, which excite the primary instincts of pugnacity and self-assertion and result in wars between the groups. The stronger clans will best survive such conflicts, and the fear which their prowess excites eventually leads to a conscious combination or consolidation of weaker ones for self-defense. And thus two or more clans are welded in the greater group of a tribe, held together by efficiency in war. In terms of chemistry the tribe therefore may be compared to a compound of molecules whose ingredients are kinship groups, each of which has been moulded by its own set of physical and

social environments. Each clan therefore associated itself in the tribe with other clans of dissimilar occupations and habits, and the process developed a testimony of experience that such differences are not incompatible with social union. The first step toward civilization, which is a condition directly proportioned to the development of differences of industrial function between the members of a group, has been taken. As it grows, the greater economic efficiency of a division of labor encourages within the tribal structure a variety of industrial groups: of its clans, each still bound by the kinship tie, one will be armorers or arrowsmiths; another, farmers producing food; a third, shepherds raising mutton and wool; others, perhaps, workers in stone for shelter; in iron for tools; or in silver for adornment. In the tribal organization the most important group is naturally that which cares for its defense against enemies, which centers about a chief or war leader, and in case of need draws upon the other groups for reinforcement. The great need of the tribal organization for efficiency in war gives predominance and leadership to the war group, which acquires privileges as rewards for its service; and the prevalence of war in primitive society soon makes of it a ruling class. The persistent kinship ideals form from the war group an hereditary nobility, proud and tenacious of their privileges, which are now ascribed to blood; and so these privileges are only accessible to other persons after formal adoption, through such

Division of industry

Rise of a Nobility

ceremonies as those of knighthood or investiture. In the tribe the pressure of outside hostility and the need of effective resistance give great cohesiveness to the molecules out of which it is formed; they must hang together or be overcome by their neighbors.

We have now passed in rapid survey the growing applications of the doctrine of evolution; as first, an explanation of variation in living beings; next, of the origin of physical elements; and, last, of change and growth in man's mental and emotional structure. Ethics, whose subject-matter is right and wrong conduct, is conditioned by the existence of man, a mental and emotional being, in contact with his fellows; it is, therefore, a social science. And so to understand the structure which it adorns we have sketched society from its sub-human origins to man, and have seen that among men the group everywhere prevails, progressing from simpler to more complex phases through the family or social atom, the clan or social molecule, to the social compound of the tribe, and in all of these we can perceive a constant sequence of change and growth. It will next be necessary to examine the development of these groups into a yet more complex form—the nation.

II

THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONS

Following society through its primitive phases of change and growth we have found that from the beginning mankind has been associated into groups; first in the family, a group of persons; next in the clan, a group of families; and thirdly in the tribe, a group of clans. So that we might better understand the relations between the types we have applied to them the physical and chemical similitude of the atom, the molecule and the compound, to which, roughly, they have a structural resemblance.

Since from now on we shall be dealing with typical groups of ever increasing complexity, it will be convenient to express by a single word the prevailing type of greatest group; and this I propose to do by the term folkgroup, so as to designate that largest number of men who at any given time feel that they are held together for the satisfaction of their common interest. In this sense clans and tribes may be folkgroups, as is also that still larger and more complex social type, the Nation. Subordinate groups can then be readily distinguished from the folkgroup; either collectively, as subgroups, or by prefixes indicative of their origin or function; and without much circumlocution or any confusion.

As we have seen, the typical influence making for

Coalescence of tribal into national groups

Effect on transportation

the consolidation of clans into a tribe was their need for greater efficiency in war. But in that phase of social development when the tribe had become the prevailing form of folkgroup, the constantly growing competition and pressure exerted by other hostile or rival tribes furnished further coherent forces, finally determining the coalescence of a number of tribal groups into the still greater and more complex aggregation of a nation; whose territory is generally determined by natural boundaries; great rivers, seas or mountain ranges, forming of themselves barriers and bulwarks, easily defended and difficult of passage to a hostile force. While in the single-community type of clan life the need of transportation was at a minimum, a tribe is obliged to live dispersedly, and for the concentration of its defensive forces its communities must be connected by paths or primitive roads, and the deeper streams spanned by temporary bridges. The nation is in need of the rapid concentration of defensive forces over a much greater territory; its ruler's power is dependent upon his frequent contact and that of his lieutenants with his subjects; added to this, the increasing differentiation of industrial employment calls for better roads for its constant interchange of specialized products between the more separated subgroups. So that while tribal conflicts tend to keep roads narrow, steep and bad lest approach should be too easy, centralized authority combines with industrial specialization to demand the substitution of wagon roads for

horse trails, and permanent stone instead of easily destroyed wooden bridges, within the national domain.

Because of its size and its ability to segregate a professional soldiery, the nation folkgroup is bound together by less imperative ties of self-defense than is the tribe; the need and occasion of aggression are lessened and the kinship ideals survive only as a vague tie which is spoken of as race. Progressive division of labor brings into existence and promotes the multiplication of subgroups unaccustomed to warlike exercises and engaged in occupations requiring internal order for their successful prosecution. The chieftain, controlling an armed force which may as well be used to suppress civil discord as to repel invasion, becomes a king, upon whose functions as a war lord is grafted the duty of enforcing an inter-tribal peace within his boundaries. And so the growing need for peace takes its place alongside of the waning necessities for self-defense in cementing the tribes into a nation, and finally supplants them.

While a tribe is a folkgroup composed of clan molecules or kinship groups each of which is somewhat different from the other, yet its basic family atoms, the product of a fairly uniform environment, are typically similar or homologous. But a nation composed of a number of tribes forced into compound social consolidation by the industrial necessities of intertribal peace and order, is sure to find within its broader domain subgroups both of the clan

Soldiery

Industry

The King

Structural
contrast
between
tribes and
nations

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and family type, developed some in one direction, some in another, by dissimilar climatic and physiographic conditions; so that the basic elements of the nation folkgroup are typically diverse rather than similar. Nations are, therefore, a much more complex type of social compound than tribes. To continue our chemical comparison, we may perhaps say that the nation typifies a complex organic compound, while the tribe may be considered as its inorganic analogue; industry standing in the social compound for the carbon whose presence in an organic compound is the distinguishing characteristic of its type.

Reactions
of peace
conditions
upon
industry

Internal peace conditions, once established in the nation by the suppression of intertribal conflict, react upon industry and give new impetus to its extension. Industry, fostered by internal order, accumulates wealth, and this reacts upon industry itself through the growth of luxury,—new wants demand new products to gratify desires for greater comfort in living, for the adornment of the person,—wants which are the logical extension of the primitive motives of hunger and love. Fear of other nations creates a demand for armaments, and fear in its expression toward the Unseen builds and decorates cathedrals, churches and cloisters. Thus, increasing complexity of demand for commodities, finding its origin in the four great basic motives of Hunger, Love, Vanity and Fear, tends toward the evolution of more highly specialized industrial subgroups

forming themselves out of the existing kinship subgroups. At first it appears that the coherence of each industrial subgroup is maintained through the kinship tie, and the workers of an industry may be drawn only from a clan or caste. But the kinship tie gradually weakens as the economic tie, the coherent force of a group of workers in a common industry, increases, and so the industrial groups tend to grow rapidly and outside of kinship lines in direct ratio to the increase of facilities for intercommunication. Industrial wealth vies with war leadership in indulging the increasing sense of personal distinction—the outgrowth of vanity, following the example progressively set by the tribal chieftains, lords, barons, earls, counts, marquises, dukes and princes. By degrees wealthy industrial leaders acquire a part of the political power formerly possessed by the war lords and eventually the nobility are ousted from the control of the State.

The atoms composing industrial subgroups finally forget their kinship ideals and associate with other subgroups, either along sentimental or political lines, or in accordance with industrial changes brought about by progress in the sciences or the arts. The head of a family may thus be a member of several subgroups. For instance, under present-day conditions, in addition to his trade group a plasterer may be a Republican in politics and a Presbyterian in religion; other plasterers may be Socialists or Free-thinkers, and other Republicans may be stock-

Decay of
the kinship
group

brokers or Roman Catholics. In the more stable inorganic stage of simple social combinations like that of the tribe it would not be deemed possible for these atoms ever to forget their allegiance to their clan, to be disloyal to their chief or impious to their God. But in the modern state the ancient kinship ties have lost their power, and men who have mentally or economically outgrown the conditions of the sub-group to which they have been born or educated, are continually breaking through its boundaries and joining industrial or intellectual classes other than those with which they were formerly affiliated.

The more highly organized social compounds are, therefore, like their chemical analogues, unstable in association; their subgroups, no longer compact but diffused over a large extent of territory, interpenetrate each other. The social atoms may be compelled by social or economic pressure to break away from one or more of their subgroups and recombine with others. Our Presbyterian-Republican-plasterer may be compelled to become a farmer or a motor-man by an oversupply of labor in the building trades; he may join the Democrats in opposing a protective tariff; and he may become a convert to Christian Science.

The sentiment of common descent, which cements atomic family groups into molecular kinship groups in primitive society, weakens with the decay of the clan. With the substitution of economic for kinship ties in the subgroups of which national folkgroups

are compounded there is a tendency, illustrated by the lengthening of the celibate period, and by the increase of divorce, for the atoms themselves to disintegrate. The growth of individualism, one of whose manifestations is the spread of liberty in modern times, may be looked upon as an expression of the universal centrifugal or radiant forces of Nature, and while deplored by many as a menace to social well-being is nevertheless always to be reckoned with. It will be noticed in all of the cognate relations of conduct, both moral and industrial, in the later chapters of this essay.

Society in its evolution, therefore, progresses with its family atoms through the various molecular and compound folkgroup-structures of the clan, the tribe and the nation from savagery to civilization. These changes of structure are caused by the efforts of the folkgroup to protect itself from the forces of famine, war and industrial rivalry by which its integrity is continually threatened. As the folkgroup reaches its higher stages of development the first two of these forces are diminishing, while the latter is increasing in power. The rise of subgroups of the industrial type and their gradual substitution for those of the kinship type are, therefore, leading characteristics of civilization.

But modern society is more than an aggregation of groups held together by definite attractive forces; they are bound together in a net of interdependent relationships which suggest an organism.

Affinities of
Biological
and Social
structure

It is true that biological as well as physical or chemical analogies help us better to understand the interrelations of the subgroups in which men and women are always joined together, as well as their relations to the more highly organized social structures of the folkgroups of which they are a part; and that the lessons of anatomy and physiology are helpful in interpreting the sequential order and laws of growth, which are disclosed by the Science of Society. Note, for example, the similarity of the sociological family to the cell which is the unit of biological structure. Each has functions of assimilation, growth and reproduction. It is in the type of grouping in either instance that its phase of progress is expressed; and from such group types, become subgroups, are constructed compound groups or organisms by which functions other than those possible to its units are successfully assumed, and obstacles surmounted by which the unit would have been impounded. Clans have their analogues in the simpler multicellular animal organisms composed of cells almost alike, subsisting on the food in their immediate neighborhood. In either instance any of the units may be indifferently replaced so far as its function goes by any other unit of the community. And so, through the slowly growing complexity of the invertebrates, or of the tribal system in which, through the segregation of subgroups of cells, or subgroups of families, as the case may be, simple organs are by degrees formed for the performance

of special functions. Arrangements for self-defense and for organized pursuit of food are in either case characteristic acquisitions of this period. And, finally, in the more highly developed national groups and vertebrate animals we find that organization of highly specialized and dissimilar subgroups, each composed of relatively similar cells or families, all of which are interconnected, and dependent upon each other as well as on the whole.

For in society, as in the living body, differentiation and division of labor are the results of progressive evolution. As the division of labor becomes more complete, family atoms combined into specialized industrial subgroups lose by degrees their relative capacity for existence independent of the folkgroup. Industrial subgroups in our cities are so dependent upon the transportation subgroup, for example, that a famine would result if railway connections were cut off for a week. They are so dependent upon the water supply subgroup that they would be obliged to emigrate in two days if their facilities in this direction were cut off. In severe weather many habitations would be wrecked if the plumber subgroup were to go on strike. Some foreign cities have had experience of the inconvenience, if not of the distress, caused by a refusal of the baking subgroup to perform its functions. And what disorder and destruction have always followed any interruption in the service of the police, such as is produced by an earthquake or other overwhelming catastrophe. Like the

Evolution of functional organization

Division of labor

Organic nature of industrial groups

Dependency on
Institutional
organization

animal body the nation is a union of parts, specialized and dissimilar in function, each composed of relatively similar elements interconnected and dependent upon each other and upon the whole. The subgroups within the national folkgroup grow to be dependent upon other groups constituted by its governing authorities to perform certain functions essential to its integrity, such as armies, navies, courts of law, post offices and the like. Economic subgroups, banks, exchanges, merchants, etc., are so necessary that city subgroups would suffer hardship and loss, and perhaps be obliged to disintegrate, if the prompt exchange of products, which they effect, were seriously impeded.

Functional
diseases of
the social
organism

This interdependence of subgroups upon other subgroups and of all on the folkgroup has a close likeness to the interdependence of functional organs in the human body, in that their uninterrupted operation, like that of the heart, the brain or the stomach in the body, is essential to the existence of the prevailing type of folkgroup, and without them civilization would speedily retrograde. Between all of the subgroups there is constant action and interaction, and a disruptive force applied to one of them, as to the motormen, or the butchers, or the firemen, will affect all of the others in the same way that a piece of infected food taken into the human stomach will set up a typhoid, a dysentery or a ptomaine poisoning, which may easily overwork the secretions, paralyze the motor centers, irritate the

heart, accelerate the respiration and possibly end in complete collapse. And so, like those of the body, social diseases originating in one subgroup affect the entire social constitution, giving pathological as well as physical symptoms to enrich the analogies by which the origin and function of the social bodies may be better understood. Is there a reality behind these analogies? Is society, or are societies, structurally as well as comparatively organic? It may well be that some higher conception will eventually be formed that may stand to the organic world in the same relation that the organic stands to the physical and that through such a superorganic conception we shall more completely understand the social. Or we may find that after all the folkgroup is only a big animal, a Leviathan,¹ to whose body we can apply the laws of biological formation and growth. Our present imperfect knowledge need make no answer to these important questions, which may well be referred to our successors for determination.

The process by which the more complex folk-groups are evolved from the simpler compounds of the clan is by almost imperceptible change, continually adjusting them with slight changes in their environment. Folkgroup environment is duplex; it consists first of out-conditions; climatic and physiographic, floral, faunal and heteroethnic;² and second,

Is there identity in these analogies?

¹ Hobbes (1651) "the multitude so united in one person * * * * called a commonwealth."

² That is, of outgroups of people.

of the reactions of in-conditions or folk forces; i.e., those within the folkgroup which manifest themselves in habits, usages and customs; and adjust the way of life of the folk to emotional, political or economical conditions, which have been formed among the subgroups as reactions from the out-conditions which form their direct environment. Of these latter forces we shall hear further in succeeding lectures.

Folkgroup
types or
social
phases

The Clan
a kinship
group

In our sketch of the method and content of social evolution we have now seen that from the family, the unit group of all social combinations, held together by the instinct of reproduction, have successively arisen three fairly distinct phases or types of compound societies which we have chosen to call folkgroups, each of which has at a given time and place been the prevailing type of human association. Each phase is broadly characterized by the predominance of a distinctive arrangement, into which its families are cast, and by the predominance in each of a certain coherent force, by which the type is distinguished. Earliest in the sequence of folkgroups is the clan; which in structure is, like the chemical molecule, an assemblage of similar atoms; or like many multicellular protozoans, parazoans or enterocœlans, a colony of undifferentiated unicellular units. The coherent force by which it is held together is the next strongest to that of reproduction—the sentiment of common descent. The clan folkgroup is stable, enduring, difficult of

decomposition, slow to enter into combination with other molecules; conservatism personified.

In the second social phase the clans have become subgroups of a more complex folkgroup, the tribe; and thereby men of one kin have been brought into friendly social relations with men of other kin. From the biological standpoint, the tribe may compare with many of the forms of multicellular organisms between the coelenterates and vertebrates, and especially with those whose similar segments, distinguished by rudimentary functional differences, are arranged bilaterally, longitudinally or radiately with reference to a common axis or center. In structure, tribes are more diverse in type and in differentiation of function than the folkgroups below them, being nature's experiments³ on the way to the evolution of the family unit into a nation. In the tribe diverse social molecules are combined into a social compound, just as the elements in their molecular proportions go together to make a chemical compound.

The tribe is a folkgroup uniting previously existing folkgroups for common defense and aggression against other folkgroups. Efficiency in war seems to be the coherent force that compels this combination and holds it in durable compacts; and yet their units at first recognize a higher loyalty to kin than to their fellow tribesmen and the tribal compound is less

³ This has an anthropomorphic ring which I did not intend; but as it is a fairly good simile I will let it stand.

stable than the clan molecule—just as inorganic compounds are less stable than the molecular bases and acids of which they are composed.

The
Nation a
peace
group

In the third social phase the necessities of peace predominate. Industrial efficiency takes the place of war as the agent determining the coherence and combinations of atoms into molecular groups. Friendly feeling is protracted beyond the limits of kinship groups to much larger, much more complex combinations of dissimilar social molecules, which, owing to the comparative ease with which they may be decomposed and recombined, present many of the characteristics of the organic chemical compound. Trade is the carbon which differentiates the organic national from the inorganic kinship folkgroup. The nation is a great folkgroup pacifying and amalgamating the lesser kinship war groups of preceding periods, whose adverse interests had formerly made them antagonistic one to the other. In the nation the clan dissolves, and the atoms recombine into other molecular groups of an industrial type in which the coherent force of a common economic interest takes the place of interest in a common ancestor.

Character-
ized by
Trade

Biologically, the nation is like an organism of the vertebrate type in that each of its constituent industrial subgroups performs a specialized function, and is interdependent upon other subgroups, with which it is compounded. In it the family or social unit cell may be and generally is affiliated with sev-

eral subgroups, reacting to their influence alternately with continually lessened resistance to changes, whether these arise within or without the subgroups. While a folkgroup of the lower order and organization, like the clan, well resists many disruptive influences and is static rather than progressive, the nation folkgroups are dynamic and progressive in direct ratio to the complexity of their structure. Modern nations are, therefore, in a state of continual flux and change, and in progress along evolutionary lines at a rate directly proportioned to the product of their subgroup complexity with the rapidity of environmental change.

We have now learned:

- I. That Ethics is the science of right and wrong human conduct as manifested toward others.
- II. That conduct toward others exists only in a society, whose roots and first development are found in zoölogical groups antedating the evolution of man.
- III. That men in Society are drawn together in groups; that of these a Folkgroup is the largest which at any given time or place is united by a sentiment of common interest, and whether Clan, Tribe or Nation, is evolved and survives because of its efficiency at that time in promoting the common interest; eventually giving way to a more efficient type.
- IV. That in evolution the Folkgroup progresses toward a more complex type; composed of sub-

groups growing constantly more interdependent, and more dependent upon the Folkgroup.

V. Society in all its phases is in motion rather than standing still; its line of progress being determined by the resultant obtained from the interaction of a constantly changing outer environment and of the folk forces within the group.

III

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT

In the evolution of society, which is always Review of organized into groups, there is a constant change and Social growth in their structure in the course of evolution Evolution from savagery to civilization.

The fundamental, theoretically indivisible, group is the family, held together by the reproductive and parental instincts.

Through the feeling of descent from a common ancestor, out of a number of families is compounded the clan, a folkgroup bound together by kinship ties.

Heteroethnic aggression compels a number of clans to consolidate into the folkgroup of a tribe for self-defense and self-assertion. Efficiency in war is the tribal bond. Some of its clans may begin to perform industrial functions.

Nations are folkgroups which are compounds of clans and tribes after industrial development has so far progressed as to make clear the need for a wider internal peace. Efficiency in peace is the national bond.

There is a general similitude between the physical constitution of matter and the constitution of social groups; families being akin to atoms, clans to mole-

cules, tribes to inorganic compounds, and nations, more feebly coherent, to the organic compounds of chemistry. And biologically there is a similar resemblance between families and cells, clans and simple multicellular organisms, tribes and the lower forms of animal life, nations and the vertebrates.

Behavior, a type of subconscious action

Physiological and psychological studies show us that some modes of common human activity are not conduct, because they are either involuntary or else not consciously adapted to ends. Uniform behavior they are, however, and therefore may be classified.

Tropisms

In the first of these modes, human action is the direct outcome of physical and chemical activity, the effect of which upon the body is the same that it would have upon any other mass of matter of a similar physical or chemical constitution. Tropisms, as they are termed by biologists, the simplest and most primitive of all modes of action, are the direct reactions of organisms to their environment. They characterize all life, and are the typical behavior modes of its lowest order. In them are included internal bodily processes such as digestion or secretion, in so far as they are the result of chemical reactions; and also the acts directly occasioned by the physical forces of nature, such as gravity, heat, light, electricity, and the movement of wind and water. Normally we are unconscious of these reactions, whose incidence extends over all material objects, inanimate or animate. This lowest mode of behavior is typical of the pre-ganglionic orders of

nervous life; the subkingdoms below the arthropods, and is the foundation upon which all higher modes of activity are built.

A second mode is that shown in the nervous reflexes; involuntary acts common to the post-ganglionic orders of animate nature, and in man produced by any irritation or excitation, through the afferent nerves, of the ganglia or nervous centers of the body. The modes of nervous action, taken together with tropisms, enable us to complete the functions of secretion and digestion; excite sneezing when an irritating substance has been inbreathed, or winking when our eye is threatened with a blow, or weeping when an insect blows into it. In all of the reflex acts there is a reaction between matter and nervous constitution. To carry out our system of classification we might say that our reflex actions are tropisms co-ordinated by the ganglionic centers. Reflex modes of action are common to all animal life except the lower orders of invertebrates, are uniform in any given race or breed; they are unconsidered, unconsciously performed, although we may subsequently be aware of their effects.

The third mode of uniform behavior is the result of instinct, a higher grade of activity than that of reflexes, and, common to all the higher animals, is especially noticeable in those whose nervous ganglia have become co-ordinated through the development of one chief ganglion into a brain. Instinct appears to be a form of impulse derived from the primordial

Instincts in
Man

tissues of experience of the race; a composite picture of what behavior has resulted in its well-being and preservation and therefore has been so impressed upon its nervous system as to be transmitted with it by inheritance from one generation to another. The emotions aroused by the instincts of animals are expressed therefore by automatic actions, as, for instance, in dogs by wagging the tail, by growling, by howling and by fawning. They turn about before lying down to sleep, they bury a surplus of their food supply, they carry their puppies by the scruff of the neck. The cause of animal instinct is the pressure of natural environment, the habitual modes of action being those that have better fitted their original possessors to survive and propagate; while those in whom they are wanting have more easily succumbed to their enemies or to other adverse forces. They can neither be eradicated from the mental constitution, of which they are innate elements, nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetimes. A number of instincts persist through the range of the upper mammals and form the foundation, as it were, of a superstructure of conscious conduct which is built upon them by man. Such are those known to psychologists as the primary instincts of flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-abasement and self-assertion, reproduction, acquisition, construction and the parental and gregarious instincts, all of which are the birthrights of our race by virtue of its descent from the beasts.

There are, therefore, three distinct modes of uniform action or behavior which mankind shares with all life below; tropisms, the direct reactions of the organisms to external forces, typical of the lower invertebrates; reflexes, the responses of the subconscious nervous system to the stimulus of such reactions, typical of the higher invertebrates; and instinctive, the co-ordination of reflexes by the brain, typical of the vertebrates. The distinguishing feature of all of the acts so directed is that in them the actor is unconscious of the purpose of his act—he is behaving involuntarily and naturally. And for the purpose of keeping these three behavior phases distinct from a higher series I propose to call them Natureways.

Anthropological research has demonstrated a similar evolution of uniform modes of conduct, by which life in any given social group is regulated through the manners, customs, usages, habits or laws prevalent therein.

A consideration of human conduct makes it apparent that in addition to the natureways we have a common mode of action which governs the vast preponderance of all our volitional acts, which like those of an instinctive origin are unconsidered, almost involuntary; being decided for us long in advance of their performance. Unlike natureways this mode is not born in us, but is acquired from imitation of others, or from well-established habits learned from our elders and associates. We rarely

Conduct,
an acquired
mode

Folkways

question these acts; in fact, we are in large measure unaware of their existence, and not having consciously observed them have never considered their why or wherefore. How many of us have seriously wondered why we get up in the morning, and not at noon or night, why we wash, dress, shoe our feet with leather and proceed to eat breakfast? We pass through the day doing a large number of acts of which we are very imperfectly conscious, but which we could change if we had any desire to do so. Why do we put on underclothes and then cover them carefully so that no one shall see them, and why do we never think of going into the street in them, except in a nightmare? Why do our men cover their legs with trousers, and not with a petticoat? In Turkey men wear skirts and the women trousers. Why, in fact, do we cover ourselves at all, especially in hot weather? Why do we feel compelled, at a public breakfast table, to refrain from sitting down in our shirt sleeves; to eat with a knife and fork instead of with our fingers, or to drink a hot drink from a cup or bowl and a cold one from a glass? Imagine the confusion which would result if for points like these there were no settled convention, which, carried through a single day, guides our conduct in uncounted thousands of ways. What would happen had we to exercise a conscious choice on all such points, and on all occasions? Probably we should be finishing breakfast about nine o'clock at night, thoroughly exhausted, and in such a frame of mind that we

could hardly determine whether to sit down to luncheon or go to bed. Our conduct in all these matters is fortunately predetermined for us by habits, sentiments and methods of thought, which, when we begin consciously to observe them, we find we have acquired in common with all the members of our group. They are the basis of economies in the use of our time which permit us as group members to do something besides those acts by which we perform the most necessary functions of life. Called by Sumner folkways, few words have ever been devised that so well illuminate their own meaning.

The folkways, however, could not have been Origin of acquired had it not been for the primeval group, the folkways family. In it the mother teaches her child its habitual modes of action at so youthful an age that it forgets that it has ever learned them. Thus originated, folkways are promoted and extended as the family is merged into the clan or kinship group, and the child unconsciously imitates the manners and habits of its seniors as they are brought to its observation. The members of the clan esteem those who have ways of acting similar to theirs; they unconsciously dislike others who have dissimilar ways; and the forces of approbation and reprobation thus exerted by the group are brought to bear through psychical suggestion upon the susceptible, eagerly absorbing minds of the children. It is obvious that if there were no social life there would be few folk-

ways; or rather each would be obliged to form his own habits with a terrible waste of time and energy. Certain folkways are common to all peoples; a larger number prevail within the nation; more still are considered as binding upon subgroups like those of fashionable society, or on industrial subgroups such as farmers, or blacksmiths; but the largest number of common habits are found among the members of the unit group—the family. In any given state of civilization the prevalence and obligation of the folkways are therefore in inverse ratio to the size of the group. The folkways are not the same in different places; not alike in the same place at different times, nor as between different subgroups of the same folkgroup.

Uncon-
sidered

Folkways are unconsidered, habitual, uniform modes of action or customs practiced by men under group conditions and are the result of efforts to satisfy interests arising out of the four great primary motives, Hunger, Love, Vanity and Fear. Folkways are built upon the foundation of natureways, but differ from them in that through imitation and education they are acquired in the family- and folk-groups. By origin they are therefore nurtural rather than natural, and are the first term of a new series of conduct modes; whose characteristic is that they are not inherited but taught. This series may be referred to properly as Nurtureways.

Folkways are therefore nurtureways intelligently taught but irrationally practiced by man, and even

in a rudimentary way shared by some of his higher animal associates. They might almost be described as acquired instincts. An illustration of their persistency is afforded by the ineffectual efforts of Peter the Great to force the Russians to shave off their beards; they, however, preferring to submit to any form of punishment rather than yield.

An interesting instance is found in the custom of Kissing a kissing, which counts for a great deal in our folkways. It is regarded with disgust by the Chinese and Japanese, it is unknown to the Polynesians, the Africans or the South Americans. On the other hand the males of the Latin races publicly osculate each other more liberally and ostentatiously than our own wives or sweethearts. In Europe, and even in sober England during and just after the Middle Ages, the custom was far more extended than it is anywhere today. The learned Erasmus, who came to lecture at Oxford University in 1499, and who visited in many of the great houses of the day, was amazed at the freedom of the English ladies, whom he described as "divinely pretty and too good natured." "They have," he wrote, "an excellent custom among them, that wherever you go the girls kiss you. They kiss you when you come, they kiss you when you go, they kiss you at intervening opportunities; and their lips are soft, warm and delicious." These ladies evidently kissed the professor in sublime unconsciousness of the fact that their delightful custom was not a part of the folkways in which he had been

Discussion
of it

brought up, or that he might find anything in the practice to disturb his philosophic calm. During the next two centuries, however, doubts seem to have arisen as to the expediency of so free a use of this form of salutation. It became the subject of widespread discussion. It is popularly supposed to have been ostracised by that phase of the reformed religion which we call Puritanism. The kissing games, which were once played by adults, have by custom become restricted to young children. Among the educated groups the notion has gradually spread that indiscriminate kissing is contrary to social welfare and that it should not be approved.

Its decline

The prevalence of this folkway, its rise into rational consciousness through discussion, its disapproval as contrary to welfare, and its final prohibition are typical of the evolution from the folkways of a second mode of nurtureways; customs of which the group is no longer unconscious, to which are gradually attached the idea of welfare, and which are therefore subject to approval or disapproval.

Folk-
customs or
mores

As a conscious custom of the people this class derived from folkways might well be designated as Folk-custom; a more expressive and useful term, I think, than the Latin word *mores*, adapted by Sumner to distinguish them.¹ To say that the group members have become conscious of their folk-

¹ The word *mores* has no convenient singular; a fact that in many associations is compulsive of circumlocution. It lacks the linguistic flexibility of the word *custom*, to which the idea we wish

customs means that they talk about them and find reasons satisfactory to themselves for connecting Social them with social welfare or mischief. forces

When by this process the folkgroup is agreed that a certain folk-custom is necessary to its welfare it puts forth all its powers, both of persuasion and force, to provide motives for its observance by all its members. To this end it uses all the arts of suggestion through myths, poems, symbols, pictures, watchwords, catchwords, epithets, phrases, the exhortation of priests and the eloquence of statesmen. In many subtle forms the subconscious forces of resentful or kindly folk-feeling, even unexpressed in words, will excite in the consciousness of one group member, like an induced current of electricity, a counterpart to the emotions formed in the brain of his fellow. To suggestion and persuasion unorganized society adds two potent forces, approbation and reprobation. Upon those who obey it confers popularity, distinctions, titles, decorations, offices and other marks of its favor. To those who fail to follow these, its unwritten rules of conduct, or who disregard its taboos, it deals out unpopularity, ostracism, public disapproval, condemnation, avoidances, excommunications, disgrace, persecutions, lynchings, punishments, death.

Failing to accomplish its purpose through appro-

to express has already become attached by the usage of a long line of writers on jurisprudence, as well as of many successful exponents of sociology.

Institutions

bation or reprobation, the leaders of the folkgroup devise institutions, which through certain machinery, such as laws, courts and prisons, are designed to supply extra motives in a definite and orderly but often brutal way through duress and death, for the conformity of all to such folk-customs as are considered most essential to its welfare, and from which it endeavors to make "dissent so dangerous that no one will dare to express it." Thus it is that the folk-customs of any time or place become obligatory upon the group and are generally followed by its members.

Transplan-
tation from
group to
group

In the small, compact kinship group the compulsion of a common environment toward uniform folk-customs is naturally stronger than in the more loosely bound tribal or national folkgroups and is somewhat dependent upon the degree to which the clan is isolated from its neighbors. Free circulation of its members among other folkgroups may lead the travelers to question any folk-custom of their own which they deem less well fitted to their conditions and needs than is that of some outgroup, and may bring it back within the realm of discussion; from which process a gradual change in some folk-custom may arise. The strong folk-feeling by which folk-customs are supported and changes disfavored was well observed in Bacon's wise counsel to one returning home; that he "let it appear that he doth not change his country manners for those of foreign parts, but only prick in some flowers of that he hath learned abroad into the customs of his country."

And thus, while the folkway is the first step up from the natureways, being instinct plus nurture or acquisition, the folk-custom is yet a second step on the same evolutionary ladder, being folkway plus rational group consciousness. Through these natureways behavior—action not volitional—rises into conduct—volitional action adjusted to an end.

Roughly corresponding to the phases of the evolution of society are the action-modes of instinct, folkway and folk-custom in the evolution of conduct. Instinct, the prevalent unconscious rule of conduct in upper animal life, results from the pressure of natural environment and survives in the more fundamental impulses of our own behavior. Folkways, the primitive, unconsidered rules of intelligent conduct, emerge from instinct in the higher animals, have their greatest power in the family and the clan, and like these groups themselves are a result of the pressure of both natural and social environment. Folk-customs demand a still higher intelligence and a higher social organization and are folkways become conscious through the attribution of social welfare. Emerging from the folkways in the clan, folk-custom, by generating a sense of subordination to a common welfare, promotes survival of the tribe in war, and is the result of forces working both within and without the folkgroup—of structure as well as environment.

It will be observed that small and compact groups have a greater number of common interests than

Incidence
of folk-
custom

large ones whose members are widely scattered. The larger number of items of common welfare arising from these interests produces a larger mass of folk-customs in a small group than in a large one. As the social forces of suggestion, of approbation and of reprobation, can be much more powerfully expressed in the kinship or industrial group, with its daily and constant contact of group members, than they can be in the mass of more scattered aggregations of such groups into tribes or nations, it follows that the incidence and obligation of folk-custom (in so far as it is controlled by unorganized forces) in any given state of civilization are like those of the folkways, in inverse ratio to the size of the group. Folk-customs are the result of a conscious effort to adapt the conduct of the folkgroup to its environment, as the organization of institutions is a conscious effort to adapt its structure to its surroundings, and Discovery or Invention a conscious effort through art or craft to adapt the environment to its needs.

Differences
of folk-
custom
Slavery

Like the folkways, folk-custom is not the same in different places, nor alike in the same place at different times, and differs as between co-existing groups. Slavery, the ownership of one human being by another, which we have rejected as a folk-custom, was approved by the ancients and probably as much by slaves as by masters. It existed as an inheritance from the Roman Empire everywhere in Europe for the first thirteen centuries of the Christian Era.

Even the Church did nothing for its suppression, ecclesiastics being oftentimes large owners of slaves. Associated To it was due the leisure which enabled the Hebrew with leisure to become pre-eminent in literature and poetry, the Greek in art and philosophy, the Roman in politics, public works and conquest. While in Europe the work of emancipation was for the most part completed in the fourteenth century, slavery was still a folk-custom in Scotland in the coal mines until 1775, and in the salt mines until 1799. In a few of the German principalities it survived until Discussion 1848. At the time of the formation of our Constitution the relation of the slave folk-custom to welfare was questioned, and was rejected by the Northern States of the Union, who had no economic interest in it. And yet it prevailed in New York until 1840, while in New Jersey the census of 1860 showed eighteen slaves out of a population of 672,000. At that time slavery was justified by the folk-custom of the Southern States, whose people based upon it their ideal of social welfare, in the belief that without it cotton, the basis of their economic prosperity, could not be grown. The Civil War was Persistence the final arbitrament of a discussion which had lasted of more than three quarters of a century, and as its Folk-custom result the Northern States imposed their free labor folk-custom upon their Southern brethren. But even now, after a half century of attempted readjustment, many of the folkways growing in and out of slavery survive so long as the subject race and the

master race are obliged to live alongside of one another. Laws and other institutions which disregard such folk-customs as are founded upon the welfare of the Southern people or of its leading groups are difficult of enforcement; for no legislation can make wrong that conduct of which everybody capable of self-expression approves. Where a folkgroup feels itself strong it will always revolt from an attempt to impose upon it an alien folk-custom, and declare, as in the Dutch manifesto of 1581 and the Declaration of Independence of 1776, that governments derive their only justification from the consent of the governed.

Character-
istics of
Natureways

Of
Nurture-
ways

In the evolution of conduct, therefore, an examination of the movements or acts of the human organism leads us to believe that their uniformities can be grouped first in two great classes. The first of these are Natureways, composed of tropisms, reflexes and instincts, whose origin is material and involuntary, arising from the constitution of matter or from the known forces operating therein, are transmitted from generation to generation, are exercised without conscious choice on our part, resulting in behavior; *naturally*. The second great class are Nurtureways, whose origin is intelligent; psychological; either consciously taught, or consciously practiced; the subject of choice; never inherent but always acquired, and dependent upon social or group forces for their origin and continued existence. All modes of behavior or conduct have a general ten-

dency toward motion or change along evolutionary lines, in proportion to and in unison with changes in the orders of Life, with which they co-exist.

The nurtureways in their expression result in conduct, voluntary action adapted to ends. Of them we have so far recognized two modes; the first, folkways, unconsidered, habitual, uniform modes of action practiced by men who acquire them in the family and folkgroups. From the folkway is evolved the folk-custom, after the group has become conscious of a feeling that it is essential to its welfare, conformity to which it enforces with all its powers. As typical of Society, the modes of the Relativity Natureways roughly correspond to the phases of social evolution; of which they are first the result, and then by reaction, the cause.

It is in the folk-custom mode of nurtureways, collectively sometimes also called *mores*, that we find the germs of morality, whose origin and growth will be discussed in the next lecture.

modes to
social
phases

IV

THE EVOLUTION OF MORALS

Natureways

In the consideration of behavior we found that in its gradual progress from involuntary and unconscious action, arising out of physical forces or chemical reactions, to the first beginnings of conscious conduct actuated by design, there are two great classes into which we can assort acts. The first being the product of natural forces without assistance from the self, submental in origin, can be called natureways and typically arises from the contact of animal life with its environment.

Nurture-
ways

The second great group of common human modes of action are acquired instead of inherited, volitional rather than involuntary, and gradually rise out of subconsciousness into the rational through various degrees of decision or judgment applied to them by the actor. Never "natural" and always "nurtural" the title "nurtureways" seems not unfitting.

Folkways

Of these the most primitive mode is that of the folkways. Unconscious, habitual, uniform modes of acting, they call for little or no effort of choice, judgment or will, and arise from the instinctive feelings of hunger, love, vanity and fear; acquired by imitation they are rudimentary in the higher animals, and reach their highest potency in the

smaller and more primitive groups, such as families and clans.

The next higher mode of human conduct is that of folk-custom; folkways of which the folkgroup has become conscious; recognized as necessary to the welfare of the group, and enforced by it through various artifices more or less intelligently devised to that end. Conformity with folk-custom is approved by the folkgroup as right, while its breach is condemned as wrong. Notions of right and wrong as applied to conduct, therefore, grow out of the approval or disapproval which the group visits upon those who respect or disregard the uniform modes of conduct which it looks upon as essential to its welfare.

Folkways and folk-customs embody the results of man's intelligence and observation through centuries of experiments in the art of how to live and satisfy his instincts with the least effort. Faculties the most recently developed are always those that involve the most effort in their exercise; and the greatest and most fatiguing work that falls to the lot of man is the exercise of choice and judgment. And so the folkways are the outcome of an instinctive desire to adjust life to environment along those lines that call for the least constant output of choice and judgment.

In spite of the resistance of folkway and folk-custom to change, owing to mental effort involved in new choices, it must not for a moment be supposed that the ways and customs of the folk are fixed,

Folkways
co-ordinate
Life along
lines of
least
resistance

Mutability
in stability

crystallized or immutable; the dead hand of antiquity throttling a virile race in its struggles to gain higher happiness through a nicer adjustment of life to constantly changing environment. But folk-custom says to the individual or to the subgroup—You shall not pursue your advantage at the expense of the folkgroup. The persistent force of folk-custom is more than an anthropological curiosity, although some reformers would persuade us that its only function is to resist a worshipful movement called Progress. We have become conscious of the existence of folk-customs, it is true, through their study among ancient and primitive peoples. But it does not follow that they are of no service to the modern State. Old they may be, but not always outworn; like the Archean rocks they may still yield the richest ores for the making of the social part of man's machinery of efficiency.

Constant
evolution
and
devolution
of Nurture-
ways

In modern society both folkways and folk-customs exist in all stages of life, growth and decay; they are born, pass from youth to maturity, and die daily. Once attained, the sociological view of life gives insight for the perception and classification of these uniform sequences of conduct of which, in the main, we are as unconscious as we are of the wonderful and brilliant bird life which scintillates in the forest, hidden behind its shade to those who know not how and where to look.

The most striking attribute of folk-custom is that it can make anything right and protect anything from

condemnation. Moreover, the same conduct may be prohibited by the custom of one group and permitted by that of another.

Slavery, for example, exists today by social approval in Turkey, Morocco, in many isolated districts of the Asiatic and African colonies and in Mexico. Folk-custom in the tribe of Israel commended the conduct of Samuel in hewing to pieces his unarmed captive Agag, king of the Amalekites, by the direction of the Lord (I Sam. xv. 32, 33), and likewise the slaughter by the Hebrews of the helpless women captured from the Midianites (Num. xxi.), although such conduct would be condemned by our folk-custom today as criminal and wrong. Folk-custom sanctions the Sunday theater in Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans and prohibits it in Boston, New York and Philadelphia. It permits the sale of a cigar on Sunday in Washington and makes it a crime in Charlotte, N. C.

Confusing as the discordance of folk-customs may seem to those who observe their wide divergences under differences of time and space, they are none the less capable of being studied, compared and grouped, and from their mandates or prohibitions with respect to particular acts men have in the course of time rudely drawn general rules covering groups of acts; and these rules are the beginning of morals. A moral rule is only an artifice of the mind to simplify the daily discovery of what particular conduct is right or wrong, according to folk-custom,

Incompatibility of ancient and modern Folk-custom

Folk-cus-
tom can be
Classified

And
becomes
the source
of Morals

Right, Duty
and
Obligation

with the least expenditure of effort. To its enforcement the controlling coercive influence of the folk-group is extended; and every act embraced by the moral rule is as surely approved or reprobated as were the particular acts from which the rule was drawn. From moral rules are drawn the concepts of rights and duties. Rights are nothing more than conduct which one member of the group has the *right to expect* from another member of the same group. And duty is simply a right turned round; the conduct which the other group member is obligated to perform. Thus, as in law, a moral right, taken together with a moral duty, forms a moral obligation.

Ethical
principle
from Moral
obligations

Ethical principles are general statements of what is moral, i.e., right, and due our fellows, drawn from the comparison and classification of those obligations prescribed by folk-custom as binding upon all the members of the folkgroup. The evolution of an ethical principle can be made apparent by a consideration of some one set of moral obligations in their historical sequence through the various phases of social evolution. Take for instance the rights of property and the wrong of theft.

Property is
rights—

Property, it must be observed, does not consist at all of material objects, but of the various *rights* of use, control and disposal which persons exercise with regard to their possessions. To begin with, the simplest right which one may have with respect to anything is to use it. And although he may have the

right to use, he may neither be able to control it for —of Use his continued enjoyment, nor for qualified disposal, such as to lend or to hire. Nor do the rights of use —of and control necessarily confer the right of absolute Control disposal, either (a) by exchange, that is to say by —of sale and delivery, (b) by gift, (c) by bequest or Disposal other testamentary process or (d) by a contract to sell and deliver at a future time. As a corollary to these rights there are the cognate rights of acquisition; by plunder, by discovery, by fabrication, by inheritance or by exchange.

The primitive foundations of property rights are undoubtedly laid in the instinct of acquisition which Acquisitive humanity inherits from its animal forebears, and instinct in from whose influence it cannot escape. It shares this animals innate tendency with the squirrel who lays by a store of nuts against the winter, with the bird who defends its nest, or the bee which both stores the honey and stings the invader of its hive. Such primitive fore-runners of property rights are hardly more than an assertion of the right to defend them, for except among the developed group life of the bee there is no acknowledgment of a corresponding duty to respect the right of the hoarder or the builder, and therefore no completed obligation.

In the life of the child the outcropping of the Its instinct of acquisition may be observed at a very expression tender age; before in fact the infant is capable of in expressing emotion other than in the crudest way; child life but in its promptings we may unquestionably find

the source of its later potency in the folkways and folk-customs of the successive social groupings, in each of which the evolution of property rights has its co-ordinate phase.

Community
of family
goods

In the primitive family group individual property rights, except that of use, were practically undeveloped; the folkway being for the group members to make common use of its various possessions. As the group was industrially self-sufficing there was no occasion for disposal by exchange save in case of famine. The family head, the father or mother, had during lifetime only a titular right of control exercised for and on behalf of the group, descending automatically according to the folkways governing primitive inheritances; but without the right of testation or disposal; and in the rare cases when exchanges were required folk-custom established a groupal right to share the proceeds. When by separation of some of its members a new family was established, a rough partition of the common stock of goods was accomplished, as in the classic instance of Jacob and Laban. Under these circumstances there could be no theft within the group. The survival in Roman civilization of the *Patria potestas* is an enlightening instance of the persistence in culture of the shadowy folkways of control prevailing in a much earlier social type. Common family property rights exist to some degree to the present time; what family man has not suffered the inconvenience of unauthorized appropriation of his dress suit, his

shoes, his shirt studs or cuff buttons, with no sense of wrongfulness or shame by his children or his brethren? The rudimentary idea of a community of goods universal among primitive people still survives in the developing mind of the child; to whom it is not robbery to take and use a part of what his ancestors would have considered as common goods.

In the clan folkgroup, dominated by the interest of kin, the folk-customs surrounding common use of the joint product continued; each member had rights Limited of use in the game, flocks and herds and fruits of the control-field, still the result of joint effort. But the folkways rights in permitted individual or family control of weapons clans of the chase, of war, of hunting dogs trained by members, and possibly of some kinds of rude tools, of which others, like grain crushers, were still the Commu-property of the clan. Within family lines the folk- nism in ways preserved the earlier strict rules of succession disposal for the common stock of family goods, which prohibited disposal by gift, exchange or bequest. Ex-changes, if made, were communal; members of out-groups, strangers, could neither hold nor inherit any sort of property rights. With environmental conditions that made for scarcity of food began the exchange of products by plunder, an inciting cause perhaps of the petty wars that led on the one hand to eventual subjection and slavery, and on the other hand to that folk-custom of clan alliances which eventuated in the formation of tribes.

The tribe, therefore, came into its own with folk-

Decline of ways of family communism, a less complete clan communism, and the beginnings of a folk-custom asserting rights of continuous personal control over certain classes of articles for enjoyment as well as for qualified disposal, i.e., lending or hiring within the limits of the tribal peace. The greater division of labor within tribal bounds naturally overthrew the self-sufficing industrial life of the pre-existing clans; there were commodities in excess here, in short supply there. There was need for exchange. The folk-custom already countenanced plunder; hence it was no theft to rob an outgroup. When exhausted by war, tribes who normally would shun reciprocal intercourse, feigned to conform with this folkway by taking a quantity of their common goods to the border and leaving them there in the trust that so easy a conformity with the plunder folkway would tend to reciprocity. And so it was that the advantages of exchange were brought into consciousness and neutral grounds were established on contiguous borders, and by joint folk-custom days agreed upon for the conduct of exchanges in a primitive market. Mercury, the god alike of plunder, of travel and of trade, represented mythically the associations which clustered about these age-long customs.

As intertribal commerce grew the kinship sub-groups began to produce specialized products; and the developing tribe, finding an economic loss involved in communistic exchange, adapted its folk-custom so as to acknowledge a right of disposal of

their products by the subgroups themselves. Meantime, the growing use of tools and the demand for more effective weapons had gradually attached some of the rights of disposal to the earlier folk-custom recognizing individual rights of use and control of these implements. In a ruder and more primitive age weapons and tools had been buried with him who had enjoyed in them the primitive rights of use and control; but as such implements grew more complex and more valuable folk-custom attached to them the right of gift or bequest, at first confined to kin, then extended to all tribal members. Meantime, folk-customs were growing which established private rights of use, control and disposal in booty resulting from the plunder of an outgroup by an individual, or the tools, etc., used, made or inherited by him. As facilities for market exchanges increased it could not be but that thrifty industrials should be allowed similar rights in purchased goods.

The private ownership of land is unrecognized amongst groups which in civilization have not passed beyond the hunting and grazing stages of subsistence; at first boundaries are recognized to communal domains, and later a more definite folkgroup interest in the area which boundaries circumscribe, combined with a capacity for disposal, becomes imbedded in the tribal folkway. Later, a folkway of individual possession of a portion of the soil through use and occupancy is somewhere accidentally¹ and sporadi-

Commerce
begets
rights of
disposal

Rise of
land
ownership

¹ The use of this term does not imply that the event was un-

cally developed; and the greater efficiency of a fixed tenure so demonstrated gives rise to a nascent folk-custom of full land ownership—which, in spite of its spread, is far from universal even in the national type of folkgroup.

Corrobora-
tion from
language

There are a host of survivals in language, custom and law of these earlier and less complete property folk-customs of the family clan and tribal folkgroups. In Roman jurisprudence the word *dominium* and in English the words *demesne* and *domain* remind us of the days when the *dominus*, or head of the house, alone exercised the communal family rights of possession. The word *mancipium*, "the firm grasp," applied to another form of property right, is a relic of the supposition that it was supposed to have been acquired by plunder, and if not retained by a very firm grasp would probably be lost again.

Evolution
of a moral
principle

When but a few of these rights are in question it is enough for folk-custom to say this man has a right to his axe, his spade, his spear, his knife, his fishhook, his arrow, etc., giving in each instance a specific pronouncement for the members of the folkgroup to follow. But as instances grow more and more numerous there is need for a general rule condensing and summarizing all of the separate prohibitions or permissions of the separate folk-custom. And hence the classification of all of these property rights as possessions and the moral rule drawn therefrom—

caused; only that it was the product of normally conflicting forces acting for once in harmony.

"thou shalt not steal"—consolidating in a single precept the duty of all with regard to the property rights acquired by individuals in material objects.

In the nation, to the earlier rights of disposal by exchange and gift are added the more personal rights of disposal by bequest and by contract; in acquisition, rights to exclusive possession of what objects have been made, invented or used are developed through patent right, copyright, easements, etc.; and the facility of exchange is much promoted by a gradual growth of folk-customs covering the buying and selling of written representatives of property rights in more cumbrous material objects. Title to a thousand bales of cotton or to a share in the ownership of a railroad passes easily, according to our folk-custom, by the transfer of a warehouse receipt or of a stock certificate. And thus nations have seen their interest in the establishment of folk-custom permitting a far wider range of individual property rights than was dreamt of in the simpler social structure. The right of disposal has, with few exceptions, become absolute in those nations which are most civilized, because experience has shown that in this way is produced the largest supply of consumable goods, fit for the fending off of famine and want as well as for the satisfaction of those more complex desires arising from the psychic motive forces which more and more are dominating mankind.

And so we may see, through all groupal phases of

Synchronic growth of social structure and moral obligation

Prevalence of custom —in inverse ratio to size of group

the family, the clan, the tribe and the nation with a constantly increasing complexity of social structure, a corresponding accretion and enlargement by the addition of one attribute after another to the folk-custom of private ownership. In the family there are few individual rights of property; use and control are communal, disposal is practically unrecognized. In the clan structure the right of use becomes personal; the right of control vests in the family, the right of disposal is still in the folkgroup. In the tribe, rights of use and control become personal; some of the simpler forms of the right of disposal gradually attach to the individual; others are still communal or unknown. In the nation the right of contract is gradually discovered and, with caution, the folk-customs admit individuals to its privileges. It is neither comprehensive nor universal to this day. So far as land is concerned, property rights therein are developed later and more slowly than those in movable objects; in modern national societies land ownership is in various stages of incomplete possession, varying widely from folk to folk.

As we have observed with respect to folkways, their prevalence and incidence are in inverse ratio to the size of the group. And so it is with custom. The customs simultaneously prevailing in any subgroup are the folk-customs of its folkgroup plus an increment of class-customs which are felt to be essential to the welfare of the subgroup. Therefore, the prevalence of custom, like that of folkways, is in inverse

ratio to the size of the group. It follows that, given a number of acts which the folkgroup recognizes as right or wrong, the subgroup will place a still larger number of acts in the same category. Certain conduct, like theft or fraud, are folkgroup wrongs, universally condemned by folk-custom; other conduct, like unfair competition, destructive underselling or preferential price rebates, are wrongs to some one of the industrial groups and are so condemned by and complained of by them. "Scabbing" is a wrong only in the class-custom of the trades union groups. Elsewhere to do what no other group member will do, to work as no other group member will work, is universally commended. It is conduct such as has been idealized in that charming little tale, "A Message to Garcia." From the progressive expansion of the right of divorce it is evident that it is not condemned by folk-custom, while it is severely banned by the sentiment of certain religious subgroups.

In any society compounded of subgroups there will be co-existent numerous systems of class-customs, some of whose rules are, but many of which are not, accepted by the greater group.

The members of subgroups within the folkgroup will hold to class-custom with respect to the fellow members of their subgroup; and to folk-custom with respect to other members of their folkgroup. Sometimes this will display in intragroup relations a reversion to clan folk-custom, often suggesting a variety of social phases co-existent in the same folkgroup,

Class-cus-
tom within
a Society

Social
morals
drawn
from
folk-cus-
tom

and of a lower phase of civilization in some of the subgroups. Social morals being the generalized precepts of the folkgroup respecting conduct approved by it as right, or condemned by it as wrong, it is plain that they are primarily based upon the whole body of its folk-custom. But it must be noted particularly that class or group morals are therefore not necessarily social morals. According to the legal and medical codes it is immoral for lawyers or physicians to advertise. Yet advertising is approved by society at large; and it is deemed perfectly right. Rebating has never seemed wrong to a railroad man while it has been vigorously condemned by the public. Nor are the morals of one group necessarily those of another. Adulteration is not considered wrong by a woolen manufacturer, while with an apothecary it is a crime. Society is conscious, however, of those customs which have received its general social recognition and finds in these only the basis of its social moral code.

Method of
growth

The growth of social morals is continually proceeding through the adoption as socially binding on the folkgroup of some of the obligations arising from class-custom; particularly those which in the life of the subgroup have conserved its welfare and made it a more potent factor in the life of the folkgroup. If the class-customs so selected are such as have been common to a large number of subgroups they may be accepted as folk-customs without discussion. But if, on the other hand, they only express the welfare-

ideals of a few of the more prosperous and powerful of the constituent groups, efforts may be made to impose them upon the folkgroup by discussion and persuasion or perhaps by force. If by force, it will be through institutions,—laws, courts or military subjection,—and the obligation may be imperfectly recognized or even rejected. And so neither the British government nor the Christian churches, with all their powers of institutional and moral control, have even in three centuries been able to change the sexual morality of the Creole population of the West India Islands—which is still dominated by the folk-custom of more plastic family ties imported from its original African home.

Morals are born in the folk- or class-groups, grow with their compounding or co-ordination, and decay as they disintegrate. It is an example of growth, for instance, that it is now moral to take interest for the use of money; although this right has only been socially accepted for about five hundred years; before that it was an item of the morals of a subgroup; and sinful in the civilization of the tribal Jews. As an example of decay, the moral rule firmly fixed during the first half of the nineteenth century that on Sunday it was wrong to read a secular book, or take a walk, or to go on a journey, has completely gone to pieces during the last twenty years, partly through the importation hither of German folk-custom, partly through the reaction against the folk-customs of the

Puritans, whose stern folk-faith has been rejected by modern religious thought.

The spread
of morals

Morals once brought into existence are spread in the same way as folk-customs (1) by the consolidation or combination of groups, (2) by the influence of leading men who perceive the favorable effect on welfare of some particular line of conduct, deduce therefrom a moral principle and propagate it by discussion from one contiguous group to another, and (3) by commerce and migration—the interchange between various groups of their surplus products and their surplus men, inducing at the same time interchange of custom and opinion. In this way both folk-customs and the moral principles drawn from them are diffused and modified and their binding force is spread from one people to another. Thus a large part of the Puritan morals transplanted from England in the seventeenth century were in the early nineteenth century diffused throughout the Western and the Northwestern States, wherever our transportation facilities would carry them.

Incidence
of morals

It is, of course, true that the moral rules universally accepted by the whole of civilized society are few and simple; that a greater number are recognized by each of the various subgroups of which the nation is composed; and finally that a still larger number are recognized as binding upon the family. Thus the incidence of the morals is the same as that of the folkways and of the folk-customs, in inverse ratio to the size of the group. Conflicts in the morals

prevalent in a folkgroup, naturally following conflicts in folk-customs from which moral rules have arisen, may be brought about therefore:

1. By differences in the class-customs and consequent group morals of its subgroups. A difference of opinion is likely to arise as to what conduct is obligatory on both parties to a transaction when they are members of subgroups widely separated either in space or development.

2. By industrial or political changes bringing about new conditions, such as the formation of new economic subgroups to have relations with other subgroups, or the absorption of outgroups, and where therefore no folk-customs have as yet been established to govern the conduct thus arising, causing the birth of a new folk-custom.

3. By the decay of folk-customs, formerly firmly established, but which by the reactions upon conduct caused by the disintegration of previously prevailing groups are made obsolete, and while nominally respected are really no longer needed for welfare—if indeed they are not absolutely contrary to it.

It is the clash of customs and the conflict of Moral opinions that make human conduct a subject so inherently interesting to members of a folkgroup upon whom the task of selecting a general folkrule of right conduct from conflicting or uncertain subgroup morals devolves. In each community the activity of this process is proportioned to the ease of intercommunication of thought, either by personal

Begins with discussion

contact or through the printed word, and to the rapidity of industrial, political and economic changes simultaneously becoming effective. The first step in moral selection is discussion, and in this discussion the leaders are those upon whom nature or culture has bestowed the power of more faithfully and clearly reproducing, in imagination, the conditions to which conduct is to be applied and of developing the rule or principle by which it should be governed. From this discussion rules of idealized

Formulation of principles

right action are next formulated in which a certain order and consistency of moral conduct are laid down, and by which the most intelligent part of the community—its leaders—believe all its members should be guided. Finally these ideal standards of social morals get to be accepted by all persons as binding upon the folkgroup, and the conduct affected by them clearly recognized as right or wrong, and a definite subject of social punishment or approval. They are then adopted as a folk-custom.

General social acceptance

If moral rules were invariable, immutable and everlasting—always the same at one time and place as at any other time and place—we would have none of this conflict, debate and discussion as to the moral obligation which we ought to assume. But we have observed, on the contrary, that the prevailing ideal of moral obligation, even as put forward by the highest religious and legal authorities, has varied from race to race, and from era to era. We have

seen that the feeling of moral obligation is fundamentally based upon the modes of conduct prevailing as nurtureways at any given place and period. Modes of conduct, themselves, vary directly with the phase of social development through which the folk-group in which they are current is passing. From these known relations we can draw this inference; that morals move and change by steps or stages along a line of constant evolution in direct accord with the phase of society, and with the modes of conduct, with which they co-exist.

Neither in clan, tribe or nation was there originally any effort to preserve the rights of members of outgroups; and so in the times of Elizabeth and the Stuarts predatory private war on the subjects of a peaceful nation was countenanced by British folk-custom and excused by the international morals of the day. The plunder of the outfolk in the form of piracy was winked at in the Carolinas and not condemned by the citizens of New York or Philadelphia down to the beginning of the eighteenth century; so that efforts of lawmakers to suppress the practice were nullified by the partiality of juries. Until after the War of Independence the capture of negroes and the trade in slaves formed a profitable part of the ventures of the old merchants of Salem and Boston; in both instances because these practices were supported as favorable to the folkgroup welfare. They were a survival in the nation phase of civilization, of plunder-exchange folk-customs in

Moral stages relative to social phases and modes of conduct

Folk-cus-
tom gives
no rights to
outgroups

herited from a previous phase of tribal society, and morally excused by the persistence in outgroups of the primitive exclusion from market rights, or of obsolescent but not obsolete property rights in human beings. Even in our own day modern folkgroups or nations but imperfectly recognize a moral principle when applied to other peoples; and citizens feel less firmly bound to protect the property rights of foreigners than they do those of the fellows of their own group.

Restricted
to the
ingroup

Just as the savage considers it right to murder any stranger but wrong to steal a trifle from any fellow tribesman, so, at the present day, ingroups of trades-unionists consider it a greater wrong to deprive a fellow worker of his job than to waylay and assault a strikebreaker, and our nation group has justified a conduct toward the Colombians and Filipinos that would be regarded as the grossest injustice if practiced at home.

Folk-custom, it will be remembered, is the selection by the folkgroup, in accordance with its ideals of welfare, of certain of the folkways produced by efforts to satisfy interests arising out of the four great leading motives of hunger, love, vanity and fear. And these motives work with reference, not to the interest of its members as individuals, but to their interest as members of a group, or the interest of the folkgroup itself. It is in fact the selfish interest of the group, large or small, which prevails in the establishment and choice of folk-custom, and

which dominates the morals derived from those folk-customs. These so derived are, however, only a part of the body of moral rules which finally prevail among the higher folkgroups; and another part, drawn from nurtureways which are more the results of individual emotions than of group feeling, it will next be necessary to consider.

THE EVOLUTION OF HUMANISTIC IDEALS

Folk-cus-
tom negli-
gent of
individual
interest

Conditions
limiting
the right
to live

It has been noticed by all observers that the moral system founded upon folk-custom is disregardful of the individual. This is not surprising when its origin is considered. It is the product of social evolution—of the evolution of folkgroups. Out of the established folkways the group selects as folk-customs those which it deems essential to its group welfare and enforces them. Except in so far as the individual shares the welfare of the group they do not consider him. The men who compose the group inherit the habits and instincts of their animal forefathers, and the precedent of nature, which pays no heed to individual welfare, is what they have to guide them in their concept of what it is right that individuals should expect of the folkgroup. In all nature and with primitive man there was almost always an overproduction of individuals with respect to the means of subsistence, so that many must in some event perish, in order that few might survive.

And so it was not to be questioned that the primitive folkgroup, under the pressure of recurring famine, should find in a corresponding limitation of the right to live some security for its own integrity and survival. In many parts of China the redundant

population is still kept down by the folk-custom of drowning or poisoning a considerable fraction of its girl babies; they think no more of it than we do of drowning kittens. It is a filial duty among the Eskimos to kill their old people when they become burdensome.

Many illustrations may be adduced of the essential Brutality of folk-custom in its bearing upon the individual. In some groups it has made a sacred duty of cannibalism. In mediæval times folk-custom approved the slaughter of heretics just as we approve the killing of rattlesnakes, and regarded torture as a legitimate means of procuring evidence. Our own folk-custom justifies and glorifies war, the ruin of business rivals, and does not condemn the bargain by which a titled roué buys the daughter of a multimillionaire; just as the folk-custom of the Italian peasant still permits him to sell his daughter to a man she has never seen, and without reproach. Folk-customs have until the last half-century relentlessly driven their own social victims—beggars, prostitutes, criminals, the unfortunately disabled—to the wall. Annually the Spartans had a roundup of their subject Helots and killed a number of them to keep fresh their own warlike qualities. Not condemned by folk-custom, these acts are not contrary to the morals of the time and place. We ourselves plead the "higher law"—or the sanction of custom—in mitigation of murder or mutilation of persons caught in adultery, and in the South it is impossible

Survey of
the motives
to behavior
—Nature-
ways

The
motives to
conduct—
Nurture-
ways

to convict of murder the white slayer of a colored man. These are only extreme instances of the frequent brutality of folk-custom, and of its indifference to individual welfare whenever it is in supposed conflict with that of the group.

In our survey of the various influences by which conduct is guided we began with instinct; for it seemed to be the parent of human folkways and to govern conduct that might be partly influenced by the will. Much of our behavior is, nevertheless, actuated by reactions of our organism with its environment of an absolutely involuntary kind; tropisms, or movements which are the result of purely physical surroundings such as the external influence of heat, light, electricity; the motions of air and water, and the chemical reactions within the body. Above these comes another class of involuntary movements caused by reflex nervous action, which must be reckoned with in a full consideration of all the conditions by which our ultimate action is determined. Beside instinct, the next higher faculty, we have now considered the social influences of folkways and folk-customs; but if we examine what is conceded by everybody to be the highest type of morals as they are, it is plain that there is something yet needed to account for those higher motives, beyond and superior to the merely groupal welfare; which may express not the potency of the group toward the individual, or the subjection of the individual to the group; but that interaction of individ-

uals upon individuals whose rule has been expressed by moral masters, from Confucius to Christ, in the precept that we must do to others as we would have others do to us.

Because up to this point we have heard little about the individual man it will not do to suppose that he does not exist; or that his existence can be ignored in any discussion of the moral principle by which, to be selected for survival, his conduct must be guided. Because in physics and chemistry we hear much of atoms and molecules and compounds and of their behavior under various reactions, it would not do to overlook the less conspicuous electrons and ions of which they are composed.

The conduct-mode which we shall now discuss is discernible only when self-consciousness becomes so far developed as to recognize the welfare of the individual as an individual. At first it obtrudes itself but faintly, for it is overwhelmed and overshadowed by the tremendous social force of folk-customs which arise from group-consciousness. It increases, however, in potency as man continues to evolve toward the higher type. Individual, it co-operates with the social, to the making of a wholly moral man. But exactly as liberty—one of the social expressions of individual consciousness—begins to express itself politically, so soon as the tremendous integrating bonds of intertribal conflict have begun to dissolve in the more disintegral peace powers of a nation, just so soon do men begin to seek a wider individual

The individual

His claim for consideration

welfare than can be pursued under their continued subjection to the folkgroup, as expressed in its folk-customs. And so individualism enters into competition with socialization as a means of human welfare.

Universal contending forces

In all kinds of action and reaction, whether of material or physical bodies, we always find ourselves in the presence of opposite and contending forces, the resultant of which is a compromise or balance along whose lines the resultant motion or activity takes place. In physics we call these opposing forces attraction and repulsion; in chemistry we speak of them as affinity and resistance. The expression which they take in economics is that of co-operation and competition; in politics of socialism and individualism. All in all these are nothing more than the physical or psychical expression of two universal causes of motion underlying all nature and life, which are summarized by the opposing ideas of concurrence and antagonism. In morals the concurrent forces are those which impel men to act together for the welfare of the group; the antagonistic forces are those which impel them to act for their individual welfare. And it is along the balance, or resultant of these forces, that society and morals move in their onward progress.

Concurrence and Antagonism

For every act there are motives. In those that we have thus far considered we have seen the influence only of the four great primeval motives of hunger, love, vanity and fear. As society progresses in the

practice of the peace folk-custom, as mankind becomes more gentle and intelligent, a fifth social motive is discernible in addition to these. This motive is that of compassion or pity, which since the time of Confucius has been recognized as the source of the highest form of moral conduct. Compassion is the capacity that one individual possesses of imagining the feelings of another and which makes him unwilling to do anything which is likely to injure that other person. And yet, as Dr. Johnson has observed, it is not natural to man. Children are always cruel. Savages are always cruel. We may have uneasy sensations for seeing a creature in distress without pity; for we have not pity unless we wish to relieve it.

The origin of pity is found in the parental instinct, expanding in man into the tender emotion which is evoked by the helpless child—"flesh of our flesh." This tender emotion is most naturally extended to include blood relations composing the kinship group; its first heteroethnic manifestation is probably the feeling of guest-friendship, the earliest evidence of compassionate relations with strangers. From its impulses are generated modes of conduct satisfying interests arising out of a new motive and tested by a new standard. The new motive is compassion for individual suffering, the interest is to prevent the suffering, and the standard is that which we would have the other person do to us under like circumstances—the Golden Rule.

Its psychic aspect

Like the motives of vanity and fear, the compassion motive is psychic, and is built upon the framework of a developed brain. Psychologically it is a complex sentiment instead of a primary instinct. Its diffusion and acceptance are due to the fact that those who are most actuated by this motive have a better chance for survival in the struggle for existence than those by whom it is not possessed.

Its influence on evolution

The course of natural selection in the evolution of greater sensitiveness of nervous organization in the human race through compassion has been well stated by Sutherland: "The man who is a good father, a good husband and a good citizen, is the ancestor of many progeny; while the Napoleonic type of abundant brains but deficient sympathies, even though it make a brilliant career, perishes in a century or less from off the face of the earth. Each person now living has two parents, four grandparents, eight great grandparents and so on. Thus ten generations back his ancestors formed a living regiment of 1024 persons. Make a small allowance" for in-breeding "and assume that on the average each Englishman of the present day had 1000 ancestors of the tenth degree all living in the time of Queen Elizabeth. Let us assume that there were then born 500 boys and 500 girls who might have been the ancestors of the now living individual. A portion of these were weeded out, some of them died through want of sufficient parental care, others as they grew up died through their own failure of

sympathetic qualities. It is no exaggeration to say that out of a thousand possible ancestors fifty would on the average be eliminated through the failure of parental, conjugal or social qualities. In Elizabeth's time out of every 1000 persons born five were actually hanged. But brawls, venereal diseases, etc., were far more potent cleansers of society. Thus those eliminated would be replaced by men and women of better stock (that is to say, those who were protected from elimination by more effective sympathies). And so we may feel sure that at each generation a steady 5 per cent of the poorer type was withdrawn, leaving room for the expansion of those richer in sympathetic qualities. But the power of such a steady withdrawal acting in cumulative fashion is enormous when spread over a sufficient time . . . and if we had means of sifting the people of Queen Elizabeth's time into two equal sets, those who could pass in these days for fairly good men and women, and those who were more or less distinctly below the average . . . it would be found that practically none of the inferior blood flows in the veins of the present generation; we being bred almost wholly from the better stock."

We have seen how folk-custom is important for the welfare and preservation of the folkgroup; it better fits the clan, tribe or nation to survive—as a group. From the foregoing illustration we may perceive how conduct derived from compassion

Evolutionary contrast between folk-custom and compassion

Personal
liberty its
political
symptom

Characters
of Human-
istics

better fits for survival the individual, with which folk-custom, except incidentally, is little concerned.

A progressive alteration of our moral sentiments toward the recognition of a right of individual happiness, as contrasted with group welfare, is due to the increasing force which the compassion motive acquires in the course of the social evolution from savagery to civilization. Personal liberty, its political symptom, is the outcome of a sense of pity felt by the masses of a folkgroup for themselves and for each other in a state of misery and degradation of which they become conscious through the contrast of their condition with that of their dominant subgroup. Its force is individualistic, expressed either by orderly attempts to change folk-custom through institutional adaptations, as in the slow breaking up of military feudalism in England; or, if repressed, by outbursts of violence such as those of the French Revolution.

Morals derived from the customs engendered by pity flow from the individual to the group, while those derived from folk-custom flow from the group to the individual. So different in fact are these customs from the folk-customs originating in folkways that I propose, in order to keep them distinct in our minds, to give them a special name, and to call them Humanistics. Humanistics, therefore, are habits of feeling and conduct formed to satisfy the interests derived from the motive of compassion for the misfortunes of others. The influence of human-

istic ideals moves centrifugally from the social atom out toward the social compound; while that of folk-custom moves centripetally in upon the individual from the group.

To become the source of moral rules, the humanistic ideals, at first advanced and practiced by individuals, must become accepted and imbedded in the ideals and emotions of some of the subgroups. We have seen that many of them promote the survival of the family, and it is there that their sway is always firmest. The conduct which expresses them is actuated by a nice regard for the feelings and welfare of other individuals and its first recognition by folk-feeling is in the prescription that whatever conduct may be exacted from a man in his relations with other groups, within the limits of his own family it must always be honorable or it will be condemned by the folkgroup. Later, and in a lesser degree, it is expected in his relations toward a larger kinship group, such as may survive the extinction of the clan; he may treat his cousin or his uncle less scrupulously than his wife or children but yet the folk-feeling prevails that compliance with prevailing folk-custom will save him from obloquy in his dealings with the other members of the folkgroup. And so we do not condemn a man who is merely honest in his dealings with strangers; but we expect him to be more or less honorable in his conduct toward his kin.

The process by which humanistic rules of conduct become the basis of a new kind of folk-custom origi-

Their influence on morals

Their expression in honor

Their limitations

nates, therefore, in the kinship group. Some of the group members, in whom compassion, or the tender emotion, is most strongly developed, discover the suffering of other individuals, as a result of conduct following some folk-custom, and by their protests folk-feeling is gradually excited to the point of its condemnation.

The
folk-cus-
tom of
infanticide

Denounced
by leaders

Slavery a
partial
remedy

Take, for example, the folk-custom of infanticide. It seems to have prevailed amongst the early peoples, especially those in which population tended to outrun subsistence. The Egyptians practiced it with no feeling of guilt against the Hebrews in the days of the captivity. The Jews themselves practiced it, and the instance of Abraham's treatment of his two sons shows that their folk-custom was averse neither to child exposure nor to child sacrifice. They had at no time any hesitation in perpetrating it upon an out-group. But prophets and seers—idealists—declaimed against it. The best families showed that they disapproved of it; and these families by their continued aptitude for survival, and consequent leadership, had great influence in the spread of their ideals. Rather than expose or kill their daughters, they introduced the humanistic of sparing them, even if later sold as slaves or concubines. By degrees the humanistic thus introduced became a folk-custom of the Jews. The Greeks of the epic period were quite indifferent to the survival of their children, so much so that the great Spartan tribe was by this sentiment reduced to insignificance. Infanticide was

well ingrained in early Roman folk-custom and it was one of the unquestioned rights of the *Patria potestas*. Softened by the humanistic of adoption, it nevertheless prevailed long enough to become a contributing condition of Roman degeneracy. In the fourth century of our era the Hebrew humanistics, which had prevailed over political ineptitude to fit that tenacious race for selection in survival, began through the Christian variant of its religion Mediæval to affect the folk-feeling of the Roman peoples. And yet the folk-customs of exposure and abandonment ^{orphan-ages} declined but slowly; throughout the Middle Ages they persisted in spite of efforts at religious and statutory suppression. In France, as late as 1638, children were sold at the gates of the Lying-in-Hospital to the first-comer for a franc apiece. Institutions devised to mitigate their brutality, such as brephotrophia or orphanages, had a mediæval inception, but only in the seventeenth century were they popularized through the devoted efforts of St. Vincent de Paul. The milder doctrines then found their opportunity because the growth of the arts under peace folk-customs had gradually changed conditions by dispelling the fear of famine, and so permitted the humanistic better to fit for survival the nations by whom it was adopted. Thus by degrees the barbaric folk-custom of infanticide declined before the Hebrew humanistic of infant preservation, until the children whose lives it had saved lived to persecute the people by whom it had

been engendered; among whom yet we find the most notable examples of paternal love.

This illustration shows the salient features of a humanistic as conducive to family or tribal survival. Its origin through compassion in a minor folkgroup; the individual stimulus to its ingroup spread through the efforts of leading men and its adoption as a religious ideal; its further expansion through the absorption of its folkgroup as a well-dispersed subgroup in a greater folkgroup, and by the latter's predilection for the religious system of the former; the long-time failure of law and religion to suppress a folk-custom founded upon environmental conditions; and upon the change of those conditions the renewal of the humanistic propaganda through individual effort and institutional device; its final acceptance as folk-custom and its firm hold in modern morals.

Potency in
promoting
survival

We have seen how the higher sympathetic development of groups which first established such a humanistic gave them an advantage over other groups in whom it was deficient; they became increasingly better fitted to survive and correspondingly more potent in folkgroup activities. For the success of a tribe, both externally as a war group and internally as a peace group, is dependent upon the strength of its intergroup sympathies; and the tribes in whom those sympathies are most developed are, therefore, best fitted to survive. The superior brute force and more selfish folk-customs of the Huns, Goths and

Vandals did not prevent them from being absorbed and obliterated by the milder and more sympathetic humanistic ideals of the European peoples whom they subdued and amongst whom they settled. Though better fighters than their adversaries, the less sympathetic Turks have not been able to stand up against their more civilized Northern neighbors in the struggle for national supremacy.

Because the exercise of sympathy promotes the survival of the folkgroup in the struggle for existence, the latter, therefore, consciously accepts and enforces some of the humanistics of its subgroups in the same way that it does its folk-custom and between Acceptance these, except as to origin, difference disappears; such as humanistics being eventually merged in folk-custom. folk-cus-
tom
And so at this juncture the sympathetic forces which have been flowing outward from the individual to the group react and flow inward from the group to the members. The group now exacts socially what its individual members first demanded.

While normally humanistics originate within family groups, they may in the larger folkgroups arise and spread through a propaganda led by an Influence of individual and then accepted and promoted by organized an artificial subgroup formed especially for the purpose. Take for example the prevention of cruelty to animals. It was never a British folk-custom before the nineteenth century. In 1805 cock fighting, bull baiting, bear gardens, badger baiting and dog fighting were not considered wrong any more than bull

fighting is today in Spain or Mexico. Schools had their cock fights at which the schoolmaster presided. Thomas Young, who about that time wrote an essay on humanity to animals, admitted that in doing so he was sensible of laying himself open to no small portion of ridicule. Twenty years later an altruistic group which had been converted to Young's opinions founded an institution—the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Thirteen years later the influence of this group on the national folkgroup was so effective that the humanistic of sympathy with brute creation was selected to be of equal legal value with folk-custom, and the first cruelty to animals act passed in 1837. By degrees the humanistic won acceptance and was effectively enforced by the folkgroup on all its members by the sentiment which procured the passage of a more stringent law in 1849. Finally vivisection was regulated in 1876—nearly three quarters of a century after the work of propagating the humanistic had been begun by a single leading mind.

Idealistic aspect of the humanistics

Such principles when first asserted may be, and often are, in advance of those changes in the mental attitude of the folkgroup which would fit them to be received and accepted as humanistics. For humanistics like folk-customs must needs receive the emotional assent of the folkgroup, or at least of that portion of it which is recognized by the bulk of its members as best fitted to lead in the acceptance of new rules of conduct. There is, of course, a period

when the proposed humanistic is debated and denied, a period during which the compassionate ideals from which it is formed are under discussion and when its influence is uncertain whether it will or will not accord with the ultimate necessities of social group evolution. During this period the folkgroup (which is nothing if not practical) will refuse to accept it as a basis for a general rule of moral conduct. Its advocates are dreamers, theorists, reformers, impracticals,—and so indeed they are,—yet it sometimes happens, as was said of the reformers of the French Revolution, "the skins of those who opposed them were tanned to bind the second edition of their works."

For it is in the humanistic, altruistic or sympathetic interpretation of group relationships where progress lies the hope of moral progress in social justice. Proposed humanistics, therefore, should be patiently considered and discussed, and not held to ridicule; for before long such of these doctrines as survive the discussion will reach the point of social acceptance. Their practice will be deemed honorably binding on the subgroup by which it is first accepted and then gradually will become accepted as folk-custom; to act in accordance with which is a moral duty, and generally binding upon the folk-group, with its transgressor stigmatized as an "inhuman" person or as a social enemy.

We have now arrived at a point from which we can survey the whole field of conduct as influenced by nurtureways, which are the three modes of common

Survey of
nurture-
way
influences

action characteristic of mankind as organized in the groups of which society is constituted.

Folkways

First then, the folkways: originating in animal groups; characteristic of the most primitive folk-groups; unconsidered, habitual, uniform within the group; a means by which all men endeavor so to systematize their daily life as to escape the effort of a constant exercise of choice and judgment in the doing of acts necessary to continued survival; motived by forces of hunger, love, vanity and fear; acquired through education and imitation; instinct plus acquisition.

Folk-
customs

Next, folk-customs (or mores) derived from folkways by a conscious choice of such as are deemed by the folkgroup to be connected with its welfare. They are the product of a newly arisen group-consciousness. To conform with folk-customs is right, to disregard them is wrong. They are favored by the folkgroup through the suggestive influence of folk-feeling and upheld with pains, penalties and rewards. Folk-customs are folkways plus groupal welfare. From the clan, tribe and other semi-civilized social phases upward, they constitute a potent factor in fitting folkgroups for selection and survival.

Human-
istics

The third mode of conduct is humanistics; according with ideals originating with, and propagated by, individuals or subgroups so as to modify the anti-individualistic trend of many folk-customs. They are the offshoot of the growing sense of

self-consciousness. Founded on compassion for others, they are gradually diffused within the folk-group through the power of sympathy to better fit its possessors to survive in civilization. Characteristic of the higher social phases of upper tribal and national culture, they are the basis of the higher or altruistic morality. Humanistics are folk-customs plus compassion. Humanistic ideals flow from individuals to the groups, while the prohibitions and precepts of folk-custom flow from the group to the individual. Originating in the family and promoting its survival, they are like the folkways in this, that Honor their sway and incidence are in inverse ratio to the size of the group. The conduct which expresses them is often called honor; it is upheld by folk-feeling in the greatest measure within the fellowship of the family group; in a lesser degree toward other members of the folkgroup. But by degrees a humanistic may be emotionally enrolled as a folk-custom, in which case the conduct which it prescribes is likewise upheld by social sanction. And thus conduct which conforms with an accepted humanistic becomes right, and conduct repugnant to it wrong, in like manner to that which arises from a folk-custom adapted from folkways; only with a lesser degree of intensity.

From these two categories of right or wrong conduct are drawn general rules of morals to aid men in practicing the art of acting in accord with folk-feeling. And folk-feeling is that state of group-con-

Moral
an Art

sciousness which is excited by ideals of social welfare held at a given time and place by a folkgroup. Social welfare is a condition produced in direct ratio to the complete adjustment of group life to its environment. Morals, therefore, are a means of harmonizing the folkgroup with the out-conditions and in-conditions of its environment. Science, and the arts which are derived from the sciences, are other means to the same end; but with these we are not now concerned.

Its
Adjuncts

Morals, like their parent folk-customs, correspond to the phase of social structure through which the folkgroup may be passing at any given time and place; primitive society implies a different and simpler set of moral rules from that which prevails in the higher, more complex types of folk-group. And so in drawing general moral rules it is also found that there are often conflicts, sometimes between folk-custom and humanistics, sometimes between folk-custom and class-custom, and sometimes between the class-customs of the different subgroups within the folkgroup, so that men are uncertain as to the conduct morally expected of them in certain situations. Looking further we may observe that to aid the determination of what conduct to pursue in practice in the moral art there are certain instruments, either devised by the folkgroup or developed in human nature, the principal of which are religion, law and conscience; and these we shall proceed next to consider under the general title of moral adjuncts.

VI

MORAL ADJUNCTS—INSTITUTIONS AND
CONSCIENCE

The history of modern ideals relative to the treatment of the insane affords another illustration of the typical course by which humanistics are begotten, Early grow, modify folk-custom and finally are absorbed theories of into the folk-feeling and the morals of the folk- Insanity group. To primitive or uncivilized man insanity appears as a part of the supernatural. The babblings of idiots and the irrational acts of lunatics are looked upon as the direct expression of deities or demons. Prevailing amongst all primitive peoples, theories of the transmigration and embodiment of good or evil spirits provide explanations reasonable in their time and place for the phenomena of morbid exaltation and derangement. Exaltations not destructive were looked upon as an expression of the Good above nature. *Piers Plowman* (1377) speaks of lunatics as God's minstrels. But paroxysms having a violent or destructive outcome were considered symptoms of possession by evil spirits. In holy writ theologians found indubitable support for this theory and for the folk-customs which arose from it. So persistent have been what we now recognize as the delusions of witchcraft and diabolical possession that to this day they survive in lan-



The doctrine of diabolical possession

guage and possibly to some degree in popular sentiment. Amulets to ward off evil spirits are still carried in the most civilized countries in the world. We still say of a perverse person that "he must be possessed by a devil" and solemn, religious ceremonies for casting out devils from the bodies of the possessed are to this day officially retained in the rituals of the Greek and Roman Churches. And even within recent years the rite of exorcism has been practiced by the Anglican priesthood.

Inspiration attributed to some forms of insanity

While from heathen times the mildly insane were considered to be inspired, and their prophecies were eagerly studied by those who expected to find in them some forecast of future happenings, the lot of those who were violent or destructive was by no means so pleasant. Here it was held that the soul of the real man was absent and that for the expulsion of the evil spirit which had taken its place any means of bodily coercion was entirely legitimate. Possession by demons was a characteristic of the belief in witches, who were nothing more than feeble-minded old women whose incoherent utterances were taken as a sign of evil purpose. And so folk-custom justified even death as an appropriate remedy for this devil-devised disorder. King James I of England in his "Demonology" (1599) wrote of its treatment, that "it is commonly used by fire, but that is an indifferent thing, to be used in every country according to the law or custom thereof." Many thousands of these agents of the evil one were thus

Other forms deemed of evil purpose and so treated

Witchcraft

condemned and burned alive; even by ministers of religion. It was not as an enemy to the British king that Joan of Arc was put to death by the Bishop of Beauvais, but as a demented person who had shown all the attributes of witchcraft. According to the reason of the times, folk-custom classed witchcraft with murder and theft as inimical to folkgroup welfare, and it was no wrong that it should be repressed in the same way as other serious crimes against society.

The first Christian asylums for the insane were founded in Spain during the fifteenth century, but they did not begin to make their appearance in England and other parts of Europe until the latter part of the seventeenth; and, except that their charges were no longer burned alive, the methods of treatment sanctioned by folk-custom were hardly less cruel than those that had previously prevailed. If any treatment were attempted it was by blows, bleeding and chains. Often the insane were confined in the prisons with those who were awaiting trial or the execution of sentence, and like the latter secured by iron fetters. Shakspear (1600) refers to lunatics as deserving "a dark house and a whip." Burton (1621) describes a madman as "a ghastly sight, naked in chains doth he lie, and roars amain."

Rise of
Christian
Insane
Asylums

Cruelty
of their
methods

But asylums were rare; for the most part lunatics were doomed to local custody, chained to a post in the open air or under a shed, dependent for food on the charity of passers-by. When cared for at home

Home treatment equally cruel

Brutalities justified by folk-custom in the eighteenth century

Skeptical foundations of a humanistic reform

the most indescribable cruelties were practiced on troublesome patients and without social condemnation. In Wales, as late as 1843, a mad woman was found in her own daughter's house chained in a crouching posture, and her knees had worn so long against her breast that its skin was raw and bleeding.

At the end of the eighteenth century public institutions for the care of the insane were committed to prevailing folk-custom by which vomitings, bleedings—*ad deliquium animi*—prolonged duckings, whippings, solitary confinement in dark cells and restraint by chaining to posts or beds were the approved remedies. Private institutions were even worse. "Persons may be and are taken forcibly to these houses without any authority, stripped naked, taken to a dark room and deprived of all communication with the outer world." (1765.) As an effort to expel the demon by which the sufferer was possessed such treatment was wrong neither by folk-custom nor by law.

With the progress of rationalism which followed the renascence of classic learning there arose a band of skeptics, to whom the sanctions of prevailing custom were no deterrents. The supernatural origin of insanity began to be doubted by at least a few. In 1690 Locke laid the foundations of modern rationalistic psychology. Condillac in 1746 had popularized the new philosophy in France. In 1762 Morgagni had asserted the physical origin of mental disease. In 1789 Howard had visited the insane

hospitals at Constantinople and Amsterdam, and had drawn a comparison to their favor with the English asylums of his day. Simultaneously in France and England, in the year 1792, a new movement was originated for a treatment of the insane based upon the theory of them as sick human beings and not upon their supposed embodiment of perverse demons.

Philippe Pinel, influenced by Locke and Condillac, had studied mental disorders, and in 1789 had communicated the result of his researches to the Société Royale de la Médecine, which in 1791 offered a prize for the best treatise on the care of the insane. Pinel's theories attracted the attention of the republican commissioners of hospitals, who in 1792 placed him in charge of the Bicêtre. After overcoming much opposition from the commune he was allowed to try his methods, and within the week had stricken the chains from the first fifty insane patients, one of whom had been so restrained for forty years.

In the same year William Tuke, an English merchant, outraged by the treatment of a friend in the York Asylum, arose in a Friends' meeting and advocated the rational treatment of the insane. His enthusiasm won support and through the efforts of a group funds were raised to establish the York Retreat, where mental disorder was for the first time in England managed by pacific methods.

In spite of the success of the methods practiced by Tuke and his followers, in spite of reports private and public upon the manifest abuses of the existing

Philippe
Pinel

William
Tuke

The agitation for humanistic reform

institutions, in spite of reforms put in practice by the more mobile French, in spite of the notorious cruelties of the existing folk-custom and in spite of agitation both in and out of Parliament, it was not until 1839, almost half a century later, that restraint was abolished in the Harwell and Bethlem Asylums, and not till 1845 that an efficient law controlling both public and private asylums was enacted by Parliament. From that time, however, the humanistic of kind treatment for the mentally defective has been socially on the ascendant; so that the cruelties long made right by folk-custom have been definitely disowned and made wrong by folkgroup feeling.

Typical cycle of humanistic evolution

As in the case of animals, our present attitude toward the treatment of the insane is the outcome of a movement in popular feeling which derived its initial impulse from an individual, moved by pity for suffering coming out of the maladjustment of a folk-custom to present environment. The next step was the diffusion of antagonism to this folk-custom through the agency of voluntary subgroups, respectively the societies for the suppression of cruelty to animals, the Friends, or the Société Royale de la Médecine. These are institutions, as is also another body socially established, the Parliament or Assembly. To the law-making institution such movements turn for support, asking it to create a third institution—a statute—establishing penalties to supply additional motives for the adoption of the humanistic by the folkgroup. The Parliament

Individual inception

Propagation by voluntary institutions

Adoption by a political institution

moves slowly; it is representative of the conservative folk-feeling behind the folk-custom as well as of the class-feeling behind the humanistic. Early legislation favorable to a humanistic is rarely effective; the legislature does not at first dare to make it thorough-going, for it has the support of folk-feeling only in part. But as it wins popular acceptance, particularly among the subgroups to whom the masses turn for leadership, it becomes practical to create still more solid and far-reaching institutional control; until finally the humanistic becomes generally approved by folk-feeling, and in large measure the laws enforce themselves.

And so the typical cycle of humanistic evolution is; its conception by an individual; its publication; its propagation and diffusion through institutions. Of these there were (a) the voluntary subgroups, (b) a political institution, the legislature, which created (c) a third institution, a law, to supply motives for folkgroup conformity with the ideal. Fourthly, religion, another already existing institution, may become conscious of the growing favor extended to the humanistic by its leading minds, may adopt it as a part of its spiritual message; and so make itself an important vehicle in its spread; because of its capacity to join Fear with Pity as motive forces for the acceptance of the humanistic ideal. When by such means a humanistic has become thoroughly embedded in folk-feeling, it begins to possess the attributes of a folk-custom and is consciously recog-
Promotion by a legal institution
Sanction of a Religious institution

Contrast
between
folk-custom
and
humanistics

Humanis-
tics grow
through
institutions

nized as essential to the sympathies, if not to the welfare, of the folkgroup.

While a folk-custom is derived from folkways of which the group was once unconscious, but which it comes to feel are needful to group welfare, i.e., the adjustment of its structure to its environment, a humanistic is a growth from some person's consciousness of a conflict between the welfare of individuals with some folk-custom, which by change of the structure or of the environment of the group is no longer needful for its welfare.

We observe further that the mode of humanistic growth and diffusion is institutional rather than moral; as the acme of conscious nurtureways, the most thoroughly conscious means are used both for their spread and maintenance. The institutions through which we find them working are in part voluntary societies—to repress slavery, to help the poor, to promote education, to care for the sick, to aid the insane, etc.; and in part quasi-public institutions, almshouses, hospitals, public schools and libraries, savings banks, insurance funds, etc.—which were originally private enterprises, but eventually have become socialized, i.e., publicly adopted by the folkgroup into its folk-custom. The service that such institutions perform is primarily for individual welfare and is quite distinct from that rendered to group welfare by public institutions growing directly out of folk-custom such as public assemblies, courts, jails, police, armies, banks of issue, stock and

produce exchanges, copartnerships, trades unions and the like.

An institution is therefore an organized and formal artifice either growing out of folk-custom or formed by leading minds to promote humanistics, with the conscious purpose of supplementing and reinforcing the unorganized and almost unconsciously exerted "moral" forces of approbation and reprobation by which folkgroups endeavor to make conduct accord with their folk-customs. The device in its developed form is a subgroup created by private enterprise or commanded by public enactment, with the idea of bringing to bear concurrent forces of co-operation, organization and persistence in support of the uniform practice of a folk-custom or to enlarge the acceptance of a humanistic as the case may be.

In the dim twilight of primitive social structure, we can always recognize the shadowy form of some joint effort, on the part of the folkgroup, to express the sentiments growing out of its attempt to imagine and interpret the powers of nature by which it is surrounded. Savage men appreciate fully that they are in the grip of their surroundings; and that powers which they cannot fully understand hold in strict limitation their capacity of existence and enjoyment. The human mind seems always to try to explain these phenomena, and as it has only recently acquired the concept of natural forces its early attempts at explanation are always along the lines

Institutions as Social Artifices
The institution of Religion
Originally an explanation of natural phenomena

Consistent
with the
knowledge
of its day

Its organiza-
tion of
the fear
motive

of myth; that is to say, by the attribution of these powers to unseen persons not unlike ourselves, supernatural, but who dwell in nature and control its forces. This line of development is aided by a tendency of the savage mind to attribute an incorporeal and immortal essence to the dead or to natural objects; a state of mind fostered by their apparition in dreams; and doubtless superinduced in a state of barbarism by folkways of irregular feeding and of intermittent periods of exercise and repose which are conducive to disorders in the circulation of the blood. For primitive man to believe in the supernatural is in fact as rational as for us to deny it. The religious and scientific rational processes of each social or cultural phase, and the conduct which arises from them, are always considered superstitious or irrational by men who have progressed onward into higher phases.

As compared to human powers, the powers deemed supernatural are infinite in magnitude; and the fear they inspire leads to a desire for their propitiation. Sacrifices and worship are the efforts to express that propitiation. The example of increased efficiency gained for the folkgroup through concurrence in its folk-customs must have been apparent to men in the early phases of the social structure, and some, at least, saw the value of the fear of the supernatural already established in their folkways, if institutionalized, in supplementing the less organized forces of social approbation or repro-

bation by which they were endeavoring to secure uniformity of moral conduct.

In their turn religious institutions made use of the same principle of concurrence. Their priests early observed the psychic value of the rhythmic expression of emotion, many times multiplied in its effect upon the participant when manifested at the same time by an entire congregation. Churches and rituals are therefore effective means when directed to moral ends, and to this purpose a large part of their service is applied in lower social phases where other institutional forces are wanting.

So long as religion can sustain in men the idea that they are accountable to powers greater than themselves, its potency in the enforcement of moral duties is enormous; but it parts with this power in proportion as it may persist in the maintenance of doctrines not in accord with the folk-feeling of the time. A man who denies the efficacy of magical rites in casting out devils from a sick person, or doubts the value of a sacrifice to the Deity in insuring a harvest, is not likely to be much impressed with the moral teachings of those who insist upon the acceptance of such beliefs as essential to salvation. No more in morals than in dogma does religion represent immutable truth. It commends at one period conduct which at another it reprobates. Judged by its then standard David and Solomon were excellent men; but imagine them applying for church membership today! The same support which religion gives to morals it

Substitution
of means
for ends

accords to the now obsolete body of scientific doctrine, in which men once found an explanation of the universe. The devout exalt the ritual, which is a means, to the same level as its ends, and resist change by whatever social powers they may possess; thus from the second century idolatry was formally classed by the hierarchy with murder and adultery as a mortal sin. The churchmen of Mary's time had as little compunction about burning a Protestant as those of Elizabeth's had in torturing a Catholic; the Pilgrim divines punished Antinomians by exile and Quakers at the whipping post—and all for mere differences of opinion about matters of little importance to folkgroup welfare.

Political
institutions

Closely allied to the religious type of institution is that of the political. The patriarchal family seems early to have proved its better fitness for survival than the matriarchal type; and the tribal exigencies of military efficiency tended to develop the chief or king as its leader in the almost constant warfare in which tribes are engaged. In discovering and carrying out the will of the tribe, the fundamental political folk-custom of assembly or mass meeting was evolved from the clan custom previously prevailing; and from this folk-custom as a basis arose a fundamental type of political institution such as the *landesgemeinde*, *folkmote*, council or other form of deliberative assembly; to meet, discuss and deliberate over the tribal needs of the folkgroup, and to provide means for defense and

offense. The outcome of such needs was a primitive secondary institution, the army.

By the time that nations had been formed from the tribal groups, men had discovered the value of institutions and that they could be organized by the royal authority or through the fundamental political institution; which through the inconvenience of mass meetings for a scattered population soon developed into a representative assembly, witenagemot, diet, folkthing or parliament. In nations peace-customs develop rapidly through the necessities of the growing industrial life. The primitive remedy, established by early folk-custom for torts or wrongs committed by one person upon another, is blood revenge; a right of retaliation by the victim's family or his kinship group exerted against the group to which the offender belonged. Punishment for theft, for instance, was originally left in the hands of the despoiled, and consisted either of reparation from the family of the thief or of his pursuit, capture and death. The custom of private vengeance or blood revenge has survived even in civilized nations amongst some subgroups, as is exemplified in the duel, not yet obsolete in Europe, in lynch law, or in the blood feuds of our own Tennessee mountains.

Blood revenge and its resultant feuds were both destructive of the strength in war of the folk-groups wherein it was most prevalent, and in a high degree injurious to the growth of industrial subgroups, which needed internal peace for the practice

Organiza-
tions of
institutions
by institu-
tions

Primitive
right of
private
vengeance
for torts

Blood
revenge a
clog upon
group
efficiency

Laws and
Courts
derived
from
folk-custom

of their crafts. It was found that theft, murder and other personal wrongs could be more efficiently suppressed and punished by the folkgroup acting as a unit, through constituted tribal authority. Thus three conditions were always working to give greater military and industrial efficiency to tribes who used this means of eliminating the right of private vengeance from their folk-custom. The king's justice, at first directly exercised, did the people's will upon wrongdoers. In the more diffused populations of the larger tribes the king's authority must needs be delegated to judges; and to procure uniformity of justice, statutes defining the offense and stating the punishment established by folk-custom were instituted by the assembly or proclaimed by the king.

In its primitive form, therefore, a statute of law is only a reduction to writing of a folk-custom. For peaceable and orderly enforcement over a large territory it involves the institution of a law court, with judges to hear complaints and to give judgments; with sheriffs or jailers to execute them; and behind all a king and army providing an irresistible power to enforce the decisions rendered. By such institutions was the king's justice substituted for blood revenge; an orderly for a disorderly process of punishment; and each of the dominant elements in the folkgroup was given what it needed—greater efficiency to the war group in war, and peace conditions for the growing group of industrial workers. The penalties of the written law and of the unwritten

folk-custom were alike; but carried out by the irresistible and impartial force of the folkgroup instead of by the angry hand of the victim or his clan.

By degrees the association of legal remedies and Evolution penalties with offenses against the person or against of Public his property led to their recognition as crimes against Law the peace of the folkgroup instead of wrongs against the victim or his clan. In place, therefore, of drawing the complaint for a wrong done to the aggrieved person the action is brought against the offender in the name of the State itself, which alone assumes responsibility for the punishment of the offender. The body of folk-custom which regulates the relations of the State with its citizens is known as public law and is primarily a code declaring what are the Law as de- peace-customs of the folkgroup, set down in writing claratory of so as to avoid dispute and enforce uniform penalties. folk-custom In the course of time public law has been extended by statutes enacted by royal authority or by public assemblies, to cover many other moral and economic relations of the citizens to the State beside breaches of peace-custom, but it remains a written law.

The discovery of the potency of legal institutions in enforcing the criminal law led to their use in another direction. If one class of folk-custom could be reduced to writing and enforced by the courts, why not others? In the almost constant intertribal conflicts many were the victories that led to the conquest of one folkgroup by another; and when two had intermingled there was always a question as to

Law as
compro-
mise of
folk-cus-
toms

which folk-custom should prevail. This confusion led to conflicts between two bodies of folk-customs in which it often happened that the conquerors conceded the superiority of some of those of the conquered as well as insisted upon the observance of some of their own. Disputes arose as to the prescribed conduct which according to folk-custom one member of the consolidated folkgroup had the right to expect from one of his fellows. Once courts had been established for the enforcement of the king's peace, the machinery which they supplied could naturally be used to settle a dispute of this nature, with the result that their jurisdiction was extended from the public law which they already enforced to that of private law.

Private Law

The ideal
of Justice

While public law is the body of folk-custom regulating the relations of citizens and the State, private law, on the other hand, is the body of folk-custom regulating the conduct of citizens toward each other together with the principles by which courts have endeavored to classify them. In the main, private law is unwritten—and the dispute of the contestants is, therefore, as to what conduct, according to folk-custom, has each a reasonable right to expect from the other—and the ideal of such conduct becomes generalized in men's minds under the names of justice, equity or right.

This unwritten, or as it is known among Anglo-Saxon peoples, common, law is, therefore, well described as "the product of the wisdom, counsel and

experience of many ages of wise and observing men"; and attempts to write and codify it have in large measure resulted in confusion. Through its derivation and capacity for enforcement through evidence and discussion in the courts, the common law, especially in great matters, is reasonably approximate in force and flexibility to folk-feeling itself. On the other hand, it is quite beyond the capacity of the human intellect to write down rules which shall take into account the infinite variety of human conduct covered by the folk-custom of all the groups, and which either has happened, is happening or may happen. And equally is it impossible to construct a code flexible enough to keep pace with the changes which are wrought in folk-custom by the continually recurring changes in the structure and environment of the folkgroup and of its constituent of codes subgroups.

The

Common

Law, its

flexibility

Inflexibility

Existing codes of private or common law, such as have been attempted in the countries which derive their jurisprudence from the Romans, can cover only a small fraction of the conduct prescribed by folk-custom. The incidents treated are mainly those about which disputes have already occurred, or which have been occasioned by conflicts between the folk-customs of different folkgroups merged by conquest or colonization. The laws of Moses, Solon and Lycurgus—the earliest of codes—have to do exclusively with private law and had the purpose of effecting the adjustment of conflicts of interest which

had arisen between different subgroups in their respective states. The codes of the Barbarians compiled in the fifth and sixth centuries adjusted the relations between the provincial Romans and the rude tribes by whom they had been overrun; so that the conduct of the members of the subject folkgroup toward each other could still be regulated by their milder folk-customs, while their demeanor toward the master folkgroups was controlled by the Salic, Gothic or Hunnish law imposed by the conquering race.

Law as an institution

Law and its Courts, therefore, are institutions whose main function is to establish in a more or less fixed form, precepts drawn from folk-custom. They prescribe for the members of the folkgroup courses of conduct in accordance with folk-custom and fix penalties for nonconformance. They are primarily devices of the folkgroup (a) for determining what is folk-custom, (b) for judging whether conduct accords or disagrees with folk-custom, (c) for substituting folk-penalties in place of private vengeance in case of transgression, and (d) for furnishing its members with organized and uniform series of motives, additional to the ordinary moral approvals and condemnations exercised through public opinion, for conformity with its will.

Devised to crystallize folk-custom

The class of wrongful conduct initially made criminal by statute, including such offenses as murder, arson, rape, burglary and the like, is known

to jurists as *mala in se*—that is to say, it would be condemned by folk-custom even if there were no written laws. Another class is that in which are placed acts not so condemned and only wrong because the law has made them so. Such acts in law are known as *mala prohibita*. In the course of time some of them, like smuggling, piracy, perjury and drunkenness, while originally regarded with indifference, have become to be generally condemned by folk-custom. Others, such as relate to liquor selling, trespass, profanity, building regulations, Sunday observance, speed limits, etc., are either statutized class-custom or artificial creations of the legislature; as such but imperfectly adopted by folk-custom, and their infractions not necessarily recognized as morally wrong. To classify them we might almost adopt the continental term and call them contraventions.

The supposed potency of written laws has given rise to the superstition, peculiarly characteristic of American politics, that a folk-custom can be created by any man if he can only write it into a law and get it enacted by a legislature. Nevertheless, such efforts to accomplish a change of conduct by writing and enacting laws not declaratory of existing folk-custom are largely unsuccessful, even when supported by the party in power of the day. For strong as is the institution of the law, it is weak as compared with the tremendous force of folk-custom, which rests successively on ideals ingrained in man's sentimental nature

Superstition
of the omnipotence
of law

Moral confusion

by life-long moral training, on the century-long folkway habits, and on the instincts inherited from sources anterior to man. When such a law conflicts with folk-custom a moral confusion is created, everyone doubting whether the statute or folk-feeling more correctly expresses the obligations involved. Such moral conflicts are not good for the supremacy of the law; for one unenforceable statute tends to bring all law into contempt, as well as to encourage law-breakers. Moral confusion is not good for morals; for the impulses to conduct are found primarily in the emotions excited by the notions of right and wrong derived from folk-custom and humanistics.

Emotional sources of morals

The approbation which every member of the folkgroup feels and expresses for right conduct is emotional; the condemnation which everyone feels and expresses against a wrong is emotional; few take time or trouble to do much reasoning, or make much inquiry when they see a man beating a woman, or a thief running away with a purse; and resentment springs unbidden in the mind of him who detects a swindle.

Conscience a subjective adjunct to morals

The personal or subjective mental faculty by which our moral emotions of resentment or praise are aided in the determination of our moral duties is called conscience. Conscience is a general name for the aggregate of a man's convictions as to his moral obligations. Whether inheritance plays some part in the formation of this faculty or whether it is the outcome of youthful training, unconscious imita-

tion and the constant and potent coercion of the social group is immaterial to this discussion. We know that in either event it is by no means uniform or clear in its dictates, potent though they are with regard to many fundamental social necessities. Like the society, and like the conduct to which it applies, it is itself the subject of growth and change. It will not allow a young Australian, during the ceremony of initiation into manhood, to eat a female opossum, which is considered a great delicacy, no matter how hungry or how much alone he may be. It enjoins one man from going to the theater; it forbids another to allow a good play to come to town without taking his wife to see it. It permits one man to stay away from church and forbids another to do so. "Our consciences are absolutely indifferent when we sit down to a beefsteak but a Hindoo's would suffer agonies." Conscience would not prevent a Jew of the kingdoms from marrying several wives nor a Christian priest of the tenth century from keeping a concubine, but the consciences of modern Jews and modern priests have acknowledged wholly contrary mandates. All that we can say of conscience is that, as a general rule, it will guide us to doing what is considered right in our age and community. While the best men have the most sensitive consciences, the worst have hardly any conscience. And where there is confusion arising from the conflict between customs, or of customs and humanistics, conscience is by no means a certain guide to duty.

Religion
and Law
lag behind
folk-custom

It is characteristic of both religion and law, as moral adjuncts, that they generally lag behind the folk-custom from which they are derived. They are less sensitive to change in the ideals of folkgroup welfare than is the folk-feeling, or public sentiment, which is everywhere recognized as the most potent and flexible of all incitations to conduct. While in the main there is agreement between all these potencies as to what conduct should be expected of men in given situations, yet there is a twilight zone of acts in which the commands of one agency may be more or less contradictory to those of another.

A twilight
zone of
moral
conduct

Thus gambling has for years been contrary to law, and nevertheless it has been recognized accessory to church entertainments; whilst the aleatory instinct is so strong among the masses that we cannot say without qualification that it is condemned by folk-custom. Neither does conscience in any degree seem to class gambling among the criminal acts; in large measure farmers, producers and business men are obliged every year to take gambling chances in the natural course of their vocations. If away from home on a holiday most men have no compunctions in playing the horses, or even staking modest sums at the roulette wheel, which if confined within limits proportioned to their fortunes is not generally condemned.

The
aleatory
folkway

Gambling is but one of a class of conduct within the penumbra of moral confusion. Speculation, the use of stimulants, tobacco smoking, horse racing,

card playing, divorce, factors agreements, price Other restriction, etc., are not definitely and clearly dealt conduct in with by folk-custom, humanistics or by the moral the shadow adjuncts. For such acts, together with many other of confu- items of business conduct, there is no settled moral sion rule; a great obstacle to perfect moral conduct on the part even of the best intentioned.

The impulses to conduct afforded by conscience are the outcome of personal or subjective feeling; those put forward by folk-custom are controlled by folk- Emotional feeling or public sentiment; those which arise from impulse to class-custom are due to subgroup feelings; the force conduct of religion as an adjunct is emotional; that of the law largely so, although devised by reasoning. Moral conduct is, therefore, a matter of emotions so far as it is under the influence of impulses which are so plainly outlined as to be definite. But while emotion may be considered as the engine which drives the ship of human conduct, it needs rational intelligence as a helmsman to keep it on its course and to avoid obstacles; and such guidance is to be asked from the science of ethics. It is, therefore, the business of ethics to consider further what is needed for the determination of right conduct and to offer a way out of the confusion arising out of the conflicts which arise between (a) the customs of one group or of one folkgroup and those of another, (b) between folkways and folk-customs, (c) between folk-cus- The toms and humanistics, and (d) between each of these and their servants, law and religion. To man, stated

Summary

the agent, the function of the science is to give a guide to conscience, so that he may fit his conduct to the social, economic and moral environment in which he finds himself.

We have now learned:

A. That in the evolution of humanistics—conduct arising from pity—there are these steps:

- (1) The primary impulse of the compassionate individual, communicated
- (2) To a subgroup, often specially organized, and thence
- (3) By institutions, and finally
- (4) By folk-feeling, the source of morals.

B. That there are two chief institutional adjuncts to morals:

- (1) Law.
- (2) Religion.

C. And one subjective or personal adjunct, Conscience.

D. That all of these except the law are essentially the outcome of the emotions.

E. That while these are aids to right conduct there arise cases in which they are not certain guides in conflicts between the precepts of custom, humanistics, law and religion.

F. That we must look further for a rational guide to conduct; and that if ethics be a science we may find it there.

VII

THE EVOLUTION OF THE WILL: ITS REGULATION OF THE IMPULSES

Regarding moral acts as conditioned by the social life of which they are the outcome, we have now surveyed the structure of society in its evolution from its fundamental or atomic group, the family, through the various phases—clan, tribe and nation—by which the gradual development of civilization can be marked. We have seen that acts themselves can also be classified into modes common to all life; that anterior to the development in living creatures of a reasoning brain their behavior is actuated along common lines by three sets of forces—physical, reflexive and instinctive—which (1) are inherent in the constitution of matter and life, (2) exert themselves unconsciously in the agent as a consequence of natural laws of which he is ignorant, (3) are transmitted from generation to generation by inheritance, and (4) serve to adapt the structure of the agent to the environment by which he is surrounded. As these three modes of action are never consciously acquired and seem to be the issue of the laws of nature, we have classified them for convenience as *Natureways*.

And we have further found that in that highest of living creatures, man, in whom has been developed

Nurture-
ways

a brain capable of comparing and classifying things and acts, there are likewise uniformities of conduct, also capable of recognition as persistent phases throughout human social life. These uniformities result from impulses derived in the main from five motive sources, hunger, love, vanity, fear and pity, which are themselves based upon the constitution of man's nervous system. The modes of action characteristic of the three phases into which the resultant conduct can be classified are (1) exerted with a greater or less degree of consciousness by the agent, (2) always acquired, (3) never inherited, and (4) serve to adapt the structure of social groups to their environmental conditions. They fit the definition of conduct as conscious action adjusted to ends. As the outcome of education and imitation they may be grouped together as nurtureways.

The motive
sources of
Nurture-
ways

We may learn something of the relative values of the motive forces behind the nurtureways by a brief consideration of their origin and constitution. The sequence of their evolution is doubtless fairly well indicated by the order in which they are named. Hunger is a sensation arising from a set of reflexes, which in turn are evoked by physical forces. Feeding, its active functional expression, is needful for all life however low. Love is an emotion arising out of an instinct, which may be plainly derived from reflexive impulses, and therefore is one step, in evolution, above the hunger motive. Vanity and fear also are the emotional expression of instincts; but

instincts evidently less fundamental than either hunger or love; later in development, they are only to be observed in the higher animals and in man. Pity is a much more complex emotional state, the product of the tender emotion tinged with sympathetically induced pain. While pity may have its foothold in the upper strata of animal life, itself it is peculiarly human, and in its present degree of development even here a recent product.

All of these five motives psychologically considered are produced by impulses traveling along the network of fibrillated cells of which the human nervous and mental system is composed. It is a peculiarity of this system that every repetition of an impulse along these ropes or cords of nerve tissue makes it easier for another of the same sort to pass the same way. Habitual use along certain connecting lines makes future use along the same lines easier; just as on the railway, a constant service on one route, composed maybe of a dozen different main lines and branches, not only induces increased patronage on the part of travelers, but becomes simpler to manage through the training of the habits of all the engineers, conductors, signalmen and switchmen along the line. Settled tendencies to reproduce acts already several times repeated form habits, which as sources of motive impulses tend to increase in power in direct ratio to their repetition.

In human conduct, therefore, it is always easier for us to do and think as innumerable generations

Power of
the
primitive
modes of
behavior

of our remote ancestors have done and thought. The strength and persistence of our conduct-motives are in direct proportion to the priority of their origin. No impulse to our conduct is as strong as that of hunger, a sensation which descends to us from the zoophytes; and next to that love, which is at least as old as the vertebrates.

Fear is feeble or unnoticeable in the lower animals, and vanity is perceptible in only a few of the higher vertebrates. As to pity, it is an emotional co-ordination characteristically human, though its footprints may perhaps be faintly traced in the parental instinct shown by some of the upper orders of animalkind.

Feebleness
of higher
emotions in
primitive
peoples

A similar course of development runs through the social life of man. The conduct of primitive man is to a large degree under the influence of his physical needs; he more often feels hunger, more imperiously is impelled to reproduction than his civilized descendant. Savages know less of fear, and while they may display vanity in a crude and conspicuous way, its reactions are less thorough-going than in our more complex social life. Pity with them is weak even within family or consanguineous lines; they have little regard for human life or suffering, and none whatever for that of the birds or beasts. In a word we may observe that the later, and as we are accustomed to say higher, motives grow fainter as we descend through the biological phases of the whole evolution of life.

And we may further observe so far as proportions are concerned that as we ascend the evolutionary scale these feebler impulses form an increasing part of the whole motive mixture in direct ratio to the development of the nervous and mental systems by which they are felt, and through which they act.

Nevertheless, we cannot evade the question, Why is it that we do not place the satisfaction of the interests arising from these prior, stronger, agelong, natureway forces first, and, disregarding all other considerations, proceed directly and everywhere to gratify them in the order of their intensity and origin? Why in our present social phase should not the stimulations of the hunger and love motives, for instance, invariably supersede all later and feebler incitements to action, since they arise distinctly out of the natureways, and should be, as they are, most fully and completely amalgamated with our natures by longest continued habitual exercise?

It is true that the primitive motives underlying natureways indeed form the main tracks of our nervous railway systems, but in the course of time we have built up by means of nurtureways an almost infinite network of branch and connecting lines, all of which serve important districts of the broad and well-developed area of our minds; and at innumerable junction stations our hunger and love mainline trains have to stop to make connections, and to interchange traffic with these numerous branches. For this reason our trunk line is so crowded that

only infrequently can it be spared for the passage of through express trains; and then, like those of the railway itself, only according to a well-planned time-table, with rules drawn up by a skillful manager, controlled by an efficient system of block signals, in the hands of the train dispatcher.

And so with our mental traffic lines; the time-table is found in the nurtureways, the rules are those of morals; the general management is in the hands of society, and the train dispatcher is individual self-control through the will, based on self-consciousness, the signal system.

In society
weaker
motives
control

While hunger and love are the most primitive, the most racially repetitive and therefore the most insistent of all the human motives; nevertheless in civilized society we find them in subjection to what we call our higher selves—to the later and, therefore, weaker impulses. This may be due partly to a degree of antagonism between hunger—primarily individualistic—and love—the emotional beginning of socialization—and partly to an excess power attained by the more numerous, if less potent, nurtureway motives acting in combination. Nurtureways, as we have seen, are the outcome of folk-feeling, a social expression of moral control. When, therefore, by social means the margin of force, by which the more primitive impulses normally outweigh the more recent ones, is reduced, there remains but a minimum to be overcome by the individual in the balance of desires. But a few more impulse

grains are needed to turn the scale against the lower motives—which unloosed in the existing complex civilization would tear us to pieces socially as well as destroy us individually. Observation shows that this final reinforcement of social moral control is drawn from individual volition.

How is this support by individual volition of the later and weaker impulses supplied?

The general question is one of a conflict between the impulses derived from one motive or set of motives with those of another. The conduct ultimately performed by the agent is always the result of a choice between two sets of impulses, one of which is always of the natureways. In behavior the choice may be determined directly by the greater power of one of the two natureways in a given situation, as for instance when a jackal has to choose between his desire for a piece of meat in the possession of a tiger and his fear of the great cat; in which case the instinctive emotion of fear controls the reflex feeling of hunger, and without volition on the part of the agent. It is in this way that behavior is determined as between the impulses of conflicting natureways in the animalkind. The result is a direct choice predetermined by the reflexes or the instincts and tends to the survival of the beast. So also the choices of young children are controlled by that impulse which at the moment happens to be least hampered by existing circumstances; as for instance when the desire for sweetmeats conflicts with the

Direct choices between natureways

fear of punishment. If elders are about, fear will triumph; if the child is alone, he will yield to temptation. Direct choice may be varied to some degree through habits resulting from the contact of instinct with experience—the progenitor of our folkways.

Conscious
choices
when a
nurtureway
is con-
cerned

Volition
derived
from self-
conscious-
ness

We have already observed that among humankind the prevalence of higher over lower motive impulses, in making choices, is proportioned to the degree of nervous and mental development in the agent. While in primitive social phases, as in animal life, much behavior springs directly from instinct, yet the emotions organized by the folkgroup through its folkways and folk-customs soon begin to guide a more conscious choice between conflicting impulses, conforming the resultant conduct to the pressure of the group, the weaker desires being reinforced and compelled by fear of the folk-feeling and of its institutional adjuncts. In still higher social phases, reasoning powers have been developed to a point where both the weaker and the stronger impulses can be consciously presented to and balanced by the mind. Such conscious choices are the result of volitions—efforts of the will. They are not observable in animals, although in them the simulation of choice is sometimes produced by habits due to external compulsion, such as a master's training, etc. Now volition is a function of self-consciousness, and its operations will be better understood by a brief review of our present knowledge of the development of personality in mankind.

The evolution of self-consciousness can best be observed in the growing minds of children. As the embryo recapitulates the course of biological evolution so the development of the child-mind probably recapitulates the course of social evolution. The mental resemblances between adult savages and young children of higher social phases have often been remarked.

The acquisition of self-consciousness, in the developing man or in the infant, is the result of a process of accumulating knowledge of the self, its structure and surroundings. This knowledge is cumulative; that later acquired based upon and inspired by that which is previously possessed. And so the mind of every man gradually steps upward a staircase of personality, attaining by degrees different levels, marked by certain characteristics which may be recognized and classified according to their effect in the determination of conduct.

(1) The first level, then, of self-consciousness is that whereon the self has been distinguished from others, both persons and things. (2) Later comes the level, whereon persons generally are perceived to be of a different class or order from inanimate objects, or from lower animals. In the personification of stones, trees, etc., in early mythology and in the attribution of human qualities to wild animals, we can perceive the traces of the earlier level of self-consciousness on which this distinction was not obvious to the gradually opening mind. (3) The

The self-regarding sentiments—

next level is attained when social relations have been discovered; the impulses derived from the contact with others—parents, relatives, friends, groups—an appreciation not only of their existence, but of the effect on us of their acts and of their beliefs about ourselves; reactions upon the self-mind of the ideas and observation of social groups about it and him; conceptions of those things about the self that others can see better than ourselves. (4) The self on the fourth level has discovered that there are physical rewards and punishments apportioned to different classes of conduct, either by other persons or by the folkgroup, and that from the standpoint of pain and pleasure it pays to be good. (5) On the next level man has advanced from this state of mind to an appreciation of folk-feeling expressed by social praise and blame, and of his satisfaction when he conforms to public opinion, and of his shame when it is transgressed. The highest levels thus far developed in our civilization are those in which the self-regarding sentiments are predominant; (6) pride and (7) self-respect. As these two levels are successively reached we first become conscious that we are capable of being proud of that position which we hold or that occupation which we pursue; and in our relations with others we will do nothing to imperil their high opinion for our class or for our work; and lastly, as a being whose character has been formed by the ascent of all of these successive stages of self-consciousness into a person who by his

attitude toward the world, not only solicits respect —the highest level of personality from others but pays it to himself.

If each of these steps in the formation of the highest form of self-consciousness be considered of equal value, then the ascent to the upper level would appear to be overwhelmingly due to the contact of the mind with society. And since all men's opportunities for that contact are not equal we must expect to find differences in the levels attained by the self-consciousness of persons (1) in different social phases, or even (2) within the limits of a single folkgroup. It would be foolish as well as useless to look for the higher levels in savage states, where the necessary social conditions have never existed. Personality from the contact of mind with men And the minds of those upon whom this social contact works—do they not possess sensitiveness and development in different degrees? We may look in vain for a high level of self-consciousness or a high grade of morality among peoples brought up in the lower social phases, among mental defectives, or among young children.

As the resultant of two sets of variables—social contact and mental sensitiveness—we therefore find great differences, in time and space, between the levels of self-consciousness to which individual minds have risen. But as each society has roughly a type of mentality characteristic of itself, and each form of folkgroup its characteristic type of association, we shall not be surprised if we find that in each social phase there is a corresponding level of self-conscious-

—and proportioned to social phases

ness to which the average mind of the folkgroup members has risen. The moral choices of the men in that phase are reinforced and determined by control impulses derived from the highest level of self-consciousness to which their group has attained.

Coincidences of favoring conditions produce super-normal men

In every social phase, nevertheless, there are certain persons who, through superior opportunities of social contact combined with a mentality above the common, have passed on to the self-conscious level characteristic of the approaching social phase. When these persons are few in number, they are the idealists and dreamers of their time and place; as they increase in numbers, however, they become the leaders of their groups, destined to fashion their folkgroup into a capacity for larger civilization, and finally to raise it from a lower to a higher social phase. They increase and multiply in proportion to their ability thus to better fit their folkgroup for survival in the struggle for existence by an improved adaptation of its folk-customs to its environment.

Personality conditioned by age

The growth of self-consciousness being both gradual and cumulative as men pass through the social phases, we may observe that within each social phase it is also proportioned to age as well as to intelligence. The activities of a young man would be much impeded by such self-knowledge as is necessary to an old man's existence. Among the inexperienced or unintelligent a lower level of self-realization forms the soil on which the fakir—medical, political or social—cultivates his crop. Of the sub-

—and by social experience

groups within a complex folkgroup not every one is capable of rising to the same level of self-consciousness as other subgroups; for conditions may be and frequently are unfavorable to that mental content and fullness of social contact which are needed for the final steps of its evolution.

The apportionment of culture is uneven in every folkgroup, just as the allotment of mentality is unlike among the sons of a single family; both disparities arise from conditions which we cannot control.

We must realize if we would know and understand morals, that the study of barbaric peoples is only one of the sources for knowledge of the more primitive social phases and mental levels of the clan or tribe, and that such undeveloped groups in fact survive as subgroups within the bounds of the most advanced nations of our time. In the United States this is peculiarly the case because, owing to the principle that men in lower social phases are always attracted toward the life of the phases next above them, our country becomes the refuge for all the inferior groups whose aspirations are repressed in their native lands by obstructive folk-customs crystallized in law, and supported by the *force majeure* of an ancient and powerful institutional control.

Folkgroups rarely homogeneous mentally or socially

The social problem in the United States

Self-consciousness once conceived of as an evolution, proceeding step by step along the same pathway as life, man, society, conduct, mind and morals, it remains only to explain its influence upon the choices, which must be exercised when conduct-impulses

Personality and will

derived from higher and lower motives come in conflict with one another.

We have seen that pride and self-respect are the highest manifestations of self-consciousness. They are also the sources of desires and aversions, which are manifested through volitions favoring the higher modes of conduct. The desires and aversions arising from pride and self-respect reinforce the choices by which the weaker and later conduct-impulses are finally made to prevail.

To draw an instance from the field of business, Personality in banking we may take the everyday experience of investment banking in our provincial towns. Two well-defined

types of security dealers exist in almost every interior city. The first is that of the local private banker, generally a leading citizen, who with sons and partners and partners' sons deals directly with neighbors and friends. Such people carefully weigh their words in giving advice to their clients; they are proud of the place they hold in the community, and their self-respect will not permit them to do anything to imperil it. They would prefer to sacrifice business rather than do anything underhanded or say anything untruthful to obtain it. If through an error of theirs or through their bad judgment they have persuaded a client to invest in an unsound security, they would prefer to buy it back rather than be the means by which he had lost his capital. It is against the higher impulses of such a firm to encourage speculative gambling, for they know that

those who indulge in it always lose in the long run. In a word the high ideals of professional conduct which are the outcome of their pride and self-respect have so reinforced the impulses arising from the later and weaker humanistic of consideration for the client that they prevail over those proceeding from the folk-customs,—ancient and strong though they be,—(1) that if people want to be cheated, let them—*si populus vult decipi, decipiatur*—and (2) that every purchaser must take and accept the risk of his purchase—*caveat emptor*.

The other type is that of the local branch office of a New York stockbroker in charge of a manager sent out by the parent house. Educated in the most impersonal school of trading in the world, where the quick succession of multitudinous transactions leaves time neither for reflection nor for consideration, he is sent abroad by his employers to get them business in the smaller city. His success depends upon the amount of new business he can bring in and the quicker he does it the better; he comes today, he may go tomorrow; he has no established local reputation, and his chief concern is to promote purchases and so to increase commissions. Providing he gets business he need have no pride in his job; to his employer his clients are only names written in a book and rated by Dun or Bradstreet. So long as they keep their margins good they are welcome to speculate whether they have the means to do it or not. The lifeblood of their business is to buy and sell,

The
brokerage
type

this makes commissions; the principal cares little how the agent gets the business. He cannot be paid with a share of the earnings, and so have a stake in the continuity of his business, for that is against the rules of the exchange; but he may lawfully be given a liberal allowance of wines, liquors and cigars as a part of the necessary expense of attracting trade. The growth of pride and self-respect as reinforcements to the humanistics of business is stifled here, as it is encouraged there.

Immoral results arising from an institutional restriction

High morals help survival

The policy of the stock exchange in prohibiting the splitting of commissions is the excuse for the branch office, in place of the more natural alliance with an old established private business. The exchange allows its member to spend more than half-commissions to get trade in a low way, but will not allow him to spend as much on a legitimate business proposition to get it in a high way. Thus it directly promotes a low moral standard among its members, a course which it will doubtless some day have cause to regret. For the choice of the higher morality always tends to survival; while the choice of the lower, though often temporarily profitable, leads eventually to social disapprobation, condemnation and reprisal and costs the group more than is compensated by individual gain.

In this illustration we can see (1) a conflict between two modes of conduct: a humanistic—consideration for the client; and some folk-customs—allowable deceptions and *caveat emptor*; (2) vol-

unitary choice of the higher mode, despite the Moral relative weakness of its impulses, through its conflict and reinforcement by the higher level of self-regarding its solution sentiment existing in the character of the bankers; (3) voluntary choice of the older and stronger but lower mode by the brokers, whose previous education in an environment of obsolescent folk-custom, institutionally crystallized, had formed their characters on lower and more primitive levels of self-consciousness.

Personal character, therefore, is the sounding board for the moral tones through which volitions are expressed in conduct. It is the sum of acquired tendencies organized and built up by self-consciousness and consolidated by habitual action, upon the native basis of a man's temperament and disposition. It is dependent to as large a degree upon environment and opportunity as is its parent self-consciousness; and so George Eliot says: "our deeds determine us as much as we determine our deeds, and until we know what has been or will be the peculiar combination of outward with inward facts which constitutes a man's critical actions, it will be better not to think ourselves wise about his character."

In our ignorance we have but two categories of character, strong and weak. But the keynote of the essential difference between these two aspects is The two fairly clear. Strong character is that in which the categories emotions and habits are organized by the influence of character of an ideal—of what a man wants out of life, or of

The
strong—

—fashioned
by an ideal

The
weak—

—feeling
the master
of its
personality

what he believes is the ultimate aim of life—and with the purposes so generated he persistently adjusts his habits of conduct to the realization—so far as his disposition and his volitional control will permit—of the aims which his ideal inspires. Disposition is inherent, the product of nature-ways; a man cannot avoid his disposition any more than he can alter the shape of his head or the color of his eyes. Like the instincts from which it springs it can be faintly modified by habitual self-control; but the emotional impulses which are acquired during lifetime from the contact of mind and society are much more largely in the hands of the volitions with which the development of a man's self-consciousness has endowed him. And so, strong character is that in which such control of the impulses has been undertaken in a systematic manner, and for the fixed purpose of carrying out an ideal, conceived by the mind, and always before it.

Weak character is that in which the sentiments dispositionally inherited or socially acquired are not organized by strong ideals; and therefore, to whatever level of self-consciousness its possessor may have attained, he lacks the inspiration necessary to bring his bundle of sentiments under the full control of an intelligent volition. He may, therefore, have beautiful feelings, which run away with his self-control—the sentimental type—and lead him to forget the end in his abandon to the means.

In strong characters, therefore, emotion is the

servant of a self-control actuated by ideals; while in weak ones, emotion is the master of a volition not dominated by a strong conception of ends and aims.

To resume:

1. The springs of impulses to behavior or conduct lie in the emotions. Summary

2. Behavior-impulses proceed from natureways, in which case they are inherent; and conduct-impulses from nurtureways, in which case they are acquired.

3. Impulses are powerful in proportion to their habitual exercise both racially and individually; and those which are the more primitive are the stronger.

4. In conflicts between impulses in the lower orders of life behavior is directly determined by whichever is the stronger, as modified by the circumstances of the time and place.

5. In conflicts between the impulses of the higher life the resultant conduct is determined by a balance of forces, in which conscious volition is or may be the makeweight.

6. Volition is a function of self-consciousness and is directly proportioned to the level of its development.

7. The joint product of disposition, temperament and self-conscious volition is organized in man as character; and this organization is systematized and strengthened by his ideals of life.

In the struggle to realize his ideals, a man of strong character will assist himself by the formula-

The
value of
principle—

—as an
economizer
of effort

tion and adherence to fixed principles of action. Principle as an adjunct to volition gives the same support to the systematic organization of individual character as moral rules do to conformity with the folk-custom; they contribute to efficiency by minimizing effort. To determine, in each particular instance, what course of action—what conduct—the man of character shall pursue, involves thought, and thought costs effort. This effort is in direct ratio to the novelty of the act under consideration. To the mind, as to the body, effort is more or less disagreeable. In order, therefore, to avoid effort the man of strong character devises rules of action for self-guidance which will bear the same relation to his conduct as folkways and folk-customs bear to the conduct of the group. Tending to economize mental effort through predetermination of the volitions, they help to organize his conduct along the lines of least resistance and to set free a larger amount of mental energy for the consummation of the ideal by which his character is dominated. Adherence to principle attracts others with whom dealings are to be desired, and Bacon advises wisely that he who desires great place should "seek to make his course regular, that men may know beforehand what they may expect." Most men of strong character understand well the value of fixed principles and the danger and confusion produced by irregular exceptions.

In the practice of the business world these rela-

tions, though rarely formulated, are well understood. Character is conceded to be the main foundation of credit; other things being equal, men of principle are increasingly better fitted to survive in the bitter competition by which the economic world is ruled. To consider the relations of economics and business to the evolutionary processes which, as we have seen, are the explanation of matter, life, morals and character, will be the object of the remaining chapters of this essay.

—as an
element
making for
survival

VIII

THE ECONOMIC IMPULSES—BUSINESS

Conduct
not all
moral

Moral conduct is a part—a large part but not all—of the acts by which a group of men is enabled to secure sufficient food supply, to protect itself from its enemies, to prolong its existence by the regulated exercise of its reproductive instincts, to increase its potency by inner efficiency or by territorial expansion, and finally to foster the welfare of its individual members. Apart from morals there is a very large class of impulses to conduct motived by economic forces.

Economic
conduct

Like ethics, economics is a quest for the ways in which with the least effort man can so adjust himself to his environment as to procure the satisfaction of certain desires. The most important of these are food and clothing for the family, lodging and the prospect of being to some degree independent of lifelong labor to supply these needs, or to gratify other secondary desires arising from a variety of instincts or tendencies such as those of curiosity or beauty. The primitive impetus to economic conduct is, therefore, derived from the same primeval impulses of hunger and love, adding thereto that of a number of morally neutral instincts, the principal of which are those of acquisition and construction. Conduct resulting from economic motives is dis-

tinguished from that inspired by moral motives in —con-
that it is concerned with individual rather than with cerned with
folkgroup welfare, and that its uniformities are the individual
result of a rationally realized experience of their welfare
benefits instead of being induced by the folk-feelings
which rally in support of folk-custom. Thus, at
the outset, economic conduct is in the main pursued
for individual interest or for the interest of a sub-
group, and only incidentally in the interest of the
commonweal. As a product of the reason rather Rational
than of the emotions the expressions of its adapta-
tion to environment, or the reverse, are, therefore,
wise or foolish instead of right or wrong. Primarily
it has no bearing, real or fancied, upon the ideals of
social welfare which the folkgroup establishes for
itself.

But with the increasing complexity of the national Its inter-
folkgroups there is an increasing disposition to con- connection
nect social welfare with certain phases of individual with morals
economic activity. The folkgroup vaguely recog-
nizes that the ramification of economic subgroups
throughout its entire structure must necessarily have
consequences beneficial or hostile to its welfare.
Wisely or foolishly, therefore, it is beginning to
attribute a social or moral aspect to a class of cen-
tralized, folkwide, economic conduct which per-
formed by the many or within a small area has a
negligible bearing upon the folkweal. It is here that
we find the explanation of the oft mooted question as The scale
to why certain conduct which on a small scale is not of offense

viewed with hostility, when exercised on a large scale, the folkgroup resents, and endeavors to regulate or suppress by statutory institutions. The principle involved in this change of attitude is that so long as a business is individualized by competition it is an affair of individual interest; but that when it is socialized by combination it becomes an affair of social interest.

Economics
not
opposed
to morals

Inasmuch as economic conduct is an essential means of adjusting the lives of individuals to the conditions of their environment, and as the greater part of that environment is social, it is only when maladjusted that economic conduct can normally run counter to folkgroup interests. The concern of ethics with conduct arising from the economic impulses will naturally be limited to that residuum of cases, wherein they conflict with the accepted rules of morality.

Economic-
moral
situations

Rules of economics, like those of morals, are in continual motion and change, in response to the constantly changing conditions by which they are affected. A series of situations arises in the effort to form the conduct-adjustments: (1) of individuals to individuals, (2) of individuals to groups, (3) of groups to groups, (4) of groups to the folkgroup, and (5) of the folkgroup to its environment.

Adjustment

The adjustments thus outlined are complicated by the process of motion and change through which morals and economics are continually passing in the course of evolution, for these factors of the problem

of conduct move along their course of development at rates which are not always the same; and it often happens that the structure of one of them is over-developed with respect to the other. Such inequality of progress leads to novel situations for which at the time being no settled moral rules have been evolved. Under these circumstances men are uncertain what conduct they are under obligation to perform, and are driven hither and thither by conflicting interests and emotions. In short, existing moral sentiment is for the time being incompetent to decide the questions that frequently arise during a constructive period of humanistics, or of interpenetrating sub-groups, or during a degenerative process involving the survival of a law after its basic folk-custom has been disowned by folk-feeling. The emotional forces by which the art of conduct is commonly inspired are confused by such conflicts. The volitions, unguided by precedent, have to seek the aid of the reasoning powers to form new principles of action: this is a slow and deliberate process, and until new rules are formulated and agreed upon the community is temporarily in a state of quandary toward the conduct in question.

A practical illustration of the theory of conflicts and confusions is found in the history of transportation rates in the United States. As originally conceived railways were private enterprises encouraged by the folkgroup on account of their manifest benefit to the communities which they serve. Their

Transportation in the United States

Maxim of
"what the
traffic will
bear"

charges for transport were fixed to agree with existing folkways of rates, and the basis and method of their assessment in accordance with the existing folk-custom. This folk-custom was derived from two sources: the custom of the water-carrying and of the land-carrying groups. As established in the folkways, the freight rates of the latter group were high compared with present standards: being adjusted to local needs by the competition of other land carriers and limited by the cost of horse-drawn carriage on the highways of that time. With the advent of competition between the railways themselves, after other conditions had made such competition practical, rates of freight were vastly reduced, especially where a large volume of business could be so produced. At places where there was no railway competition the reduction was adjusted to the point necessary to secure, as against wagon traffic, all the business there originating. Thus grew up the custom of the railway group of fixing its charges in accordance with "what the traffic would bear" and in accordance with existing folkways in satisfying the conditions of life in the local village or other group. To do so conflicted with no folk-custom, because by increased speed and lower rates the service rendered to each community increased its welfare beyond that produced by any previous folkway of transport.

Enterprising men discovered in certain community-groups folkway conditions which they could

turn to their own profit, with corresponding advantage to the members of the group, by promoting industrial enterprises therein, which had been held back only by the high cost of transportation to that point. These promoters approached the railroad group with the proposition that special rates, or perhaps rebates from existing rates, be given to them, promising in return a large amount of traffic. Such rates and rebates proved highly beneficial both to railroad and to groupal welfare, and were adopted into folk-custom. They furthered the incoming of other enterprises into the favored towns and became in time an important stimulus to the growth and prosperity of cities. The ultimate result, however, of these new adjustments between folkways and folk-customs was a large amount of irregularity in freight discrimination: unimportant local groups or individuals unable to control large shipments being subject to very unfavorable discrimination.

Such discrimination was not, at first, regarded as Not prima-unfair. According with groupal welfare in a very rily unfair broad way it was not inconsistent with folk-custom. The sufferers were a residuum, an insignificant minority of industrial producers: *de minimis mos non curat*. For it is not the business of the folk-custom to look out for the individual: its concern is only with the folkgroup.

Differences in carrying charges between different groups or persons in fact not only were supported by existing by this precedent, but by another one, of immemorial folk-custom

usage. Until the advent of the railway the great bulk—probably nineteen twentieths—of all freight traffic was water-borne. Ships and other vessels are comparatively large units of carriage, and in order to sail them safely and profitably, it is necessary that they should be loaded full. If a loading vessel has been only partly filled by complying with the existing folkway of competitive freight rates it is better for the group who sail it, and for the folkgroup itself—of whose organism the sailor-group is a most vital member—that it should be fully loaded before departure, even if the last end of its cargo should have to be carried at a lower price. And so the sailor-group from time immemorial, in accordance with folk-custom has been in the habit of filling up its ships at the best price it could get: anything was better than sailing in ballast. Such is the custom of sailing vessels to this day: and by these means oversea markets are often opened to classes of merchandise which at a higher cost of carriage would not be demanded abroad. The analogous situation on the railroads is that of back-loading, where almost any revenue is better than a train of empty cars.

The custom
of sea-borne
traffic

Back-
loading

Immediately following the Civil War a period of industrial stimulation gave large profits and apparent prosperity to all classes of business. Coinciding with the reaction from these conditions was the inevitable national return to a sound currency basis, involving widespread folkway changes, with business losses to those who were behindhand in adjusting their con-

duct to these environmental disturbances. Almost coincidently also came a period of hitherto unparalleled railway construction, involving keen competition for business, accompanied by an accentuation of the rate irregularities above referred to. Discriminations favored the strong, and the weak, considered politically, were in the majority. There was a growing need for a humanistic of equal treatment in the adjustment of freight rates, to which the crude railway management of the times was oblivious, relying upon the well-established folk-customs by which carrying charges had for centuries been fixed. The This brought about political agitation, and the familiar establishment of a subgroup to forward such a change. The western farmers, in fact, organized themselves into granges and attempted the accomplishment of this purpose by statutory legislation in the states where they were preponderant.

But existing folk-custom was too well and firmly fixed in folk-feeling for the immediate change desired by the group. Railroad construction in the states abruptly ceased and the enforcement of their crude statutes halted. The railway group and the farmer group rose to a higher level of self-consciousness through the discovery that they were interdependent members of a folkgroup organism. Meantime the conflict between the folkways founded on economic impulses, and the proposed humanistic continued. The relations of the railway group to the granger group, and to an increasing number of com-

Development of railroads into social organs

A case of functional disease

Railway commissions as a remedy

munities and individuals, were out of adjustment to each other. All these groups were out of adjustment to their environment. From private enterprises beginning with the simple relations of individuals to individuals, later of groups to groups, the railways had developed more complex folkgroup relations, which in their inception had not been dreamed of. They have been evolved into interdependent organs essential to folkgroup welfare, and their structure has become the means by which an integral and very important function of the social organism is performed—a gear wheel of the intricate social machine without which it ceases to operate.

In the process economic impulses had come into clash with moral impulses, with resultant strife and bitterness between subgroups. It was fortunately a condition of functional and not of organic disease. Neither of the folkgroup organs—railway group nor industrial group—was fundamentally affected. Functional diseases either of the body or of society are cured through readjustment of the functions; and the necessary therapy was supplied by the device of institutions—the railway commissions—which for the past thirty years have been gradually accomplishing this task. They have modified folk-custom and furthered humanistic development in the interest of weaker individuals and groups, and of the commonweal; that is to say, by a progressive adjustment through moral and legal means of the changing folkgroup structure to its environment.

In this sketch may be seen birth and the gradual growth within the folkgroup of a new subgroup—the railway—its early development in conformity with existing folk-custom and existing folkways; economic evolution and the influence upon the subgroup of economic impulses; their adjustment to folkgroup environment, at first harmonious and later discordant; the advance of the railways from individualization to socialization through the ramifications and growth of the system; motion and change also in folkgroup morals through the changed environment in the depression of 1873-79; conflict; the earlier triumph of folk-custom over law; the later growth of humanistics evolving into new folk-custom; the establishment of institutional control; and the process of final adjustment to the harmony between folkways, class-custom and folk-custom, by which our folkgroup better fits itself for survival. The history is really one of the readjustment of business to morals; the main subject with which this essay is concerned.

Business is human activity, i.e., conduct, with respect to the exchange of services, commodities or moneys. In primitive social phases—the clan, for instance—business is undeveloped. The kinship molecule begins by holding most objects of use or desire in common, very much as in the family atom of today. In all probability the first exchanges were largely by force or intimidation, the spoils of war or of theft, plundered by one socialistic kinship group

Socialization
of the
railways

Its evolution

from an outgroup not kin to itself—an act commendable rather than to be condemned. As society passed from the kinship to the tribal phase, the relation of common interest between the clans which form the tribe developed a peaceful folk-custom for the exchange of commodities produced by the industry of one and desired by another.

Dependent on exchanges

Business, therefore, is an outcome of the failure of self-sufficing industry to adjust the structure of a group to its environment. So long as the primitive folkgroup produces within its bounds everything needed to satisfy its wants it has no need of exchanges, but so soon as it produces an excess of any commodity or acquires a folkway of using any commodity which it does not produce, it finds its interest in exchanging a part of its product with other folkgroups so as to procure such goods as others may produce in excess of their needs. The folk-customs of intragroup communism and intergroup plunder which formerly prevailed are gradually supplanted by new folk-customs governing the interchange of goods with outgroups, and finally of systematized exchange within the folkgroup bounds. The earliest form of peaceful exchange is barter, or the exchange of one commodity directly against others, closing the transaction, and barter is business in its most rudimentary form. The formerly self-sufficing hunting, pastoral or agricultural clan which begins to hoard a surplus of its product for the use of others, and to receive from others in exchange a part of their sur-

The evolution of money

plus, next feels the need of a measure of value for such exchange. The ultimate expression of this necessity is money—cattle or bronze, gold or silver, cowries or banknotes—as a medium of exchange.

Business originates in the excess product of industrial groups and is a potent factor in the development of the conditions under which economic subgroups are formed and maintained. In highly civilized nations the economic type of subgroup tends eventually to supplant the decaying tribal and clan groups out of which they are originally formed.

The customs of business are probably at first clan customs because the clan is the primitive industrial group. But in the evolution of the tribe from the clan, and of the nation from the tribe, that part of the customs which has been developed by the Kin-groups growth of business eventually adheres to the supplanted industrial, rather than to the kinship group. The contempt of trade manners peculiar to some aristocracies is very likely a survival of clan-feeling, originating at a time when that group and the industrial group were in bitter rivalry. It is the fate of customs based on kinship-ideals to become constantly less important to group welfare, and so to be gradually supplanted by customs based on economic ideals.

As an instance may be cited the subjection of children to parents, which began in absolute ownership, fairly analogous to slavery: a condition which in custom, if not in law, persisted long after the maturity of the infant, until the eighteenth century. It is only

—but is
yielding to
industrial
custom

Group
types of the
20th cen-
tury in the
U. S.

Industrial—
—extractive
—manufac-
turing

within the last ten years that the power of the parent to control his child until the age of thirty has been broken in France. The early laws of Kentucky allowed parents to put disobedient children in jail "until they were humbled." In the New England agricultural family of the early nineteenth century, the status of the children was often that of dependents, participating in the common support but without separate means so long as they lived at home. But at present the economic independence of the child of over school age is folk-custom in the Northern States, even where unrecognized by law; while in parts of the South the right of parents to exploit the labor of their progeny is as yet undisputed.

The types of economic group which have grown up during the nineteenth century and serve society through the exercise of business functions may be classified thus:

A. *Industrial Groups*: primarily producers of raw materials extracted from the natural environment, such as game, skins, furs, wool, meats, food-stuffs and textile fibres, and those similarly drawn from mother earth, such as ores, crude chemicals, fuels, oils, metals and minerals; and next manufacturers of raw materials by moving or combining their particles so as to make them directly serve the folk-ways of the consumer, through processes of tanning, spinning, weaving, grinding, smelting, founding, refining, etc. The importance of the business func-

tion of the industrial groups, in a given social phase, is measured by the proportions of their product not consumed within the group: the farmer who supports himself and his family entirely from the product of his farm, and exchanges none of it for the products of others, is not in any sense in business.

B. *Transportation Groups* perform the service of carrying commodities, either raw or finished, anywhere between their initial production and their ultimate consumption and exercise a business function whose importance is in direct proportion to the distance traversed or the obstacles overcome.

C. *Trade Groups*, such as selling agents, brokers, Trade merchants, exporters or importers, and those engaged in the distribution of merchandise from the producing to the consuming markets, such as commission merchants, jobbers and retailers, serve actively in the exchange of commodities, either for their own account or for that of others. The value of their business function is in direct proportion to the existing obstacles opposing a direct communication between producer and consumer. These obstacles may be natural, like distance, or lack of facilities for intercommunication; artificial, such as institutional barriers erected by law, tariff duties, etc.; or moral, arising out of a difference in folkway and folk-custom—language, social status, scale of living, etc.

D. *Labor Groups* sell their working time or Labor task-performance either for subsistence, for wages

or for piece-price; and whether manual, skilled or clerical, are evolved with the development of industry, transportation or trade so soon as co-operative rather than individual toil conduces better to the survival of that subgroup by which it is performed. The first phase of labor is of slavery or family work in a communistically or patriarchally organized society; its second phase is that of time wages, the third is that of task-performance and piece payment; its fourth seems to be along the lines of profit sharing. A rudimentary trace of business exists, even in its earliest phase, but that function takes a more important place as the simpler stages of customary, competitive and combination wages are passed and the more complex conditions established by the piece-price and the bonus systems are entered upon.

Financial

E. *Financial Groups*, such as bankers, stock-brokers, promoters, insurers, serve society by transacting the exchange of domestic and foreign money and credits, and in the purchase or sale of marketable property rights, investment securities, or contracts for the assumption of risks. These groups perform a business function whose importance is in direct ratio to the complexity of the folkgroup organization.

Profes-
sional

F. *Professional Groups* are those who sell services based upon special knowledge needful to social or industrial welfare, such as engineers, physicians, lawyers, teachers, authors, artists or clergymen, and these are in business to the extent that their services

are exchanged for money or for commodities exchangeable into money.

The conduct involved in the business activities of each of these groups is influenced and determined by motives three sets of forces—the economic impulses, the moral impulses and the self-conscious level to which they have attained. The resultant of the conflict or co-operation of these forces is expressed in the group morals, or standard of what conduct it is right to expect from a member of any one of these groups. Evolution For each group has its own class-customs obligatory upon all of its members, however imperfectly known or, may be, entirely unknown to the members of the other groups. From the class-custom, standards of right conduct are formed from the group members, binding indeed upon the group, but by no means binding upon members of other groups, or upon all groups. For example, advertising is contrary to good morals in the medical and legal professions, but is right for the industrial and trading classes. The pleading of a purely technical objection is not wrong for a lawyer, but is not considered right for a business man. A broker who sells a security on the stock exchange does not guarantee the value of his commodity: if it proves worthless, he is not condemned, but a dry goods merchant must see to it that what he sells is merchantable, i.e., sufficiently perfect to be serviceable for the customary use which is made of it. A textile producer may without moral wrong put on the

Its vagaries

market a mixture of silk and mercerized cotton to answer the purpose of a pure silk fabric at a lower price, provided he does not actively misrepresent its quality, but an apothecary who uses a substitute in the preparation of his prescription is guilty of a crime. The most wrongful conduct in the class-custom of the labor groups is to compete for a fellow member's job, but elsewhere groups and communities very generally resent restraint of competition as a restraint of trade.

Subgroup standards may vary from folk-group standards

Subgroup standards, therefore, are not necessarily folkgroup standards for moral conduct, whether because the conditions differ under which they are to be applied, or because the principle which underlies them is not recognized and approved by the whole social fabric, no matter how completely it may be accepted by some one of its constituent parts. To win that degree of acceptance which will admit them to an undisputed moral rank, they must either be recognized by the folkgroup as essential to its welfare, or as responding to that degree of emotional satisfaction which the current development of its sentiment of pity demands.

A comparison of the group morals derived from class-customs with the universal morals derived from folk-custom, and which are recognized by society as obligatory upon all of its members, will give a fair index to their correspondence with the prevailing morality of the time. It is in the differences between the customs of one group and those of other groups

with whom they transact business that will be found Conflicts of many of the disputed and debated questions of trade subgroup morals which are always vexing so long as the morals common ground of a folkwide moral principle fails to be found.

The bearing of these subgroup differences upon the development of business morals during the course of the existing social, industrial and economic evolution is most important. The course of this evolution has been rapid, especially during the last five decades of the nineteenth century, and the first decade of the twentieth.

Business groups are dependent upon the satisfaction of their interests for their origin, development and continuance. The interests which bind a business group together and make it effective as a constituent factor in folkgroup welfare are economic interests, and the functional activity of the group is proportioned to the degree of satisfaction obtained. This satisfaction is economically expressed by the margin between the cost of its subsistence, and the remuneration which existing conditions permit it to obtain from its activities within the folkgroup. The conditions are the nurtureways combined with natural and geographical surroundings. The remuneration is variously known as revenue, wages, fees, rates, commissions, etc. The marginal result is profit.

Business in the last analysis is based upon the extent and potency of the desires of subgroups in

Business groups the outcome of their interests

Profit the economical expression of interests

Business results from differences in the folkways

domestic trade, and of folkgroups in foreign commerce, to exchange their surplus products so as better to satisfy the interests arising from the motive powers of instincts and other forms of mental activity, known to us by the terms hunger, love, vanity, fear, etc. The primary expression of these interests, as we have seen, is through the folkways. Business is, therefore, due to an effort to cater to the folkways which it discovers in groups whose needs it is organized to supply. Obviously the reason why it can succeed is because there is a difference between its folkways and that of the group it serves. Bakers sell their products to bankers and not to other bakers. If manufacturing bakers sell to retail bakers it is because the latter are really traders and not of the industrial-manufacturing group so far as the transaction is concerned.

Profits proportioned to differences in folkways

Business profits are evidently in some way proportioned directly to differences between the folkways of groups. Between an Indian, whose folkways promoted the easy acquisition of fur-bearing skins, and John Jacob Astor, whose folkways were favorable to the importation of toys or muskets, the exchange of commodities was immensely profitable; the Indian getting something that satisfied his hitherto unappeasable vanity and curiosity, the merchant being able to exchange the furs against money at a net profit, after paying all expenses, of four or fivefold the cost. A stock exchange broker will do business for a fellow member of the board, whose folk-

ways closely assimilate his own, at a gross profit of two hundredths of one per cent, out of which his sustenance is still to come. While folkway dissimilarities may in fact be rightly considered a large determinant of business profit there are doubtless other factors, not to be overlooked. One of these is folk-custom, rather, however, as an inhibitant than as a stimulant, for the economic interests of the business groups are always subordinate to folkgroup interests, and are limited by its moral laws.

It is not, however, for the ultimate welfare of the social organism that it should starve or throttle any of its component organs. Unfortunately folk-feeling is not infallible. Through ignorance—mass delusions, hoaxes or superstitions—business groups are sometimes unfairly treated, or discriminated against by the folkgroup. And for the same reasons they are sometimes unduly stimulated; as by high protective tariffs, or by statutory favoritism. In the long run the community pays out of its own pocket the price of its ignorance, just as do the individuals, who for similar reasons misuse or maltreat their bodily organs. France suffered for centuries the depletion abroad of her best intelligence through the persecution of the Huguenots. Spain's intellectual decline began with the expulsion of the Moors and Jews. Germany's treatment of her grain traders was paid for by the agrarians themselves as well as by all consumers of breadstuffs. The people of New York have paid at the nose for their attempt to limit the Results of folkgroup antagonism to its own members Examples

Examples
at home

The com-
munity
suffers by
retaliatory
legislation

profits of the money-lending groups by usury laws passed in the supposed interest of the farming group, whose decline is partly attributable to that cause. Missouri's vengeful attitude toward insurance companies has been paid by her insurers both in cash and in loss of credit. For many years the laws of Texas and California so discriminated against non-resident lenders that their merchants lost that power of commanding credit which was needful for the development of the resources of the land, and for a rapid increase of population. Business risks are still greater there than in most other states, and such risks are compensated by the consumer in the price of merchandise. Enterprise along certain lines has now and again been throttled by the too exclusive control granted by our patent laws; and it would have been difficult to dislodge white phosphorus poisoning except for the humanistic attitude of the Diamond Match Company, which controlled the safer processes. For the tariff favors granted to the wool and woolen interests the people have paid a double toll in the inferior quality and enhanced cost of their clothing over a period of forty years. If the object of a law is to satisfy the animosities or prejudices of groups or sections, rather than to ensure the maximum efficiency of the existing activities of a business group in the work which it has to perform, the community itself will have to foot the bill.

Materially decreased profits mean a diversion of capital to other forms of enterprise, so that the struc-

ture affected by a misdirected antagonism becomes anemic and less able to discharge its natural functions in the furtherance of the commonweal. If on the contrary one of the subgroups be over-advantaged, remote and unintended results may follow—witness the growth of cities, the consequent relative disproportion of tenants to landowners, and the decrease in personal welfare which comes from an unsatisfied normal land-hunger, the spread of panaceal dogmas, the growing scarcity of the food supply—due to the favoritism shown to the manufacturing subgroups since the Civil War.

To summarize:

1. Economic conduct is a means of adjusting the Summary lives of persons to their environment—of procuring individual welfare.
2. Exercised within group limits it is always conditioned by moral impulse; which is in fact one element of a person's environment.
3. Normally, therefore, the economic impulses are not in conflict with the moral impulses.
4. In their evolution, however, their progress is sometimes ahead of, sometimes behind, that of the moral impulses.
5. This gives rise to conflicts, and may produce confusion, uncertainty and business losses.
6. Business is human activity with respect to exchanges of services, commodities or money.
7. Business may be classified in accordance with groups who perform it.

8. The business groups are:

- A. Industrial: in business to the extent of their exchanges; in self-sufficing industry there is no business.
 - (1) Extractive: farmers and miners, producing raw materials.
 - (2) Manufacturing: producing finished articles.
- B. Trading: exchanging the products of the industrial groups.
- C. Transportation: distributing the products and exchanges of the industrial and trading groups.
- D. Financial: mobilizing the surplus capital of the industrial, trading and transportation groups.
- E. Laboring: selling services to industrial, trading and transportation groups.

[Groups B, C, D and E are wholly in business.]

- F. Professional: selling special knowledge or skill to the other groups, and to that extent in business.

9. Conduct, in each of these groups, is determined by three factors: (a) economic impulses, (b) moral impulses, and (c) their average level of self-consciousness.

10. Each group has class-ways, class-customs and, therefore, group morals peculiar to itself, which do not always accord with folkgroup morals.

11. The vitality of business groups is dependent upon the incentive of profit; i.e., the margin of earnings above subsistence.
12. The earnings of business, and, therefore, its profits, are due to differences in folkways between business groups or between folkgroups.
13. Business groups perform functions by which the folkgroup exists in that state of civilization (i.e., of complexity) to which it may have developed.
14. Business groups are interdependent; and reciprocally dependent on the folkgroup, to which they stand in the relation of functional organs to an organism; and therefore
15. Stimuli and inhibitions, applied by the folkgroup to its business groups, react upon the folkgroup and further or impede its welfare.

IX

BUSINESS CONDITIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN THE UNITED STATES

The balance of conduct-impulses

Controlled by personality

We have seen that moral conduct is the volitionally regulated outcome of the balance of two often conflicting sets of impulses, formed in the human mind from habits or modes of behavior derived from physical environment, and habits or modes of conduct derived from social contact. It is like a deliberative body divided into three parties, two of them strong and nearly equal and one of them weak, but holding the balance of power. The stronger parties are natureways and nurtureways, the weaker and yet generally determinative party is self-consciousness. All of these sets of impulses are the product of evolution, slowly progressing over a long period of time. There is a unison in the evolution of the orders of life, of society through its various phases, of conduct through its various modes, of morals with its adjuncts, and of mind as it rises from one level to another of self-consciousness. By comparison of the degrees of evolution attained by the better known of these factors at any given time or place, we can proceed to make tentative

inferences as to the degree of evolution and probable operation, at the same time and place, of the lesser known factors. This, in fact, is the hypothesis which, by degrees, we have been developing in the study of social, moral and mental evolution that has been sketched in the preceding chapters. The end we now have in sight is the application of this hypothesis to the business conditions of the first decade of the twentieth century, and as conducive to that purpose we have, in the last chapter, reviewed the set of impulses derived from economic motives, and have endeavored to discover their place in the final determination of business conduct, at the same time analyzing the business structure to which they are applied. If this review is sketched in outline rather than pictured in detail, it is because the object of this essay is rather suggestive than final, being designed to stimulate research and classification along lines of discovery of which, at present, we have but vague and hardly formulated ideas. It has the further purpose of presenting to business men, present and prospective, a method of interpreting business conduct and its relations to the community, which may perhaps assist in the advance of their vocation from the plane of an empirical art to that of a scientific profession—along which lines it is now, but all too slowly, developing.

Inference of the unknown from the known factors

The method of interpreting business conduct

What are the conditions of economic, moral and personal environment in the United States today, and from what have they proceeded?

Present-day environment

The facts of the environment with which at the opening of the nineteenth century our forefathers were confronted, were as markedly different from those with which their descendants had to cope at its close, as today between Asia and America, Madagascar and Massachusetts, or Peking and Philadelphia. During no previous time, and at no previous place in the history of the world, have the conditions of life been so changed or so great an alteration in manners and customs made manifest in so short a time.

Population
and its
conditions
in 1790

Substantially all of the population of the United States, then about one twentieth of its present number, lived east of the Blue Ridge or Alleghany mountains and south of the Penobscot or north of the Savannah rivers. Ten times as many souls now inhabit the same territory. In it there were only six cities of over eight thousand inhabitants (Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Baltimore, Charleston and Salem) where now there are four hundred and nineteen. The main concentration of population was on the coast and by the banks of rivers, of which the Connecticut, Hudson, Delaware, Susquehanna, Potomac, James and Savannah were navigable for upwards of a hundred miles from their mouths.

Transpor-
tation in the
eighteenth
century

Transportation then, as now, was the key to the formation and concentration of social groups; and the only practical means of freightage was by water. In methods of land transport, little improvement had been made for nearly two thousand years. In

the eighteenth century London was no nearer Rome than it was in Cæsar's time. Travel was mainly on horseback, except on the four or five post routes. On those roads a maximum speed of forty miles a day could be maintained, on others fifteen. At the close of the Revolution it cost \$12.24 to transport a hundredweight of merchandise from Philadelphia to Erie, Pa., a distance of four hundred miles. A stone road, crudely constructed, had been built from Philadelphia to Lancaster toward the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1806 a National Turnpike across the Alleghanies, to connect Cumberland, Md.,—the head of boat navigation on the Potomac—with the western country was begun. In twenty years it had been completed only as far as Zanesville, Ohio. But such crude interstate transportation as this and other highways could furnish was speedily made obsolete by the opening of the Erie Canal.

Before our Revolution, the Duke of Bridgewater Water had introduced a canal system into Great Britain, carriage by and by the last decade of the eighteenth century its canal success had been demonstrated. In this country the first canals were naturally designed to extend the already existing but imperfect means of river transport—and by their means a number of eastern interior settlements had been brought to tidewater. But it was left for the Erie Canal, begun in 1817 and finished in 1825, to alter the distribution of population almost in the twinkling of an eye, as an earth-

The Erie
Canal

Its relation
to steam
navigation

The
westward
flow of
population

quake may change the course of a river or create a great lake out of a fertile valley. In the next twenty years it made New York the commercial metropolis of the country, formed an outlet for the rich farming districts of western New York, and founded the industrial cities of Utica, Syracuse, Rochester and Buffalo. At one clip it cut the cost of transporting a hundred pounds of merchandise between New York and Buffalo from five dollars to ninety cents. It put the Philadelphia-Pittsburgh route, with its rate of \$11 per hundredweight, out of business in five minutes. Following upon the heels of Fulton's great invention of steam navigation, which linked it up at either end with industrial possibilities, the Erie Canal became the trunk of a cheap water route along which poured freights and families, like the sap which a tree gathers by its rootlets and distributes through its leaves. It revolutionized business by halving the cost of the imports and manufactures of the East to the western settler. The possibility of exchanging these against his products began his conversion from a self-sufficing farmer into a business man. Lumber came in vast quantities from the forests of New York and iron from Ohio. In twenty years the population of Ohio, Indiana and Michigan increased from 700,000 to nearly 3,000,000. A canal to the Ohio River and steam navigation upon the western rivers distributed another stream of settlers and merchandise through the Southwest.

The most important trade route was, however, fixed by the greater economy of the canal and lake route, drawing men from New York and New England, scattering them in the mid-West; leavening the typical folkways of the frontier while binding it by ties of trade and sentiment to the East. An influx of German liberals, following the unsuccessful revolutions of 1830 and 1848, established themselves at the western branchlets of the canal in groups whose contribution to the industrial, intellectual and moral growth of the prairie states can hardly be overestimated. DeWitt Clinton, in fact, had won the field of Gettysburg forty years before the battle was fought, and had sounded the knell of the folk-custom of slave labor when Lincoln was a boy of sixteen.

Towns—Erie, Cleveland, Sandusky, Toledo, Detroit—sprang up along the line of march. Chicago and Milwaukee were made possible. In the thirty years following the first census, the proportion of urban to rural population had but slightly increased, more than nineteen twentieths of the people still lived in the country or in the smaller towns, and the number of cities of eight thousand inhabitants or more had hardly more than doubled. But in the five decades after 1820, the number of these cities practically doubled with every decade, until in 1870 more than one fifth of the entire population lived in cities of this size. In the succeeding forty years this proportion had doubled, and two fifths of the people were in this class at 1910.

Influence
of railways

All of the older cities are on the waterways. This tendency was not profoundly altered by the advent of the locomotive, invented by Stephenson in 1825, and it was not until after 1850 that the railroads began to influence the folkways of urban preference and their resultant folk-customs. The reason is not far to find. Up to the Civil War the efficiency of the railroad as a means of cheap transportation was undetermined. It could not compete with water freight, and in many cases could not compete with wagons over the now improving highroads. Railroad operation had to await the invention of the telegraph and of the steam gauge in 1849 to make it practical. Even then it had to wait for cheap steel before it could be economically successful. The introduction of the Bessemer process in 1870 completed the conditions under which it has become so potent a factor in the shaping of our twentieth century folkways and folk-customs.

Effect of
cheap trans-
port on
folkways

The evolution of business is everywhere conditioned by cheapness of transport. Every penny off the freight rate makes it possible to effect exchanges over a wider territory, tends to break down folkways of self-sufficing industry in which there is a minimum of business, and to replace them with folkways derived from the economic impulse to exchange surplus products, group against group, in which there is a maximum of business.

And so the evolution of the business groups, which had begun in a small way on the seaboard, and

in the area tied to it by natural waterways, went on by leaps and bounds over a constantly widening area. In the farming group of extractive industrials, there grew up a progressive tendency to specialize in response to an increased demand for specialities, the outcome of city folkways. The general farmers of Colonial days formed a strong group whose common interests were modified only by territorial separation. Their intragroup sympathy was in direct ratio to the uniformity of their folkways, and of the ensuing body of folk-custom. But with urban growth and the increase of cheap transportation a new kind of agricultural service was required; and the concomitant breaking up of the farming group into a large number of specialty groups has had important reactions upon the folk-customs and moral impulses of the entire folkgroup.

Increasing concentration of population always spells a loss of self-sufficing qualities, and the old folk-custom must vanish as independence is lost. Only forty years ago the milk supply of the city groups was obtained either from cows kept in their own stables, or freshly milked from farms close to the point where it was to be ultimately consumed. Morning's milk could be served on the breakfast table of men of moderate means, and for the poorest, the previous night's milking was always available. The continued aggregation together of larger masses of people increased land values and drove the milking herds a little farther into the

growth of
the business
groups

—in
extractive
industry

Urban milk
supply

Bacterial
infection its
controlling
factor

country; but it was not until after 1850 that dairy farming became a distinct type. The folkways of the consuming adult of the city group, with respect to milk drinking, have materially changed with the increasing distance of the source of supply, but it is still a necessity for children, and here the folkway changes are less marked. The controlling factor is the susceptibility of the product to bacterial infection. In milk the production of bacteria is enormously rapid; under favorable conditions billions may breed in a single cubic centimeter within twenty-four hours. The fluid now reaches the larger cities from a zone three or four hundred miles in radius. For example, milk trains begin to move on New York the forenoon of the day before the beverage can be delivered; therefore, instead of twelve hours old at the worst, it is twenty-four hours old at the best, and much of it has gone thirty-six and forty-eight hours since it was drawn from the cow.

Changing
folkways
—in cities


—on the
farms

The effect of these conditions on urban folkways has been to change folkways (1) of keeping dairy cows within city limits, (2) of feeding them with swill or fermenting brewer's grains, (3) of consuming milk fresh from the cow or chilled only by standing through the night, (4) of feeding non-sterilized milk to infants, (5) of adult drinking of milk as a beverage, (6) of its use in the treatment of disease, and probably many others. The farming folkways of self-sufficing agriculture, formed during the lapse of twenty centuries, have been equally disturbed.

(1) Cattle are no longer kept as an adjunct to general farming, but as the producers of a money crop, (2) the barns in which they are kept have to be specially constructed, (3) higher standards of cleanliness are upheld, (4) there is a growing tendency to co-operation in bottling and selling, (5) ice is stored or manufactured on the farm, (6) the milk is immediately cooled, (7) dairy cows are tested for tuberculosis, and the infected ones destroyed, (8) much milk is pasteurized or sterilized, and (9) through the requirements of city folkways, farming is being transformed into a strictly business enterprise, and is being concentrated in large and highly specialized units. The reaction of these urban and industrial changes upon the folkways of the transportation group has been (1) the building of large freight cars on passenger trucks, often with refrigeration, (2) their equipment with air brakes, —in the (3) first-class rights allowed milk trains on railway time-tables, (4) it has been a factor in the double tracking and standard gauging of railway lines as they approach city groups, and (5) in their equipment with steel rails, stone ballast and signal systems for heavier and more rapid traffic.

Some of these folkways have become folk-customs and have been institutionalized by statute law, establishing standards for milk purity, regulating its sale and delivery in large cities, forbidding the practice of swill feeding, and providing for the inspection of milk vessels and dairies or a quarantining period for

Development of
folk-cus-
toms from
the new
folkways



—and of
institutional
adjuncts

Economic
effects

Financial
effects

Sociological
effects

imported cattle. Among the formal institutions which have been created wholly or in part to promote the recognition of these folk-customs are state dairy inspections, colleges of agriculture, agricultural experiment stations and farmers' co-operative organizations to the number of eighty-five thousand.

Among their economic effects are increased wages for farm labor, now more than double those of the preceding half century, and a fourfold to sixfold increase in the efficiency of an acre of land.

In finance it has created funds drawn from the accumulated profits of other industries to lend to farmers for improvements, to establish great milk-handling corporations, to lend to railroads for the increase of their facilities, and it has led to the enlargement of the deposit and exchange functions in country banks. As a secondary reaction there is a demand for funds to finance extensions in the steel and machinery industries, and collaterally with the improvement of running time on milk trains there is an improvement in the facilities for local passenger travel on the railroads.

Business groups have been promoted of dairy-men, of creamerymen, of milk middlemen, and the unionization of railway employees is materially strengthened by the need for their co-operation in a service of such imperative necessity to the welfare of the city groups.

Such changes have the increase and enlargement of the city groups made necessary in the folkways of

an industry, in social and economic groups, and in human institutions. Similar changes, I may add, have been produced in thousands of other social and economic groups likewise affected by great and sudden changes in the folkways of urban people, so that there is hardly a social or industrial group that has not been obliged to accommodate itself and its folkways to the unparalleled changes in environment produced by the movement of population during the last forty or fifty years. A vast amount of folkways, the outcome of human experience in past ages, has been thrown on the scrap-heap, and an enormous number of new ones as yet uncatalogued has been called for to accommodate the modern structure of society to the changed conditions of its life. And with them have gone time-honored folk-customs, to be replaced with new, tediously built up in the folk-group by discussion, debate and final adoption into folk-feeling.

Similar effect of urban life on other groups

In effect equal to the results produced upon folk-customs by a concentration of population, were those caused by the suddenness and magnitude of its diffusion in a frontier country. The conditions under which a pioneer in a newly settled territory must necessarily seek welfare are radically different from the environment under which the citizen of a well-established community pursues his more conventional way. The pioneer of the decades of 1820 to 1870 had to cope with the scarcity of stored provision for subsistence, with the dangers of a wilderness

Changes in folk-custom from western settlement

Need for immediate results

inhabited by wild beasts and savages, and with the pressing need for immediate results. Capital which was necessary for the development of the natural resources about him, he did not possess, and he was fain to procure its usufruct as best he might. Under these circumstances, the folkways of the interest rate for capital went far beyond the limits which had been fixed by those of the elder states. To compensate the lender and to induce freedom in lending, terms based

Its effect on finance

upon the legal and customary interest rates plus a share in the profits were promised, the latter being capitalized at the start by issues of so-called "watered" stock. The exaggerated self-reliance of the pioneer, overconfident of his powers, led to the inception of all kinds of "wild-cat" enterprises, the like of which Dickens has pungently satirized in *Martin Chuzzlewit*. The inflated promises of the promoter, but half realized in the end, became a part of the folk-custom of pioneer finance, approved by the overconfidence of frontier groups. This approval gave the opportunity to the fraudulent financier, who always thrives under the protection of any folk- or class-custom which he can turn to personal advantage through affected compliance and deceit.

Such are but two examples of the tremendous changes in folkway and folk-custom due to the breaking up of self-sufficing industry in the nineteenth century, produced by the development of transportation and by the environmental and struc-

tural changes which followed. A similar account could be given of almost any one of the fundamental processes whereby food or raw materials are extracted from the earth and converted to the use of civilized need. In every instance, the few and simple groups of the first half of the last century have been obliged to abandon the easy folkways accruing from hundreds of years of use and experience, and to break up into many and specialized subgroups that, with great toil and effort, have struggled during the latter half to adjust themselves to the novel conditions forced up by the discoveries of the Age of Steam. As well as anywhere, an illustration can be borrowed from the history of our textile evolution. In the self-sufficing farmstead of the early nineteenth century, the sheep that nibbled on its upland pastures were shorn in the spring by the men of the household, their wool was carded by hand or by the local miller, and in the fall or winter spun, woven and shaped into garments by the women of the house. Of tools, the shear, distaff, spindle and hand loom had existed in practically the same form since prehistoric times. They were used by the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans long before the Christian era. Woolcombing was introduced by St. Blasius in the fourth century, and the single-thread spinning wheel is seen pictured in illuminated manuscripts of the fourteenth, but, at least in the early days, it had failed to dislodge the distaff from the folkways of the colonists. Allusion to women's

The effects
of Steam
Power
Folkway
changes in
the textile
industry

Power applied to spindle and loom

former monopoly of the spinster's art survives in our popular expression for maternal ancestry as "the distaff side." These primitive methods of making cloth and clothing had, therefore, been ingrained in the folkways of many hundreds of years when, at the breaking out of our Revolution, Hargreaves, Arkwright and Crompton were perfecting machines to spin several threads at once; and these, after the introduction into this country in 1813 of Cartwright's invention of the power loom, gave birth to the factory system. By 1825 "tens of thousands of men and women who would have been doomed to eke out a scanty livelihood by farming, cobbling or unskilled labor, now found new opportunities before them" and so adopted new folkways from which new folk-customs had to be devised.

Power applied to the needle

The impetus which the power loom had given to the growth of the textile factory system was transmitted to the clothing trades by the invention of the sewing machine. Ready-made clothing had been introduced in a small way as early as 1831, to employ journeymen tailors during their idle seasons, but it was not until the fifth decade of the century that the employment of machinery and the division of labor made possible great economies in the making of both men's and women's suits. As a consequence the home-making of men's clothes has entirely disappeared as a folkway, as has also, in large measure, that of the dress of women. The adjustment of the textile industry to these folkways is the

cause of a large part of its profit in recent years. It has profitably ventured the adaptation of the folkways of one group of women, who preferred an independent wage to a communistic family subsistence, to a new folkway of using ready-to-wear garments. While the group of women wage-earners was acquiring one folkway, the family group was acquiring the other folkway, in place of common folkways which both groups had formerly shared, and the textile manufacturer found his opportunity of profit in catering to these changes.

The changes on which these new business relations depended were, therefore, at once the cause and the outcome of the factory system, which, in its nineteenth century development, was the product of four factors—mechanical invention, cheap power, improved transportation, and the growing folkway of the industrial exchange of surplus products replacing the declining folkway of self-sufficing industry. The factory system, in so far as it served as an instrument of adjusting these changing folkways to each other, was a device of great importance to social welfare, and so was adopted by society as a folk-custom. In New England, prior to 1850, it was a means of escape for the women and children from the dreary, unsocial atmosphere of the inland farmstead; a means of support for many whose home labor had been displaced by altered ways of life; and a means of culture for those who were brought into contact with the mental and religious advantages

Genesis of the factory system

Its spiritual advantages

which only can be afforded by a more concentrated community which is accumulating wealth. To these it added the moral advantages of disciplined employment over idleness and of happiness over discontent. If the hours were unduly long, the pace was not so intense as to prohibit intellectual avocations; witness Lucy Larcom and the "Lowell Offering." Similar conditions prevail today in large measure over the South, where the group of the cotton mill is a prime factor in the uplift of the mountain whites.

Its interpretation

The factory system is, therefore, something more than the mere outcome of economic impulses, since it furthers new adjustments of the lives of individuals to their environment along lines of ethical as well as industrial efficiency. In the period under review this system was passing through a process of continual development, whose rate of motion was in direct proportion to those folkway changes which had made it practicable. Such changes came out of the need for the adjustment of conduct to certain other changes which have been taking place in both the environment and structure of our American folk-group, following a series of remarkable inventions, affecting directly the industrial and transportation groups, whose object was to increase the efficiency of power derived from steam. The following table will suggest concisely some of the groupal metamorphoses which have called into existence a tremendous volume of new nurtureways.

Other groupal changes promoted by invention

TABLE I.—GROWTH OF FAMILY, RURAL, URBAN, RACIAL AND INDUSTRIAL GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES COMPARED WITH THE INCREASE OF POPULATION 1860-1910

	Census of			Growth relative to the increase of population			
	1860	1900	1910	Increase %	1860 to 1900	1860 to 1910	Less
A. THE FOLKGROUP							
1. Total population.....	31,443,321	75,568,686	91,402,151	143	197		
2. Density per square mile	10.8	25.6	30.3				
B. GROUPS, SOCIAL							
3. Families.....	a 5,959,752	16,187,715	20,255,555	172	240	1.20	
4. Persons to a family, avg.	5.3	4.7	4.5			1.22	
5. Post Offices, rural.....	27,257	74,797	57,178	174	109	1.22	
6. Persons to each Post Office, avg.	811	604	863				
7. Rural population (in civ. div. less than 2,500).....	22,105,348	45,197,390	49,348,883	105	123		
8. % of 7 to folkgroup.....	70.3	59.5	53.7				
9. Civil divisions over 2,500	1,241	1,891	2,402				
10. Population therein.....	9,337,973	30,797,185	42,625,383	230	356	1.61	
11. % of 10 to folkgroup.....	29.7	40.5	46.3			1.81	
12. Towns, etc., over 8,000	141	546	726				
13. Population therein.....	5,072,256	24,992,199	e 35,555,506	393	601	2.75	3.05
14. % of 13 to folkgroup....	16.4	33.0	38.9				

TABLE I (Continued)

	Census of			Increase % 1860 to 1900	Increase % 1860 to 1910	Growth relative to the in- crease of population Times greater Less	
	1860	1900	1910				
15. Cities over 25,000	35	161	229	426	661	2.98	3.08
16. Population therein	3,753,442	19,754,491	28,543,816	31.2			
17. % of 16 to folkgroup	11.9	26.1	50				
18. Cities over 100,000	9	38	20,302,138	440	672	3.35	3.41
19. Population therein	2,627,458	14,208,347	22.2				
20. % of 19 to folkgroup	6.4	18.8					
C. Groups, RACIAL							
21. The foreign-born	4,188,658	10,341,276	13,515,886	147	223	1.03	1.13
22. % of 21 to folkgroup	313.2	13.7	14.8				
23. For'n-birth or parentage	e 8,200,000	26,198,939	32,413,723	219	320	1.53	1.63
24. % of 23 to folkgroup	e 26.0	34.3	35.2				
25. Italians	11,677	484,027	1,343,125	4,045	11,402	28.29	57.89
26. Hungarians	a 1,256	145,714	495,609	11,501,39	3,359	80.43	199.79
27. Russians	3,160	484,027	1,732,462	15,213,54	7,241,106,39	277.79	
28. % of 25, 26 and 27 to folkgroup005	1.47	1.89				
D. Groups, INDUSTRIAL							
29. Mfg. establishments	140,433	512,191	265	1.85			
30. Factories		207,514	f 29	2.13	f 1.33		
31. Wage-earners in 29	1,311,246	5,306,143	305	f 40	f 1.83		
32. Wage-earners in 30		4,712,763	6,615,046				

TABLE I (Continued)

	Census of		Increase % 1860 to 1900	Times greater 1860 to 1900	Growth relative to the in- crease of population	
	1860	1900			1860 to 1900	Less 1860 to 1900
33. Textile establishments..	3,058	4,521	5,352	47	74	.33
34. Wage-earners in 33.....	194,394	664,429	881,128	242	334	1.79
35. Ratio 34 to 33.....	63	145	164			
36. Capital employed in 33.	\$150,205,852	\$1,049,636,201	\$1,841,242,131	599	1,194	4.19
37. Ratio 36 to 33.....	\$49,119	\$32,169	\$344,029			
38. Ratio 36 to 34.....	\$779	\$1,601	\$2,098			
39. Women's clothing, est.	188	2,701	4,558	1,337	2,324	9.35
40. Wage-earners in 39.....	5,739	83,739	153,743	1,359	2,579	11.80
41. Pig iron establishments	286	224	208	D 21	D 27	13.09
42. Wage-earners in 41.....	15,927	39,358	38,429	146	141	1.02
43. Capital employed in 41.	\$24,672,000	\$148,226,000	\$487,581,000	500	1,874	3.49
44. Ratio 42 to 41.....	56	175	186			
45. Ratio 43 to 41.....	\$86,265	\$661,277	\$2,344,139	666	2,616	
46. Ratio 43 to 42.....	\$1,540	\$3,779	\$12,603	145	718	
47. Avg. daily stack cap'cy	b 8.8 T.	146.8 T.	261.4 T.	j 1,663	g 2,970	
48. Ann'l output per wage- earner.....	b 66.5 T.	367.2 T.	667.5 T.	j 452	g 905	
49. Iron forges.....	97	7	0			
50. Wage-earners in 49.....	2,135	308		D 76		
51. Capital employed in 49.	\$2,623,000	\$522,000		D 80		
52. Avg. ann'l product 49.	472 T.	2,214 T.				
53. Farmers (independent).	2,423,895	5,674,875	6,361,502	134	162	.94
						.82

TABLE I (Continued)

				Growth relative to the increase of population			
				Times greater		Less	
				1860 to 1900	1860 to 1910	1860 to 1900	1860 to 1910
		Census of					
		1860	1900				
E. GROUPS, TRADING							
54. Traders and dealers...	267,921	833,212	p 1,162,000	211	333	1.47	1.69
55. Clerks and copyists...	630,127	1,594,331					
56. Salesmen and women...	611,139	921,130					
57. Commercial travelers...	92,919	163,620					
58. Total of 55, 56 and 57...	1,334,185	2,679,081					
F. GROUPS, TRANSP'N							
59. Miles canal.....	4,225	3,383	e 3,644	D 20 mD 14			
60. " railroad.....	30,592	194,262	249,992	535	717	3.74	3.64
61. " street railroad...	402	22,576	40,088	5,516	9,872	38.57	50.11
62. Employees 60.....	36,567	1,007,068	1,684,552	2,652	4,503	18.54	22.86
63. " 61.....	b 5,103	68,919	d 209,729	j 1,251	k 4,009	18.75	20.35
G. GROUPS, FINANCIAL							
64. Banks.....	1,562	10,378	22,991	564	1,374	3.94	6.99
65. Corporations.....			262,490				
66. Officials of Banks.....	3,031	74,072		2,344		16.39	
67. Bankers and brokers...	9,644	72,984		657		4.59	
H. GROUPS, PROFESSIONAL							
68. Teachers.....	112,969	446,133	595,306	295	427	2.06	2.17

TABLE I (Concluded)

	Census of		Growth relative to the increase of population			
	1860	1900	1860 to 1900	1860 to 1910	1860 to 1900	1860 to 1910
69. Physicians and surgeons	55,159	132,002	151,132	121	174	.84
70. Lawyers.....	34,839	114,460	114,704	229	1,60	.89
71. Clergymen.....	37,529	111,638		197	1,38	
72. Engineers, civil and mechanical.....	e5,000	43,239	60,574	765	5,35	
73. Electricians.....	12	50,717	135,519	f165	f7.53	
J. GROUPS, LABOR						
74. Farm laborers.....	h2,203,407	4,410,877	5,975,057	100	171	.70
75. Domestic servants.....	h1,269,389	1,560,721	1,572,225			
76. Miners.....	147,50	563,406	1,053,283	281	621	.87
77. Mechanics (house).....	429,825	1,212,512	1,507,162	185	250	
78. Slaves.....	2,652,839					
79. do, of working age.....	2,111,591					

Notes—*a*, approximate; *b*, 1870; *c*, 1906; *d*, 1907; *D*, decrease; *e*, estimate; *f*, 1900-1910; *g*, 1870-1910; *h*, arrived at by adding to the enumerated free whites two thirds of the slaves above 15 to Farm laborers and one third to Domestic servants; *j*, 1870-1900; *k*, 1870-1907; *m*, 1860-1906; *n*, 1860-1907; *p*, estimated increase 1900-1910, calculated on the basis of Bradstreet's reports; *T*, tons.

Summary
of groupal
changes
1860-1910

These figures illustrate succinctly the essential features of the condition and growth of the business groups during the last half century. They are typical and characteristic—a volume could be compiled of which these are only a few instances. From them we may infer that in the last half century

Urban
groups

A. The folkgroup, expressed in terms of population (1), has nearly trebled. This rate of increase is the base rate for the other comparisons for the same period. The ten, thirty and forty year comparisons are based upon similar differentials for their respective periods. Relative increase means a growth greater than that of the base rate, relative decrease a lesser rate.

Farming
groups

B. The drift from rural to urban life, say to towns and cities of over eight thousand (13), has been three times as rapid as the growth of the population. The rate of increase in the rural population (7) has been a little more than half that of the whole growth. The farming group (53) has grown about eight tenths as fast as the folkgroup.

Factory
groups

C. There was (21-27) a rapid formation and increase of heteroethnic subgroups largely of the unskilled labor class, the entry of which into many industries has disturbed and complicated their current ethical adjustments.

D. The increase in the groups laboring in all factories (31) has been at a rate about four times that of the folkgroup.

1. While laboring groups employed in an essential, basic and age-long established industry, the smelting of iron (42), have materially declined Iron relatively to the population, the total capital investment (43) has increased at nearly a tenfold ratio, probably indicating a large increase in the groups financially interested in iron making. As compared to forty years ago, the output of pig iron per mechanical unit of production (47) has increased thirty-fold while that of each unit of the laboring group (48) Labor and has increased less than tenfold. The effect of capital in in promoting efficiency in this particular industry is, contrast therefore, twice as great as that of the labor employed (45, 46, 47). In number the establishments Administra-making pig iron (41) have decreased actually 27 per cent so that relatively to population they are now only 36. per cent of the basis of 1860. There is a great degree of concentration of this industry in large units under the control of a comparatively few condensed administrative groups. In each of these concentrated units the average laboring group (44) Labor con- is nearly three and a half times as large as in 1860. centration

2. The number of textile groups (33) has grown only one third as fast as the folkgroup, while Textile the capital used by them (36) has grown six times industry faster; and the total laboring group in their employ (34) has grown not quite twice as fast as population. There is a moderate concentration of this industry into larger units, in each of which the average labor-

Clothing industry

Trading groups

Transportation groups

Street railways

ing group is two and a half times as great as in 1860 (35).

3. Certain other industrial groups especially favored by changes in the folkways have grown to large proportions out of little or nothing; as in women's clothing (39), where the establishments have increased twelve times and the laboring group (40) thirteen times faster than population.

E. Trading groups (54) have grown at a rate of about one and a half to one and three quarters times that of the folkgroup; this in spite of a large increase in the turnover of each trading unit, due to a trebling in the average density of the population. Increased turnover accounts partly for an increase in labor employed (58) by these groups between 1860 and 1900 of 623 per cent or four and a third times that of the population.

F. It is in the transportation groups that the most startling changes have taken place. Large subgroups, such as telegraphers and telephone employees, have grown like mushrooms. Fifteen million miles of telephone circuit, with its appurtenant groups of officials and employees, has been the creation of thirty years. Since 1860 the mileage of steam railroad lines (60) has increased three and one half times as fast as population and their laboring groups (62) nearly twenty-three times as fast. The most marvelous growth is that of the street railway system (61), which has increased ninety-eight-fold or fifty times faster than population; its laboring groups

(63) at less than half that rate, owing to the economies resulting from the change of motive power.

G. Financial groups have grown greatly in Financial excess of populational increase. Bankers and brokers (67) had increased four and a half times faster than population in the forty years ending in 1900, and in the full half century the banks themselves (64) grew seven times more rapidly than the people; their officials increasing at nearly four times that rate (66).

H. Among the professions, engineers (72), Professional statistics of whom for the full half century are not yet available, increased more than five times as fast as population in the first forty years and will doubtless show still more phenomenal progress when the results for 1910 are known. A large group of electricians (73) has grown out of nothing. The extension of education is reflected in an increase of teachers (68) in forty years at twice the populational rate. The other older professions except that of medicine (69) have grown more rapidly than the folkgroup. The increase of the group of lawyers (70), more than one and a half times that of the population between 1860 and 1900, is plainly correlated to the business expansion and rapid evolution of new custom characteristic of that period, resulting in unsettlement and conflict, which in the national social phase is resolved by the peaceful and orderly processes of the common law. It may be queried, as it is yet too early to determine, whether the relative

Laboring
groups

decrease of this group during the last decade is due to a later progress toward a relative stability of custom, or to other conditions, thus far unobserved.

I. It is impossible with our present data to give more than a superficial account of the laboring groups. Farm laborers (74) and domestic servants (75) show a relative decrease. The exploitation of our mineral wealth is reflected in the great growth of the group of miners (76), and the increased luxury of living by that of house mechanics—carpenters, masons, plumbers, painters and the like (77). The census volume of occupations in 1910, when published, will give the basis for many more instances of phenomenal change in the group structure of American society during the half-century than are now available.

Such changes, calling for a prodigious creation of new folkways, class-customs, folk-customs and humanistics, are the outcome of efforts made by the folkgroup to adjust itself to the novel conditions by which it has been confronted during these years of extraordinary motion and exceptional change. A further pursuit of the line of investigation, of which the more important features have been developed in the foregoing, will display a period characterized not only by an immense growth of new business groups and by the development of old ones in new directions, but by ethical conflicts due to an admixture of alien races, folkways and folk-customs with our own,

which has been briefly touched upon in the foregoing discussion. We are now prepared more deliberately to discuss the question of the ethical consequences of hetererethnic immigration, which will be the main subject of the next succeeding chapter.

X

IMMIGRATION—QUICK TRADING


We have seen in the last chapter the operation of two conditions, arising from economic impulses, which, during the last half century, have profoundly influenced a series of far-reaching changes in the structure of our American society. The first of these forceful conditions is the movement of the population (a) toward pioneer conditions, (b) toward city life. The second, beginning as a reaction from the first and then reacting upon it, is an industrial reorganization, leading to the substitution of economic exchange and intergroupal distribution of products in place of the folkways of self-sufficing agriculture inherited from the remote past. These changes have promoted the decay of many long-established folkways and folk-customs, and from them have sprung new folkways out of which society is attempting to re-create its system of folk-custom and humanistics, so that its life may be more completely adjusted to the environment.

Economic profit is the incentive for the formation of a business group; and profit, as we have seen, is the result of differences in the folkways of social groups. Therefore, the first response to these broad, continuous and rapid folkway changes was a

widening of the opportunities of gain, encouraging Growth of a rapid growth of new business groups to perform new the exchanges needed to adjust the lives of the growing business groups subgroups to the changing folkgroup structure. By 1893 the United States had grown from a simple series of territorial groups, united by needs of self-defense and self-development, into a complex series of interpenetrating business groups, united by the most imperative ties of economic interdependence—from a simple segmented type into a complex organic type, with intercommunicating systems of nerves and arteries. The pursuit of greater efficiency in this movement influenced the progress of invention and the formation of ever more highly specialized business subgroups to carry the burdens imposed by this altered folkgroup structure in order to perform its industrial, transportative, trading, financial, laboring and professional functions.

But custom is a plant of slow growth, and the class-customs which these groups have been called upon to create have naturally been more or less experimental in character, hastily formed or imperfectly adapted to needs, and the work of choosing from them the folk-customs and adapting from them the humanistics has proceeded apace, but under the sore trial of almost revolutionary conditions. Institutional adjuncts, like legislation, which is always a laggard behind folk-feeling, have meddled rather than assisted in the change, and the hesitation of the religious organizations in accepting the changes in

Slower readjustment of folk-custom
Inefficiency of institutional adjuncts



modes of thinking which are the inevitable outcome of such folkway changes, has deprived the churches of their wonted influence in support of the higher moral ideals. As has already been observed, the normal function of such institutional adjuncts is that of buttresses to a completed moral structure rather than that of scaffolds in its construction. We have now to consider two other conditions of our moral evolution—the influence of immigration and the remodeling of business method in the period under review.

Immigration—

—in the
eighteenth
century

—in the
nineteenth
century

For the effect on folk-custom of the sudden absorption of many millions of people of alien race will rank in potency with the sudden diffusion of one part of our population and the sudden concentration of another. From the known ratios of increase of the population it may be inferred that immigration during the eighteenth century was an almost negligible quantity. An analysis of the family surnames enumerated in the census of 1790 shows that over 90 per cent of the then population was of British descent. Six in a hundred were of German origin, about two Dutch and less than two Irish. Little changes in these conditions were effected in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

But following the great expansion which was the result of the opening of the Erie Canal, the foreign influx began. In the previous decade every one thousand of the native population had to assimilate but one foreigner annually, but, between 1830 and 1840,

this had increased to two a year and in the next five years to four. In 1845 came the crop failure which produced the Irish famine, and the annual immigration rate jumped at once to ten in the thousand of the native population. By 1850 one tenth of the people were of foreign birth and more than one quarter of foreign birth and parentage. Today a third of our population is either foreign-born or the children of foreigners.

These people were not only aliens by birth, but by language, folkways, folk-custom and religion. Their moral ideals have been formed by previous environment, in great measure under the influence of persecution or oppression from which they have fled. Deceit and fraud are always sanctioned by the folk-custom of persecuted or oppressed groups, because it is by these means only that they are fitted to survive the uncontrolled domination of a master race. The weaker group is in the same case as a child brought up by exacting and irascible parents, who in self-defense is certain to become crafty and untruthful. The customs of the Irish peasant immigrant were those of a folkgroup which had not passed the clan or at most the tribal phase, with a proportionately weak development of peace-customs. The folk-custom of the Russian-Jewish urban immigrant is that of tribal groups, welded together by heteroethnic oppression. In both instances, the external environment of persecution suppressing truth folkways had, in fact, established the folk-custom of outgroup Alien folk-ways and folk-customs The influence of persecution

Dual
conscience
a condition
of survival

deceit as a condition of survival. This gave rise to the phenomenon of dual conscience described by Mary Antin. "The Gentiles . . . said our merchants and money lenders preyed upon them, and our shopkeepers gave false measure. People who want to defend the Jews ought never to deny this. . . . We cheated the Gentiles wherever we dared because it was the only thing to do. . . . Wherever we could we spared our own kind, directing against our social foes the cunning wiles which bitter need invented. . . . A Jew could hardly exist in business unless he developed a dual conscience which allowed him to do to the Gentiles what he would call a sin against a fellow Jew."

The
problem of
assimilation

Until immigrants of this kind become assimilated socially as well as territorially, they are slow to adopt our folk-customs or to maintain our moral standards. American moral ideals are already adjusted to a structure and an environment out of which have grown the folkways and folk-customs, resultants of more than two centuries of individual freedom, of struggle with nature and of conditions of unimpeded and vigorous growth. Moreover, a large part of this immigration is of men who, by lack of previous contact with the higher social phases, have only attained the lower levels of self-consciousness, and in whom, therefore, the motive powers of the self-regarding sentiments of pride and self-respect are undeveloped. This multitude, suddenly injected into such an environment and among

Under-devel-
opment
of self-
conscious-
ness

such folk-customs, have to do business in order to live, and it is some time—often two generations or more—before they learn how to subordinate the folk-customs arising out of oppression to those that are formed by freedom; or to attain the self-conscious levels which are the outcome of life in a folkgroup of the nation type. The tendency of these alien groups is to settle in the great mercantile cities, of whose population they and their children form three fourths or more. So it is that, in places like New York and Chicago, there is barely more than a fifth of the population whose respect for folk-customs, formed out of the native environment, is based upon an experience of more than a single generation of descent.¹

Our ethical peril, in fact, is not a yellow but a white one; not beyond the Pacific, but at home. The anarchy that it injects into our peace-loving customs is, of course, relative. Tribal customs may be perfect adjustments of tribal life to its environment and yet may be the source of serious conflict when imported into national conditions. The characteristic solution of conflict in clan and tribal phases of society is war, and therefore appeals to force may sometimes explode within a more civilized folkgroup which is endeavoring to assimilate tribal groups. Those who have fled from oppression are often unskilled in the

¹ Is it not also probable that the disproportionate excess of males in this inflow has an influence on sex morals which can hardly be overestimated?

methods of peaceful compromise by which groupal adjustments are effected in a democracy. Inter-groupal conflicts which penetrate the innermost structure of the national organism are a peril which calls for energy, patience and courage on the part of all who have a stake in the higher ethical adjustments to which the Anglo-Saxon race has attained. This is presently more difficult by reason of the excursion of business organization beyond the bounds of personality; and it would be impossible were it not for the democracy of our public life and public school, and for the efforts of our social workers.

The white
man's
burden in
the United
States

No nation in history has ever had such a Sisyphean task laid upon its shoulders, as to absorb in fifty years a third its own numbers of subject races, fleeing from the domination of political ideals less humanistic than our own, and to adapt to their own the imported folk-customs arising from this cause. As a white man's burden there is nothing to compare with it short of the overflow of the Germanic tribes into Europe in the early centuries of the Christian era.

Change in
business
methods
1860-1910

Hand in hand with these protean racial group movements has gone a change in the methods of the older established business which is at least of equal force in begetting changes in folk-custom. In the beginning of the century, business competition, by which the margin of profit is restricted, was feeble. Under the existing conditions profits were correspondingly high. The reason for this is plain. Ex-

changes, on which business profit is founded, depend upon differences in the folkways of the groups between which the commodities, money or services are exchanged. The business profit of the trade between the Indians and the settlers was great because of the wide divergencies of their respective folkways. In the same way arose the large profits of the British exploitation of India, of the mediaeval trade between Italy and the Orient, and of the ancient business relations of the Phœnicians and the Greeks. While gross profits accrue from diverse folkways, the competition to obtain them is regulated by the interaction of ability, capital and credit on the perils, secrets and distances involved in inter-groupal trade.

Now, at the beginning of the century, the disparity of folkways between the then unspecialized ingroup of American traders and the outgroups with whom they did business was enormous. Buying rice and tobacco from the planter groups at low prices, these traders supplied the ability, knowledge and capital for shipping them to England, separated from us by distances and secrets, and by extraordinary perils during the wars of Napoleon and of 1812. Nevertheless, the average of perils, distances and secrets was less between ourselves and Great Britain or the Indies than that involved for them in obtaining from other shipping groups the naval stores, cotton, tobacco, rice and flour needed by them, and so the business was both large and profitable to our mer- Large profits in the first half of the nineteenth century Features of outgroup trade before the Civil War

chants and to theirs. And of British manufactures, as well as of West Indian sugar, molasses and mahogany, we were eager buyers at large profits, because our social structure and climatic environment had not established folkways of these industries within our own groups. Similar conditions prevailed in the exchange of our ginseng root and silver dollars against the tea, coffee, muslins and silks of the East; so great were the risks and so wide the divergences of folkways that the customary profit was to double the capital investment by every voyage. In the trade with our own Indian tribes, with an even greater disparity of folkways, a basket of toys or an old musket would buy furs on the wharves of New York which could be disposed of in London, after paying all expenses, to an advantage of 400 to 500 per cent. The enormous profits of slaving and smuggling were due to folkway differences between ourselves and outgroups which are too obvious to enumerate.

1890-1910

Suppression
of perils

—of secrets

—of
distances

Diffusion
of skill

But in the last two decades the elements contributing to profit have vastly changed. Business perils have been almost eliminated by almost universal peace. Business secrets have been abolished by the telegraph and the printing press. Distances have been annihilated by the steamship, the railroad, the telephone and the trolley car. Trading skill and knowledge have been diffused by a school system which trains disproportionate numbers of the population to clerky aspirations, for until the recent development of the engineering function in business,

the education that was generally given to the great mass of common school pupils was sufficient for a start in the store. For a population only two and a third times that of 1870 there are four times as many independent firms rated by the commercial agencies. In each period of depression the competition between overstimulated industrial and trading groups has grown more bitter, until the old-time profits have disappeared.

Up to thirty years ago office operations were performed by business clerks in the same way that they had been for more than two centuries, but in spite of the typewriter, the duplicating carbon, the loose-leaf ledger, the card index and the calculating machine, which have diminished the effort of routine business operations by at least two thirds, the use of clerical labor has increased four times as fast as population. Between 1870 and 1900 the number of commercial travelers increased thirteen-fold. Part of this showing is doubtless due to the increasing specialization of business functions, but taking all these classes together their rate of increase has been at least double that of the population which they serve. These progressive changes toward more widespread knowledge of business have wrought havoc with the rate of profit, and it is now impossible, save in a few little-known specialties based upon folkway-differences of small and isolated groups, to accumulate a fortune from the profits of a business of small or moderate size.

Diffusion of
business
knowledge

The folk-way of quick trading

To meet this emergency the pace of trade had to be vastly accelerated. Where a marginal profit sufficient to support a given organization could no longer be had from small sales, such firms as could not compass the necessary increase have had to go out of business. Business organizations have been more constantly employed in out-of-season work, and the number of transactions accomplished by them has been proportionately increased so as to meet the fall of net profits from an average of 20 or 25 per cent on the amount of the sale, to one of from 1 to 4 per cent on the same. Quick trading involving the minimum of time to each transaction has become a commercial necessity; in it lies all the hope of gain and the possibility of survival; this has involved changes in every productive industry and in the operations of every trading group.

Folkways of standardization in merchandise

—in transportation

In pursuit of this ideal, products can no longer be irregularly produced; they must be standardized, so as to be described by catalogue or by word of mouth, rather than by such personal inspection as was the custom before 1875; or even by showing of samples, a folkway which arose later. Even this is not enough; and as in quick trading lies all the hope of gain and the possibility of survival, so must also the operations of business be standardized as well as the merchandise. In the same direction has reacted powerfully the growth of markets following the increase of population and of its constituent groups. To fit these most important changes in

folk-custom, forced by the decline of profit and the resultant necessity of quick trading, grow new standards of conduct which are the modern morals of business conduct. The rapidity of the changes in methods and customs which have been characteristic of the growing age of steam and the budding age of electricity, have made it difficult for minds trained in the methods and customs of an earlier part of this period to grasp the moral necessities of its finish.

Standardization itself has in time become a potent factor in laying the foundation for a still further enlargement of industrial production. By making possible the exchange of large quantities of standardized merchandise units, it has stimulated their production by *concentration*, that is to say, by combination of smaller productive groups into larger, more economical units under a single management. Doubtless the impetus given to certain industries by folkways of tariff protection has been a condition contributing to the movement toward combination, as a relief from overstimulation of the formation of subgroups. In some industries a further step has been taken by *integration*, the knitting together into one compact, harmonious whole of all their related branches, or of all the necessary processes, in the conversion of a raw material into the finished product. Taking for example iron and steel, the first step was the consolidation of the formerly competing companies of each branch into such organizations as the Tube Company, the Steel

The Steel Corporation

and Wire Company, the Bridge Company, etc.; next the integration of these with their rival, the Carnegie Company, into the enormous industrial group of the United States Steel Corporation through the addition of mining companies, producing the ore; of barge and steamship lines and railways, transporting it; of coal, coke and limestone companies, producing the materials for smelting; together with a number of selling, engineering and financial groups, devising and exchanging the finished product. These various combinations formed a single integrated group to extract the stored-up forces of nature, to manufacture them without break of continuous treatment into finished commodities and finally to deliver these to their ultimate consumer. Such processes have eliminated the scattered mines, forges and blast furnaces which produced our iron in the early seventies; have created railways and steamship lines for the service of a single industry, and have greatly simplified and standardized its product. In forty years (1870-1910) the number of blast furnaces *decreased* from 386 to 208, while their annual product *increased* from 1,800,000 tons to 27,000,000. While the metal working trades are perhaps the most conspicuous examples of the concentrative process, yet it has gone forward in almost every line of staple production. The number of concerns making men's clothing decreased, 1870-1905, 42 per cent, while the value of their output increased two and a half times on a much lower scale of prices. Between 1870 and

Other types of concentration

1910 the number of slaughtering establishments increased only 38 per cent, while their product grew seventeen-fold. Two thirds of the woolen mills went out of existence during the same period, but those that remained made two and a half times as many goods as before.

Nowhere has the potency of these forces been Labor more revolutionary in its effect than in the duties and efficiency demanded of the labor groups in all industries. Average wages of ordinary labor have more than doubled, but in forty years the relations of the laborer to his industry have been subject to changes such as had not been accomplished in the preceding four centuries.

Take the boot and shoe industry as an example. The boot and shoe industry 1870-1910
In 1870 there were more than twice as many factories as in 1910. At the earlier date the average number of workers in a factory was twenty-nine, each producing annually 877 pairs worth \$1600. In 1910 the average number of wage-earners was 130, each with a product for the working year of 1539 pairs, worth \$2400. The organization of the industry has been revolutionized to produce this result. The division of labor into three operations, cutting, sewing and tapping, which was the outcome of a standardization of sizes effected in the last year of the seventeenth century, had prevailed down to 1845, Group when the simultaneous invention of a sewing machine for uppers and hand-power peg drivers started a new movement of specialization. The invention specializa-
tion through invention

Elaborate division of labor

of the power pegging machine in 1855 was followed by that of the power sewing machines of Mackay and Goodyear in 1860 and 1871. Before 1900 the three primary labor operations involved in making a pair of shoes had been subdivided into twenty-one. To further cheapen the product this process of subdivision and the speed at which it is carried on has been almost indefinitely increased. Writing in 1903, the expert of the Moseley Industrial Commission reported of a certain factory that "Labour is divided and subdivided to such an extent that it would require my personal presence on the firm for at least a fortnight to detail it." He expressed surprise to see the operation of skiving uppers, in England performed by one woman, in Brockton performed by four men on machines, each operator paring one side only of the leg. And his guide remarked, "If only the fractional part of a second is saved in each operation it tells up in the course of twelve months' working." He found all who were on machines working "as hard as possible, . . . the machinery running at the highest speed and the operators . . . had to keep their eyes skinned and their fingers in motion."

Folkway changes involved

The progressive specialization of such an industry not only involves large innovations in folkways, disturbs long-standing relations of settlement and housing—for formerly, while the sewing was done in factories, the soling was done in the household—revolutionizes the relations between employers and their help, etc., but brings forward immense moral

questions as to the outcome of these changes—the right to contract, the right to work long hours, the right to employ women and children, the right to pursue private economic welfare at the cost of groupal welfare, the right of employers to manage the business, their duties as to the protection of high speed machines, the rights of labor unions to intervene, the rights of laborers to determine who their fellow workmen shall be. The moral principles involved in many of these questions are not yet settled, but in the process of adjustment, unstable or undetermined folkways and folk-customs have led to confusion and conflict.

In every industrial group, especially in times of Trade depression, the struggle with diminishing depressions profits has evolved new folkways of efficiency, of standardization and of the relations between master and servant; and of these many have not yet been absorbed into the mass of general ethical principle which as morals it is our object to discuss. Trade depression is a potent cause of new folkways of industry; a force tending toward great efforts to increase pre-existing efficiency, toward great economies, toward great consolidations and concentrations. Of these, so long as times remain "hard," the consuming public—the folkgroup—is the primary beneficiary, but as a result in succeeding periods of good times and advancing business, profits and wages ultimately tend to increase.

It could not be expected that such changes could

The
finance of
a century
ago

Deposit
banking

Credit
changes in
fifty years

be accomplished in the folkways of industry, or of labor, without corresponding changes in the folkways of finance. At the close of the War of the Revolution, finance was pretty much confined to dealing in foreign exchange. In 1790 there was one bank each in New York, Philadelphia and Boston, and at the beginning of the century only twenty-eight in the whole country, with a capital of twenty-one millions, while the currency circulation averaged but \$5 per capita. Nearly all coins were foreign. There were four standards of value for the British penny, the use of which persisted in the folkways of trade until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Deposit banking was not established as a folkway; the Bank of Maryland had been in existence a twelvemonth before the first depositor came to its doors. In fact, its development did not come until after the Civil War, and the deposits of all the 1562 banks existing in 1860 were less than those now held by the two principal institutions in New York City. While in 1860 there was a bank for each 22,991 persons, there is in 1910 a bank for as few as 3975 persons. At the beginning of this epoch the money in circulation averaged \$13.85 per capita; at its end \$34.33.

The deposit function was, in a measure, supplied by the country store, whose folkway was to credit customers on its books with the produce which they brought in, and to charge them with the commodities which they took away. As late as the middle of

the century there were retail stores in New England towns doing a large business without handling as much as five dollars in real money in a week's time. The United States government allowed four years' credit for land sales and twelve to eighteen months' time for customs duties. Shrewd merchants took advantage of this folkway, and from the proceeds of a first cargo from the Indies often financed two or three more, which could be turned into cash before the duties of the first became due. At one time John Jacob Astor was thus employing no less than five millions of government money in his business. Folk-feeling ran against this method, it was repudiated by folk-custom and in 1842 it was prohibited by statute, on the ground of privilege.

In merchandising, the rise of the humanistic practice of implied warranties, and its gradual substitution for the legal folk-custom of *caveat emptor*, have had much to do with a thoroughgoing change in the folkways of the settlement of debt incurred through time credits arising from sales. This practice is largely responsible for the now rare use of the bill receivable in closing merchandise credits, and its virtual replacement by open book account, the reason being that the seller's implied warranty of his goods prevents the closing of the transaction and the final fixing of the amount due. This interesting change was furthered by a number of other folkways and customs which grew up during the convulsion of the Civil War.

Rise of the
custom of
implied
warranties

Early state socialism

Insurance

Taxation

Corporations

But for a long time thereafter no objection was made to the advance of state bonds in aid of pike and bridge corporations, and both city and county bonds were issued to invest in the stocks of railroads so as to induce transportation development. This practice is now looked upon as wrong, but it was only extinguished by the losses of the panic of 1873. Our enormous insurance funds are the development of the last sixty years, their real importance arising in the last half of this period. The insurance investigation of 1906 showed folkways which had been of no importance, or even of advantage to these funds during their formative stage, that had subsequently become wrongs because of their scale, and of their gross partiality to favored individuals.

Up to 1860 the taxes collected for the support of the general government had never exceeded seventy millions in any year; and they did not pass the hundred million mark until the second year of the Civil War. Up to that time the customs tariffs, on which the treasury depended as the chief source of its income, had fluctuated between revenue and protection; but the high-water mark of protective legislation, the "Tariff of Abominations" of 1828, would be called a Free Trade measure today. Internal revenue taxes are a growth of the necessities of the War of the Rebellion.

Promoters existed, of course; wherever there are great enterprises to be carried out the advantages of the co-operation of capitals is apparent, and private

business corporations began to be chartered before the end of the eighteenth century. Up to 1815 there were some 120 manufacturing corporations in Massachusetts, and perhaps fifty in New York. Every company then had to have a special charter from the legislature. But until recognition by folk-custom of the need of great transportation lines, corporate progress was slow. In the latter half of the nineteenth century general laws were passed permitting incorporation to any group of men who would comply with certain fixed conditions, but the main application of the corporate principle of organization to all branches of trade, industry and finance has been made within the last twenty-five years. More than two hundred and sixty thousand such companies made returns to the United States Internal Revenue in 1910. Syndicates for the underwriting of the great blocks of capital required by these promotions have been developed only during the last fifteen years.

The increasing complexity of production, and the Professions association of power, mechanical and chemical problems with questions of light, heat and electricity, and the need, in times of trade depression, of greater efficiency in production, have given scope and impetus to all of the old professions, and opportunity for many which were not even heard of two or three decades ago. New customs had to be developed on which to base the rights and duties involved in the contact of these new departments of science with the

older and newer industries for which their skill was needed, and to regulate the new expansion of the older vocations of the architect, chemist and mechanical engineer.

Labor

In number, the wage-earners who sell their services or their time to those engaged in industrial operations have become by far the largest and most important business group. Outside of agriculture there were over 12,600,000 people thus employed in 1900; assuming a family ratio of three to each worker, about half the total population.

Change in
class-
feeling

During the last half century the collective character of none of our groups has been so profoundly altered as has that of industrial labor in the East and Northwest. No longer is its temperament that of the Puritan with a stoicism endued by generations of contest with pioneer conditions in a self-restraining atmosphere of personal liberty; it is now mainly that of men of more volatile races habituated to police restraint rather than to self-control, imbued with folk-custom arising from tribal rather than national conditions and educated under such conditions of discontent as to induce them to wrench themselves loose from all the ties of friends, homes and fatherlands. The habits and customs of the immigrant workers are adjusted to their former environment; they find themselves projected into a social fabric of folkways and folk-customs whose meaning they do not understand, and to acquire which at their average maturity is a difficult task. They interpret

the absence of police restraint as a license to allow themselves modes of behavior and conduct whose volitional control is not inspired by the higher levels of self-consciousness; for to attain these levels presupposes social conditions by which they have never yet been influenced. To further complicate the problem of assimilation they find themselves confronted, not with a fairly stable social and economic status, but are plunged from the start into the series of unstable conditions which are the outcome of great and rapid evolutions in population, in business groups, in invention, in immigration and in quick trading.

Certain significant changes in the customs surrounding this greatest of all industrial groups call for especial mention.

The first of these is the change from the self-sufficing to the business type of industry, to which we have already referred, with its resultant loss of independence and of incentive to the development of self-respect.

The second is the increasing employment of women in all business groups. In 1868 the first typewriter was made, and so discovered a new outlet for the occupation of the weaker sex, already expanded by the power spindle and the loom. The organization, first of water power, then of steam and finally of electricity, has transferred three fourths of women in the female household occupations of the previous industry two thousand years to the factories, located in large

social groups, towns and villages, whose civilizing influence has reacted economically, biologically, psychically and morally upon the wants, health, intellect and character not only of this generation, but of many yet to come. The whole number of the sex engaged in trade, transportation and manufacturing increased 385 per cent between 1870 and 1900, as contrasted with an increase in the whole population of only 96 per cent, and of working males of no more than 203 per cent.

New groups

Thirdly, the inventions of the last quarter century have brought into existence industrial groups formerly unknown, like electricians, telephone operators, automobile drivers, street railway employees, etc., and have led to the rapid decay of many others.

Changed relations of employers and employees

Last, but most important of all in the creation of folk-custom, is the changed ratio in almost all the manufacturing industries of workers to employers—a necessary consequence, we may say, of concentration, in the effort to adjust production to the decline of profits and the rise of quick trading. The enlargement of the mechanical unit has caused the decay of folkways of constant touch and sympathy between masters and workmen, and has developed group-feelings excited by the discords, rather than by the harmonies, of their interests. It remains to be seen whether this antagonism will eventuate in destructive warfare, or whether the handwriting on the wall will inspire these groups to draw nearer to each other in a joint effort for their common weal.

It seems likely, with respect to bigness, that the Titanic disaster marked the end of an epoch. Perhaps many of the merely big enterprises may disintegrate into humanly possible units. Otherwise humanistics will probably gain a foothold in folk-feeling that may cause the folkgroup, with a fine disregard for merely economic motives, to adventure the experiment of state control and management. We may only feel sure that a folk-custom has already arisen of intolerance to great enterprises, and that on the scale to which many of them have attained during the last fifteen years they are no longer morally possible. The mainsprings of this folk-custom are doubtless partly found in a dislike of the unneighborly relations arising from the decline of personal contact between the groups co-operating to produce, and the neglect of quality which in many cases has accompanied the excessive effort to cheapen and expand production.

We have now reviewed the effect of the great Summary immigrations of alien races disparate in their habits, folkways and folk-customs; in their levels of self-consciousness; in their social organization; in their economic practice; and in their moral principle with all that our national environment, our political evolution, our civil status and our established moralities have led us to consider as necessary to our welfare. The effort to assimilate such elements produces moral confusions and moral conflicts and brings up the complex question of the relations between one

Distrust
of the
overgrown

organization of social groups passing through higher social phases with other intrusive groups passing through lower social phases.

If a problem of such magnitude were not enough to vex and disturb our powers of moral construction, in addition we have a social structure crystallized by the practice of many centuries to be newly fitted to a rapidly changing cultural environment—the outcome of the tremendous progress of the last century in science and the arts.

Folkway, folk-custom and humanistic, which are the means of forming those moral adjustments with the environment which better fit men for survival, are by no means so rapid in growth and development; and this is the more true because of our conscious effort to stabilize them through institutional adjuncts. Law and religion are often the means by which obsolete custom is maintained long after it has become maladjusted to a changed environment. Thus arises a third series of conflicts; clouding the moral atmosphere and making the best intentioned and best trained of our population uncertain as to what course of conduct should rightfully be pursued.

Both righteous conduct and economic success are ideals of business life. It is quite possible to exaggerate the part that merely economic success plays in the adjustment of the business life to its environment. It is with this question that we shall be particularly concerned in the next chapter.

XI

MORAL CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS

We have now arrived at a point where it is possible to halt, and turning about, take stock of that to which we have been giving a more or less detailed attention. Thus far we have been concerned with Retrospect a survey of the nature and origin of moral conduct, analyzed with respect to its nature and synthesized with respect to its origin. Moral conduct in its essence is a social phenomenon, involving the relations of the acts of one man with respect to other men.¹ In the preceding chapters we therefore began by considering that aspect of the subject presented by the relations of society to man. Inasmuch as our purpose is to determine, if possible, by what ethical principles the individual should be actuated in his conduct toward the society of which he is a part, it may lead to a better understanding of these interrelations if we reverse for a time the current of our investigation, and approach the subject from

Morality
a social
matter

¹ Involving also certain phases of its extension toward such of the higher animals as have been domesticated by man, and so adopted by him into the social structure. When man first accepted this responsibility his conduct toward them was naturally regulated by the prevalent folkways which in a hunting state had been adopted toward the wild animals that formed the major part of the food supply. This aspect was only altered when in a large way such animals were bred to be man's helpmates in the task of modifying his environment.

that aspect in which it presents itself to the individual himself. We have found:

Neural factors in behavior	A. That all animal acts are the outcome of nervous or quasi-nervous impulses; excited by external forces but conditioned mainly by the degree of development of the nervous system; possessed of uniformities which enable them to be classified, and:
Environmental factors of behavior	1. Animal life begins to develop in a primitive environment of physical elements and natural forces which gradually are modified by modes of behavior, inherited, and not chosen, by an agent unconscious of their purpose; and these are the outcome of the pressure of natural environment upon animal structure, serving their mutual adaptation and so tending to the survival of the races by which they are practiced. Together they may be classed as natureways, whose modes are:
Nature-ways—	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) Tropisms; direct responses of the organism to its environment, characteristic of lower invertebrate races whose nervous system, if any, is diffuse or unco-ordinated;(b) Reflexes, co-ordinations of tropisms, characteristic of higher invertebrate races in whom a segmentally co-ordinated nervous system has been developed; and(c) Instinctive acts, co-ordinations of reflexes, characteristic of the vertebrate races possessing a more complex nervous system centrally co-ordinated by a brain.

Within races, natureways are more or less uniformly diffused; they cumulate by inheritance from racial lower to higher races; they constantly grow, exist and die; they are stable in direct ratio to their diffusion and longevity; and, inherited by mankind, form the foundation on which its conduct is builded. Of these modes those derived from instinct, the least stable, is capable of modification by experience and reason.

2. All human acts are the outcome of a combination of nervous and mental impulses, which add to behavior conscious conduct. Conduct differs from behavior in that it is the result of voluntary purpose and not physiologically inherited, is developed under social conditions as the result of a concurrent effort to adjust individual and groupal life to the environment, and expresses itself in three fairly distinct modes, together classed as nurtureways, viz.:

(a) Folkways; simple volitional adjustments of persons to environment; unconsidered common ways—habits of conduct, characteristic of the lower human grades and social phases.

(b) Folk-customs; more complex adjustment of groups to their environment; the general expression in action of doing to others what one expects from others, characteristic of the middle human grades and social phases.

(c) Humanistics; effecting the triple adjustment of environment to groups and individuals, the expression in conduct of pity or love for one's neigh-

bor, characteristic of the higher human grades and social phases.

—their
groupal
characters

Like natureways these modes of conduct grow, exist and die among the human groups, and their energy and stability is in direct ratio to their duration and exercise.

Nurture-
ways a
shield
against
nature

B. Man's life begins its development, then, in a primitive environment composed of physical elements, natural forces and their modification through natureways inherited from his animal ancestry. But this environment changes, and the changes as they come are adjusted to his life by almost imperceptible adjustments—modes of conduct. Conduct is a device of man's intelligence to build between himself and nature a screen of artificial or cultural environment, by which he is enabled to control and adjust the primitive environment to his constantly growing needs. In the last analysis this screen is nurtureways.

—are
conditioned
by volitional
develop-
ment

1. This process evokes a mental evolution in man, in the course of which it is also possible to descry a graduation. Conscious choice is the product of volition; and volition is found to be a function of the conscious knowledge of the self. Self-consciousness is proportioned to intelligence, and is conditioned by it. The prime factor in the development of intelligence is the opportunity of mixing with and acting with other men and other minds. And so, both conduct and intelligence are conditioned by the society in which they are involved.

2. Man is adjusted to his final environment,

which is largely social, by both behavior and conduct. His actions are the outcome of conflict or of harmony between impulses derived from natureways and those derived from nurtureways; in cases of conflict the lower, most energetic and most stable modes would prevail were it not for the development of his character. Character is organized by self-consciousness. Consciousness of self in man is gradually evolved along an ascending pathway by whose levels we measure its attainment. Its lower levels do not supply forces with which to overcome impulses derived from the natureways or from the lower nurtureways, when in conflict with less energetic, less stable and later evolved modes. But self-consciousness on its higher levels has accumulated means whereby its function, volition, may overbalance the lower impulses and deliberately choose the higher but weaker impulses, thus determining conduct of the higher modes. Volition becomes, therefore, the regulating factor of conflicting impulses to action from whatever source derived. The habits of conduct thus formed, together with those proceeding from inherited disposition and bodily temperament, are organized together by self-consciousness into a system of sentiments; and this is character. Thus character is the all-important force behind that conduct which other men have the right to expect of any given human agent.

C. Of the three component elements of character, temperament is the outcome of an existing

—with
natureways
are adjust-
ments to
environ-
ment

—in which,
character
is all
important

The
nature of
character—

—its
relative
stability

—its
degenera-
tive
possibilities

Social
groups—

—their
reactions

organic structure capable of modification within narrow limits; disposition is a still more stable inheritance of nurtureway tendencies, and habitual conduct is fixed on the nervous highways by frequency of repetition. Theoretically, therefore, character should be a comparatively stable product, and this practically, it is. Business men recognize its permanency to the degree that they have made it their chief criterion of credit. But its temperamental basis is subject to attack through sickness, or mental disturbances may lower the level of self-consciousness by which its three elements are organized. There is no more dangerous debtor than one whose character has been established on a high level, but who by such degenerative processes is beginning to lose it. For this reason, creditors properly keep character under continual observation, lest reputation be continued as an asset, after the bases of character have been partly destroyed.

D. The social structures—groupal phases assumed by the efforts of men to live in association—in which conduct is performed, and in which character is developed, are environmental conditions of great potency and necessity in the development of both nurtureways and personality. Without a correspondingly complex social structure neither the higher levels of self-consciousness nor the higher modes of conduct would be possible.

In our survey of society we have seen:

i. That mankind has always ordered itself into

groups of which the unit group is the family or social —their atom. universality

2. That these units are compounded with other families into a series of folkgroup types; each type —their a social phase of advancing complexity, viz.: structure

(a) The Clan, a molecule of families tied by the sentiment of kin.

(b) The Tribe, a simple or inorganic compound of families or clans tied by efficiency in war.

(c) The Nation, a complex or organic compound of families or tribes tied by the need of peace.

3. That in the struggle for existence it always —their has been the experience of mankind that a groupal potency organization better fits its members to survive, and in survival that the ever-advancing complexity of environments have always to be matched by increasing complexity of folkgroup structure. In other words, the higher groupal phases have become predominant because of their efficiency in adjusting men to the surroundings in which they have to live.*

E. In the foregoing synthesis we have observed Parallelism correspondences between modes of behavior and levels of nervous development, and between the latter and the stages of life; and a certain parallelism between conduct modes, self-conscious levels and social phases. Without forgetting the penumbrae or twilight zones qualifying all border lines between classes, we may now permit ourselves to draft a tentative scheme, recapitulating the correspondence between life, action, society and morals.

Assuming that the summaries and comparisons of life, nerve structure, mind, society and conduct, as shown by this table, form an approximately true picture of their development and correspondences, we may proceed to draw from it some tentative generalizations bearing upon moral choices.

Moral
conflicts—


The main difficulties found in choosing between impulses are found, as we have seen, in the cases in which they conflict. In the vast majority of instances, of course, a preponderatingly powerful motive determines choice without the exercise of volition, because there is no conflict; as where we exchange merchandise for cash in a department store, or where we obey the direction of the traffic squad. In both of these instances our conduct is perfectly co-ordinated to predominant folk-custom. But in other instances this predomination may be wanting; whereupon conflict of motives may arise from three sources.

—due to
diversity of
character

In the first place, in every society we have to deal with men of diverse characters. Some group members have one or other of the ingredients of character developed to a lesser or greater degree; they may have attained different levels of self-consciousness, they may have inherited different dispositions and be unable to modify them, or they may have temperaments maladjusted by bodily infirmity or self-abuse.

—their
problems

Granted a person whose choice of conduct is impelled by a high grade of character is brought into



business association with another of a low grade, what course is he to pursue? The latter does not recognize at all duties which the former is bound to consider if not to perform. Obviously there is here a great difficulty in the choice of conduct, which does not exist when transactions are entered into between persons of fairly equal characters, high or low.

Next, and closely connected with the perplexities —due to involved in disparities of character are those in- social involved in dealings entered into between groups disparities belonging to different social phases. The same conduct has different results in different groups. That which in one place perfectly adjusts the agent to his environment fails to do so in another. He who would act in a Kalinga or Igorot village in the same way that he would at a summer hotel in New Hampshire would run grave risk of having his head added to somebody's collection. The same financial attitude toward a group of gold brick operators as toward the members of the Clearing House would surely result in a loss of one's money. It is quite impossible to make the same wage-contract with the —their I. W. W. as with the Iron Moulders' Union or problems the Brotherhood of Railroad Engineers. Liberal terms of credit to dual-conscience groups, such as we find among certain of our immigrant refugees, would involve greater risks than the same terms extended to the established wholesale jobbing trade.

The needs of our modern system of quick trading have developed common super-honest modes of con-

Business
honor,
its basis

duct, based upon business honor, that is, upon humanistic ideals of regard for the other party in what recently was a selfish contract and a little further back was based upon deceit and plunder. These ideals are propagated by trading groups and business organizations, and become finally a part of the law merchant, or of the statutes of the state. The trade morals involved in the extension of open credits, in uniformity of prices to competing purchasers, in implied warranties of the quality of goods, in stable rates of discount and interest, and in the taboos on preferential payments, secret liens, freight underbilling, or customs undervaluation are instances in point. A number of low-grade business groups are still but faintly influenced by this whole class of honorable or humanistic business considerations, and their habitual conduct accords only with the folk-customs of a by-gone age, or of the more primitive social phases. Here is evidently another perplexity: how to act toward the member of a group or class which is not passing through the same social phase as the agent.

Intra-
groupal
conflicts of
custom

Thirdly, there comes the question, intimately associated with these preceding, of choice between the various modes of conduct approved by our own group in the case when these apparently are discordant. What course are we to follow when the humanistic impulse tells us to do one thing, folk-custom another, and the law, maybe, a third? What

generalizations may be drawn that will help judgment in these contingencies?

For example, consider the assessment of personal taxes. Our method has descended to us from a time when the larger part of the existing personality was as visible as the titles to real property; being composed of the tools, cattle and household goods incident to self-sufficing industry. Out of the chaos of the English revolution grew the folk-custom of a fixed revenue for the state, and with it a humanistic that taxes should be so levied as to bear with equal weight on all persons similarly situated. These two nurtureways grew into our existing legal institutions for the assessment of both real and personal estates. The tax assessment of intangibles—

But by degrees conditions changed. Personal credits, the outcome of the substitution of commodity exchange for self-subsistence, became an important form of investment, fluctuating, intangible and unrecorded. Industry, rapidly expanding, created a further great investment field in negotiable instruments, such as notes, bonds, shares, etc., the ownership of which was as easily concealed as that of personal credits and even more readily transferred.

As such forms of debt became more important, the law assumed that ability to pay arising from the ownership of these new forms of investment could still be measured by the same folk-custom which from colonial times had been applied to real estate, that of their estimated value in sale. In the first half of the nineteenth century public expenditure was so light

—its growing divergence from folk-custom

Its effect
on social
welfare

that tax rates were low and the inducement to the evasion of these laws trivial. The assessment of corporate property was hardly attempted, reliance being made on assessment of the instruments of ownership, when in private hands. And so the question of double taxation, once upon the property and again upon the evidences of its ownership was not important. But with the great collective wastes that began with the Civil War, tax rates increased; and the line of least resistance brought corporate property up to assessment for full value. Conscientious owners of intangibles were now asked to pay a third to a half of the income which they received in taxes, and they saw that to tax the property and then to tax the instrument of its ownership was double taxation. And so, where the law was enforced business was driven into exile. In the twenty years following 1870 factories employing 100,000 workmen moved from New York City to the Jersey shore. By the contrary policy of exempting personality, Pennsylvania attracted an enormous influx of manufactures. For political reasons, the people of New York were powerless to correct this law-made injustice, but the group met its attack upon public welfare by creating a folk-custom which sanctions the evasion of taxes on intangibles. Only in the case of publicly administered estates is there a constant conflict between the law and the folk-custom; wherein again the humanistic of equal treatment is traversed. In at least one instance a municipality has publicly

refunded taxes legally collected from an over-conscientious citizen, others persistently refuse to assess personality, and some have revolted against their own officials when they have tried to enforce the law.

And so we have three sets of impulses at work—one derived from the humanistic of equal treatment, —its one from the attempt to enforce laws whose execution, by violating that humanistic, effect injustice, and as a compromise between these the folk-custom of evasion devised to further the survival of the folk-group, menaced by the withdrawal of capital, one of the vital factors of its welfare. Truly a tangle of opposing impulses derived from nurtureways.

Equally significant are clashes between folk-custom and class-custom. Many labor unions think it right to use force in the settlement of a trade dispute; the public demands peace. Railroad managers may starve their maintenance so as to support their dividends; the people demand that they make their roads safe for travel. Beef packers long butchered their cattle in unsanitary surroundings; the nation speedily laid heavy penalties on such conduct. And so arises the question, which to follow—class morals or the morals of the folkgroup.

Lastly, there is the conflict between the moral and the economic impulses. Fortunate indeed it is that business in actual practice is not conducted with a sole eye to gain, but in general with due regard to social, that is to say moral, consequences. But to be

Conflicts
between
folk- and
class-
customs

Economic
and moral
conflicts

successful, the merchant or manufacturer must be efficient, and in these days of large enterprises and of quick trading we have seen that a large production at minimum cost is essential to efficiency; to which standardization of the product as surely succeeds as the wheel follows the foot of him who draws the wagon.

Moral
effects of
quick
trading

For, the economization of time and effort demanded by the modern methods of business leaves little room for higgling or trading. Qualities are standardized, quantities are standardized, prices and terms of credit are standardized, so as to permit the largest number of possible transactions to be consummated in the shortest measure of time. It is clearly perceived that this is the nub of business efficiency, and upon the totality of efficiency in any business depends its welfare; that is, its adjustment to its environment, and its ability to survive. Alexander T. Stewart discovered the efficiency of standardized prices in the early forties. Previous to that time it was a folkway in the United States, as it is today in Italy or Spain, to ask one price of the buyer with the idea of taking another in the end; and of settling the final question of what was to be paid by the process of bargaining—the chaffering of the market. Stewart saw the opportunity of creating a widespread confidence in his business methods by introducing a custom that all who bought from him should be treated exactly alike. His experiment was received with derision by his competitors. Half the

Standardi-
zation—
—of prices

pleasure of buying would be lost to the public, they said, if the opportunity for the interchange of wits involved in higgling and trading were denied. It was confidently asserted that customers would be driven away from a shop where the delights of bargaining —its were done away with. But Stewart's hopes were influence more than realized, and on the foundation of the on success principle of fixed prices he built the most enormous business success of his generation; many of his competitors, driven out of business by their incapacity to forecast the trend of folk-custom, were glad to hire their services to aid the great merchant in the very policy that had led to their own downfall.

The vast majority of attributes of all staple merchandise are now so standardized that the main question in selling is not so much persuasion as in getting the standards fairly represented before the prospective buyer's mind. If the offering fits his economic needs his last doubt is the ethical one—i.e., is the representation a "fair one?"—and he acts in accordance with his answer to this question; if the answer be "yes" the trade succeeds. Therefore the standardization of conduct is equally important with the other kinds of standardization to the success of any business which is conducted in conformity with the modern idea of large sales and small profits; and thus it is that in business conduct, well-established and widely known principles promote success.

We may at this juncture profitably engage in a brief digression to discuss success in general. What Success—

—as
related to
individual
welfare

—as related
to familial
welfare

does it imply? At least individual welfare. Some would have us believe that the only measure of welfare is wealth amassed. Many merely rich men, however, must always lie under the stigma of failure, because they cannot command the respect of their groups. Others even have failed to command their own self-respect, and have died under the strain of that disgrace. What does it profit a man to have won wealth if he may not live to enjoy riches? In direct ratio to the station which they have achieved, the terrible force of adverse mental suggestion pursues men who fail to win the approbation of their group; and if it does not kill, deprives life of the pleasures which well-earned wealth can command.

We have observed, during our discussion of humanistics, that not only the fitness of the individual, but of his progeny, to survive derives from and stimulates the compassion-motives to conduct. And so, in the prospect of mere individual success, there is less incentive to exertion than in the stimulus that comes from the hope of building a successful social unit, by better fitting its offspring to cope with the world. Thus the second, the enduring element by which success is judged, is familial fitness for survival, and here character is the all-important factor.

Looking even beyond individual and family welfare in the quest of that more perfect adjustment of life to environment, of which success is the token, we find it universally conceded to those who have developed the talents which are latent in their

dispositions. The meed of success is granted to the statesman whose influence over others has gained assent to policies devised for folkgroup welfare, to —as related the artist who has portrayed nature or life so as to to social appeal to men's emotions for all time, to the writer welfare who has flashed thoughts, new or old, so vividly before the imagination that they have found an enduring place in the memory of the race, or to the publicist who has aided the group in its efforts to fit itself for survival. The third, the immortal element of success lies, therefore, in the development of man's power to aid in the building of the screen of artificial environment which civilization raises between mankind and the forces of nature.

Success, therefore, is the name by which society recognizes power to modify the natural environment of the individual, the family and the group. That —as power power is acquired through developed talents, character and wealth, mingled in proportions varied to the task undertaken. Money, the cold storage form of wealth, is only feebly efficient as a substitute for the other elements and reliance upon it alone leads to eventual failure in the attainment of results.

No one knows this better than the business man, for in business credit is the outward and visible sign of success; nobody of intelligence lends to the unsuccessful. Capitalists require evidence of a full adjustment of the borrower to his environment, and look for it in three factors; character, ability—that is to say efficiency—and capital. Money, therefore, has

Credit the
touchstone
of business
success

Fallacy
of the
wealth-basis
of credit

indeed something to do with business success, but only one third as much as most people imagine. In time of trouble, wealthy men have been refused loans on prime security because they could find none to trust their character and ability, while those who were strong in the latter qualities had no great difficulty in supplying their needs.

Social
conditions
of success

Success, then, is a proof of fitness to survive, evidenced by self-development, by familial welfare, and by individual prosperity; a series completely adjusting the man to his environment, the major part of which is society itself. If a man's conduct is mal-adjusted to that of the major part of his environment, how can he maintain his fitness to survive?

Economic
and moral
adjustments

As we have already seen, moral conduct is one of the devices by which the folkgroup adjusts itself to its environment. Economic conduct, primarily the adjustment of the individual to his environment, in a lesser degree aids the adjustment of the folkgroup and its subgroupal constituents. When they conflict, the moral, that is to say the purely social, impulses are certain to prevail in the long run. Failure on the part of individuals or of a subgroup to recognize this fact and to make their conduct agree with the adjustments adopted by the folkgroup provokes retaliation on the part of the folkgroup; sometimes this may proceed dangerously near to the point of starving an essential social organ, as in the case of the railways during the last ten years. Their troubles are due to an indifference

to folk-feeling. In the long run, a business group will not succeed if it neglects or disregards the moral expedients which the folkgroup has found essential to its vitality, justified by long continued racial experience. And so the principle to guide a business group to the highest success through the conflicts between economic and moral impulses is the first rule of trade-morals:

I. *Economic impulses must be adjusted to moral impulses, by the subordination of immediate profits to prevailing folk-customs and humanistics.*

Reverting now to the question of conflicts between the modes of behavior or conduct, or between the higher them and the moral adjuncts, religion or law, it will be well to remind ourselves that the primary object of each phase of social organization is to promote the survival of the group in which it prevails. At any given time and place, therefore, the highest social phase then and there established is that particular form of group organization which best fits the group to maintain itself in its environment and to compete with other social groups therein. To aid its survival the group selects nurtureways; and experience shows that of these it always finds most potent to that end the higher and not the lower modes. In our discussion of the humanistics we have observed the potency of moral conduct derived from the customs engendered by pity—the highest of the nurtureways—to promote the survival of the individual in civilization:

1. Because they increase the efficiency of his group;
2. Because he is more likely to be approved by the group leaders—who are themselves always of the higher type—the nervous stimulus of this approval being of itself a large factor in individual survival, and
3. Because, other things being equal, his children and descendants will be more nearly adapted to the moral environment of future generations; for this is selected from the highest morality of the present.

Ascending
scale of
moral
duties

The correspondences and parallelisms which we have observed between the phases of social structure, the levels of self-consciousness and the modes of conduct confirm the observation that the higher modes of the natureways are those which are always associated with the survival of the more complex social structures. We may further infer that they are a large factor in the success of the individual, considered as adjustment of his life to his environment, both natural and social; and especially do they tend toward fitting the family to survive. From reasons of both social and individual welfare, therefore, is drawn the second of the rules of trade-morals:

II. *The perplexities arising from the contending impulses of discordant nurtureways can be adjusted in the interest of enduring welfare only by the choice*

of the higher modes of conduct rather than the lower.

This rule expresses the duty of one party to perform, and the right of the other to expect, conduct which accords with humanistics rather than with folk-customs; with folk-customs rather than with folk-ways; with folkways rather than with instincts, and so on.

And when the morals of a class are contending with those of a people are we not right in concluding that national welfare is of more importance than those of any group of men within its domain? Thus we arrive at the third general rule of trade-morals:

III. *In conflicts between customs, those of the folkgroup must always be preferred to those of any of its subgroups; the welfare of society rather than that of a class. Class-customs must be reconciled to each other by mutual concessions not in conflict with folk-custom.*

But sometimes there is a conflict between a humanistic, or a folk-custom, and a law, in spite of the fact that laws are the creatures of folk-custom. In considering this we must not forget that there are two varieties of law: the private law which is supposed to be declaratory of folk-custom, and prescribes the relations of citizens to each other; and the public law which prescribes the relation of the citizen to the state. It may be said that private law is declared for the convenience of the folkgroup;

Ascen-
dency of
morals over
the private
law

but that public law is expressive of its will. Private law may disagree with folk-custom in various ways.

The folk-custom expressed in a law may have died; i.e., become maladjusted to folkgroup welfare; or it may have been supplanted by another folk-custom or by a humanistic. This is the case when we say the law is obsolete. Under these circumstances, the dead law must yield to the live folk-custom, though less readily on account of the penalties which it commonly prescribes. It is the function of juries to relieve defendants of these penalties and they may be relied upon to do so. A man, therefore, is justified in transgressing a law that is plainly reprobated by public opinion.

Eccentric
laws

Through haste and lack of knowledge of the subject-matter, half-baked legislation, thoroughly inexpressive of intergroupal or of individual obligation, may be placed upon the statute books. Private law is tangled up with the interests of classes, by whom it is often promoted. In spite of the astonishing number of such projects as are annually proposed to our legislatures few, fortunately, are actually enacted. But still there are some. In the state of New Jersey, for instance, out of an annual product of some six hundred new laws, a few are so absurd or so impractical that they are repealed or amended even before the end of the session in which they are passed. The business man must not disregard such laws; but his duty to society is to disobey

them, to follow folk-custom, and to take the first opportunity of testing them before a jury.

With public laws, however, the case is different. They are expressive of duties toward the folkgroup, and provide penalties against crimes, misdemeanors and contraventions. They do not involve private interests, and are rarely inspired by them. It may therefore be assumed that they are the reasonable and proper expression of folk-feeling and of the folkwill. It is better to suffer some economic disadvantage than allow any portion of this class of laws to fall into disrepute. At all events, their theory, which is that they bear equally on all citizens at all times, may be supported. In order to do this, practically everyone must aid in their enforcement and see that his neighbor's conduct conforms to them, as well as his own. Hence we come to the fourth rule of trade-morals:

IV. In cases of conflict between laws and the nurtureways, private laws may be subordinate to folk-customs and humanistics; not, however, without the duty of a public contest of the obsolete or mal-adjusted statute. Public law may not be subordinated to folk-custom and must be followed; but there remains a duty, to compel conformity on the part of other group members.

Trade and religion have little to do with each other. We may simply note in passing that religious precepts which conflict with folk-custom need not be dogmas

Ascen-

dency of

public law

over morals

followed unless they are expressions of the higher mode of humanistic conduct. It is a duty to the public to make no profession of adherence to religious principles which have come to be contrary to the welfare of the folk. It is an equal duty to support such of them as are in accord with groupal welfare; for upon occasion they may serve as a powerful auxiliary to the practice of moral rules.

Disparities
of character
and group
alliances

Finally, we must approach conflicts brought about by unequal development of character between individuals and by unequal social evolution between groups. There is so intimate a connection of interactions between the levels of self-consciousness, by which character is determined, and those of groupal evolution that they may be considered together.

Duty
toward an
outgroup

The observation of two groups or of two individuals widely separated in culture, whether they be nations and classes or a civilized man and a savage, leads us to the immediate conclusion that a mode of conduct which is rightly expected within the higher folkgroup or toward persons of the higher characters is not primarily a duty toward the lower. In most instances, in fact, it would preclude survival. Nowhere in nature is the same behavior or conduct expected from a higher racial group towards a lower. It is never that which prevails within the group. A wild beast demands no consideration by way of gentle manners; this is also true of a wild man. The principle is generally recognized that there is no obligation upon an individual to conform to the

nurtureways of a group in which he does not live. As a corollary of this principle it is the duty of one who lives within a group to fit his conduct to that of the group. Placed in a new environment he must fit his ways to it or impair his chance of survival. By this necessity, missionaries of the highest character have properly adjusted to their use the folkways and folk-customs of the tribes to whom they have been accredited; and even when their purpose was to train them to higher modes of conduct than customary with their group.

In a mixed civilization, like that of the United States, there are both men and groups who are widely abnormal in folk-feeling. The conflict of their morals and those of the folkgroup find their most destructive expression in business competition. If unrestrained, the methods of those groups by the operation of a moral Gresham's law would speedily drive out the more honorable modes of conduct demanded by the necessities of survival in our complex environment. In the vast development of novel business situations through the rapid expansion and acceleration of business progress during the last half-century the malicious and unscrupulous competitor has at his hand a hundred means of injuring his rival, where formerly he had one. But if these methods were allowed to prevail the standardization of business would be checked; quick trading stopped at the expense of a largely increased cost, which the consumers would not tolerate. And so it arises that

The problem of a mixed civilization

Duty of ostracism toward fraud

the first duty, both of morals and of law, in the conditions outlined above must be to control and suppress fraud and unfair competition in favor of the more honorable forms of business conduct prescribed by the law merchant. To accomplish so potent a result, all of the social and groupal activities must be enlisted, and therefore we come to the fifth rule of trade-morals:

V. The perplexities arising in business competition, from disparities of character or of social evolution, can only be overcome by self-respect, groupal co-operation and publicity. The first accords with the necessities of self-survival; the second with the necessities of class survival, and the third with the necessities of folkgroup survival.

The business application of this principle is that if we trade with a man at all we must trade with him on our own level. We do not need to do business with any one and therefore may decline his account.

The principle of honor with caution

This should be done whenever his character is known to be on a low level. When by reason of his affiliations with a social group of low order his character is suspected, policy will lead us to deal cautiously but still on our own level. Our share of the responsibility to educate and develop such individuals to the highest moral standard of which they are capable is not discharged by acting toward them as if we were on their own low plane. Both to our subgroup and to the folkgroup we owe the duty of educating them

to a higher one. If their self-conscious level is that in which they are only influenced by fear, class co-operation can effectively establish this kind of motive. If they don't behave, the group will not solicit their business. Finally, publicity will enlist the services of the entire folkgroup; which may be relied upon to use its own potent methods in compelling adherence to those modes of conduct which experience has shown to be necessary for its survival.

XII

COMPETITION—CONTRACT— CONCLUSIONS

Competition is universal

No more fundamental principle exists in business than competition. As has already been explained, it is the economic form of a force that is universal; that antagonism which for reasons beyond our ken is latent in all matter, everywhere and at all times. It must certainly be taken account of in any effort made by business men to succeed, that is, to effect a complete adjustment of their lives to an environment, a part of which antagonism is. Economic competition is a species of antagonistic conduct resulting from the desire of more than one person or group to obtain the same thing at the same time. And such desires are the outcome of impulses, derived from instincts and feelings, which incessantly urge men toward conduct designed to satisfy their interests so arising.

The varieties of competition

Competition may be regarded from the point of view of society as harmful or beneficial; from the point of view of industry as constructive or destructive; and from the standpoint of business as fair or unfair.

—beneficial

I shall pass lightly over the first two aspects, stopping only to define beneficial competition as that

which brings to society a larger number of better products at a lesser price; and constructive, as that —constructive which makes for the improvement of merchandise and business methods by reason of the impetus which it gives—especially in periods of economic contraction—to improvements in methods and economies in production which in the long run revert to the welfare both of society and of the industry itself.

By constructive competition, the remuneration of the working groups—labor—is eventually increased and they are made surer of continuous employment—the capitalist groups find in such conditions a demand for large amounts of new capital—and the groups which employ both labor and capital have renewed strength and power conferred upon them by the successful solution of the problems involved.

Harmful competition is that which gives a poorer —harmful article to society at a higher cost; and destructive competition is that which so weakens the industry that many able workers are driven out of business, —destructive and many sources of employment of both capital and labor dissipated or destroyed.

Business competition is mainly between groups, each of which has common interests, and common ways, customs and compassions. Folk-custom recognizes distinctly the welfare of the folkgroup in beneficial and fair competition and its disadvantage in harmful competition; but less clearly the merits of constructive or the calamities involved in destructive

—unfair

or unfair competition. To what can be ascribed this discrimination in folk-feeling? Doubtless to an admiration of the marvelous results which have been achieved through keen competition in the last three generations; and to the false sentiment which in this, as in so many other cases, has exalted a means beyond its ends and has in a way defied it. If a traveler from ancient Greece could revisit our civilization he would not wonder at our worship of any unknown God; but he might very well satirize our blind devotion to the fetish of progress. We seem to have forgotten that the result to be wished for is welfare, and that progress is but its servant; not its master.

The fetish
of
"Progress"

Restraint of
unfair
competition

Its origin in
Progress-
worship

Folk-feeling, indeed, has already begun to criticise this folly of sentiment, and subtly to correct it, though it may not yet be popular to disparage progress in public. A folk-custom is arising out of the discovery that folkgroup welfare is involved in an effective restraint on that unfair or destructive competition which results from this blind worship of progress. The law merchant of the eighteenth century recognized only one form of unfair competition, the imitation of a trade-mark; other varieties have since been added, some of them by statute, but many more by the decisions of the courts.

Practices, therefore, which in former times were chiefly noted by their rarity have been instigated by the precept that there is no economic limit under conditions of quick trading to the possible growth of

industrial units. The larger the better has been the rule for twenty years, and businesses which have not grown continuously too often have been looked upon as doubtful enterprises. It is true that a few industries manufacturing controlled specialties, dependent upon advertising for their distribution, can always be operated at decreasing costs when their output keeps pace with the growth of population. But this is not the case in industries making standardized products and articles of common use, or in those that are engaged in the service of distribution. In such branches of business and doubtless in many others, there is a certain economic unit of installation whose increase brings no further saving or efficiency. In the card wool manufacture, for instance, better woolens operating results are obtained by five ten-set mill units than by one fifty-set unit. The most successful fancy woollen mill in the country is a single unit of only thirteen sets of cards. In many grades of cotton goods, twenty thousand spindles make a more capable productive unit than any larger one. It is doubtful if the costs of the larger mills are lower than of such of their competitors as have discovered the actual economic unit, have held fast to it, and have refused to be led astray by the apotheosis of bigness.

—in cottons

But this is a digression along economic lines. The practical point of competition as related to moral competition conduct lies in the conflict which often arises in the choice of business methods. An overgrown competitor needs to increase its sales to the point of a full

product and may resort to dubious methods to accomplish this result.

—leading
to unfair
methods

Thus have arisen the modern forms of unfair competition, which fall naturally into two classes: those forbidden by law and those condemned by folk-custom. Interference with a competitor's contracts, "passing off," or the substitution of similar merchandise, the misrepresentation of goods or methods, and transportation rebates are now actionable at law and can be prevented or punished by suit in the courts.

Graft

But local price cutting, disparagement, customers' graft and attempted boycotts of raw materials are not as yet fully recognized by law; though often exploited as contrary to public welfare. All of these except the first are amenable to groupal co-operation and publicity. Take for instance customers' graft. A merchant discovers that his rival is paying a personal tip to the buyer in consideration of an order. Generally this knowledge in the possession of the buyer's employer will put a stop to the practice. Economically it is fatal to the success of the giver of the graft. If known, it will destroy his credit. It is

Disparage-
ment

in the experience of most lenders of credit that the first warning of impending financial difficulties has often been thus disclosed. Disparagement almost surely reacts upon its perpetrator and destroys confidence in his own offering. It is poor policy to advertise the goods of your competitor in offering your own. A boycott of raw materials rarely succeeds; for it is as easy to form a co-operative group

Boycott

of defense against it, as to effect the combination necessary to control.

Local price cutting is the most effective weapon Local price of overgrown business. It is a powerful tactic of cutting—trade warfare, an effort to surround the adversary or drive him into a corner, either to compel him to surrender or to destroy him. The folkgroup, however, intuitive with the truth that its welfare depends upon a balance of the competitive and co-operative forces, is in no mood to tolerate the utter destruction of either of them. Folk-feeling, therefore, disregarding the immediate economic advantage of temporarily lower prices, condemns this tactic and is —con-
demned by folk-feeling now rightly endeavoring to penalize it by statute. Folk-custom demands that the smaller competitor be preserved so long as he is an efficient agent of competition. It enters no protest against his extinction when by lack of ability, capital or character he is no longer able to survive under conditions of fair prices; i.e., those folkways of market value at which the whole folkgroup is willing to absorb the whole product of the industrial group. But the folkgroup sees its interest in the conservation of competition, and turns in wrath upon a group which disregards its rule.

The most effective bulwark that the industrial Publicity, a group can upbuild when attacked by the tactic of local bulwark price cutting is, therefore, an appeal to the public conscience of its customers. Publicity of the local prices will often react upon the aggressor by interesting

groups of buyers in other localities, eventually compelling him either to desist, or to sell his goods at less than cost over the entire area of his operations. For with the growth of great industries there has been a corresponding growth of great facilities for publicity and of a great interest on the part of the people in the novel moral questions which have grown out of the rapid changes in art and business of the period in which we live. Conduct, after all, is the most universally interesting part of human existence, wherefore its exploitation is profitable to the press.

Value of
fair
competition

On the other hand, far-sighted economic judgment generally recognizes the value of fair competition in determining the ultimate success of any distributing organization. Its proximate effect is a confidence in market prices, and a feeling of satisfaction in the morality of business methods, which in all experience are powerful stimuli to exchange. In fine, fair competition is a distinct adjunct in the fixation of price folkways. So well known is this fact to trade groups that a jobbing house in a local center is always anxious to divide the market with a competitor, and often offers inducements for the establishment of another house in its own line of business. Under such circumstances, granted a reasonable equality in capital, ability and character, each of the two competitors is more successful than the one had been before.

Socialism
anti-com-
petitive—

To escape from competition has been the object of many experiments in modern society, and groups

have often been formed for the purpose of reverting as nearly as possible to the non-competitive or primitive type—like the Shakers of New Lebanon, the Rappists of Economy, the Perfectionists of Oneida, and the many Fourierite phalanxes, of which Brook Farm was the best known. The Socialist theory is based upon an escape from competitive conditions; and it enlarges upon the hardship which often results from economic competition, while minimizing its benefit to the folkgroup, and to social evolution; which, as we have seen, is most intimately paralleled by that development of individual character which Socialism deems to disregard.

The socialistic ideal is that of a state where conflict is suppressed and harmony prevails. It is as difficult to see how a society could exist which is not founded upon a mixture of the competitive and co-operative forces as it is to imagine a physical universe without equal proportions of attraction and repulsion.

The primitive group, it is true, was not economically competitive and it was contrary to its folk-custom to protect its industry from the competition of other groups by lowering prices; but instead it practiced biologic competition and it was its folk-custom, and therefore quite right, to arm itself and to exterminate or enslave the rival group. Conflict was biologic rather than economic because the environment was that of nature rather than of that development of social structure which we call civili-

—and
based on the
suppression
of
economic
conflict

Primitive
conflicts,
biologic
not
economic

Some surviving anti-social class customs

zation. There is, similarly, an interesting example still surviving in the class-custom of some of the lower trades-union groups which, rather than yield to outside competition in the matter of a lower wage-scale will resort to private war and endeavor to suppress competition by *force majeure*. These organizations are essentially in the tribal phase of social, and on the lower levels of self-consciousness in mental, evolution. Therefore they adhere to the tribal principle of private vengeance as against the national principle of intertribal peace. A similar indictment may well be brought against industrial groups who attempt to further their own interests by perhaps less brutal but no less immoral methods in endeavoring to destroy the plants or businesses of their competitors. As members of the folkgroup they precipitate a clash of class-custom against folk-custom. The outcome of such conflicts in fitness for survival is expressed by the third and fifth rules of trade-morals.

The weaker elements of society have generally denounced their successful competitors with about the same resentment, I should say, as the weaker stag in a herd of deer would feel for the rival who had overthrown him; or that with which the vanquished cock in the barnyard would regard the chanticleer who had driven him out of the society of his favorite hens. Folk-custom will have nothing to do with this self-pity; and society has always recognized the cleansing influence of business com-

petition upon the business groups. It is for the Evolutionary value of competition—social welfare and a consequent folk-custom that the finally surviving business groups shall be those best fitted to serve the needs of the folkgroup, which will not condemn as wrong the process, however disastrous to the individual, by which this result is obtained; provided it does not run counter to the prohibitions against fraud and unfair competition which we have already discussed.

In the competition of a weaker person or a weaker group with its superiors, as in the relations of the very weak to the very strong everywhere, there is a constant temptation to the use of deceit. Especially Deceit—is the impulse to this form of protection greatest, where weakness is due to a relative deficiency in the character elements. It may be practiced in business either by buying or selling groups.

As an act of the seller, deceit is an attempt to mislead, by falsehood spoken or acted, one of the buying group with whom an exchange is contemplated, as to either the quality or value of the merchandise which is its object or of merchandise competing with it. It is a breach of the good faith which is now a well-established folk-custom regulating competitive merchandise exchanges.

Deceit was by no means contrary to primitive morals, nor is it today contrary to the customs of some of the smaller trading groups which remain on the low levels of self-consciousness. In patriarchal times, primitives Abraham was commended of God after he had



—among
the Jews

deceived his son into believing that not he, but a lamb, was to be offered a sacrifice on Jehovah-jireh. The Lord Himself appeared to Jacob at Bethel, and said, "Behold, I am with thee and will keep thee in all places, and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed," just after the blessing intended for his brother Esau had been stolen by the grossest of frauds. Nor did Jehovah, through Michaiah His prophet, hesitate to deceive Ahab, the king of Israel to his destruction at Ramoth-gilead. All of which is proof, not of any immorality in the Bible tradition, but of the fact, evidenced by many other tokens, that deceit was not considered wrongful by folk-custom among the ancient Jews.

—among
the Greeks

In Homeric times, neither Hector, the Trojan hero, nor Ulysses, the pride of the Greeks, disdained to deceive the unhappy Dolon by promises and oaths to his death in the episode of the horses of Achilles. The goddess Minerva herself, mirror of wisdom and virtue, betrays the noble Hector and commends the deceitful cunning of Ulysses. In Roman law, a promise was not binding upon the parties to a contract unless solemnized with ceremonial formalities.

—among
the Romans

The business morals of the Turks do not forbid any reasonable deceit wherewith the sellers' interest may well be forwarded. Defoe, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, found "certain trading lies" not dishonest because expected, but the Lex Mercatoria, written at the end of the same century, enjoined "truth and the avoidance of fraud or deceit on all

—in the
eighteenth
century

occasions." In our own law the doctrine of *caveat* —its *emptor*—"let the buyer look out!"—has only been survival in gradually superseded by the opposing and humanistic doctrines of implied warranties; and does still prevail in many varieties of contract and sale, where, as in real estate transactions or in horse trading, there is opportunity for care and deliberation in the conclusion of the bargain and in the examination of the object transferred.

For the evolution of modern business in the direction of candor, as we have seen, is governed by methods of quick trading compelled through the redaction of profit margins by the unparalleled improvements in the arts of transportation, of diffusion of intelligence and of the transmission of power, brought about in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The success of this method depends upon radically different ethical standards from those which might successfully be used in more leisurely transactions. Many things have now to be fixed which formerly were indeterminate. We have noted its effects upon the standardization of merchandise. Deliveries must correspond with the samples. Often it is no longer necessary, because impossible, to examine every unit for discovery of discrepancy, and therefore warranties of qualities, quantities and of "dress" or packing will now be implied in the sale itself and enforced by the courts as a folk-custom well imbedded in the law merchant. It was not so a century ago, or even among some pro-

rejection by quick trading

—its
control by
modern
customs of
good faith

Deceit
militates
against
success

Good faith
in merchan-
dising

ducer groups, more recently. In the newer varieties of articles of sale and consumption standardization is unsettled even today. But in all successful large business the value of fixing the folk-custom of good-faith in trade relations is recognized, for it is through the general confidence engendered by reliance on it, that an increased outlet is found for a larger product.

Deceit, therefore, is not only wrong but rarely pays in the long run. It works against business continuity, and so against success; as do all of the palpable breaches of folk-custom.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century the trade custom of uniform and fixed prices has gradually been extended from retail to wholesale transactions until now it is a well-established business custom. It is wrong to sell merchandise for resale to different members of the same buying group at such differences either of price or of terms that one shall have an advantage over the other members of his group. Another way of stating this proposition is to say that on a given market, that is to say to the same group at the same time, the sale price of a standard article of merchandise shall be the same to all members of that group. This does not prevent, however, a different price being named to another market, that is to say to the same group at another time or to the members of another group. And so the export price of an article may be higher or lower than home or domestic price—always providing that it does not lead to unfair competition. The details

of these variations are governed by a number of group-customs; in some groups the prices may vary from day to day without notice; in others only after reasonable notice, as in the case of markets where information as to market conditions is exclusively in control of the selling group.

The basis of good faith in merchandising is compassionate as well as customary, the buyer must be —is protected by the seller from any deceit; that is to humanistic say, of a concealment of facts which would put him at a disadvantage as compared with the other members of his group in the same market. If this rule is obeyed by sellers, there is no further duty on their part to protect buyers against their own errors of judgment. With no merchandise facts concealed from him the buyer's business is to accept all market risks.

In cases where the folkgroup itself creates the Fair selling group of a commodity, and by virtue of that creation establishes conditions which compel all buying groups to deal with its creation, society itself has an interest in establishing fair competition and good faith, and properly institutes laws preventing discrimination; as in the case of railroad rebates. These folk-customs of good faith, which in private business are enforced by the laws of successful competition, must needs be established institutionally the moment that the state lends its aid to a monopoly with which its citizens have to deal. Therefore it constitutes other institutional groups, Interstate Com-

competition
and good
faith in
monopolies

merce, Railroad and Public Utility commissions to enforce the folk-custom, now embodied into law, upon the creature corporations with which it has entrusted its right of eminent domain; and which by virtue thereof have evolved from the stage of competition to that of monopoly.

Contract—

—redeems
society
from
barbarism

—is a
foundation
of business

Contract is the basis upon which all modern business is founded, especially in those forms of exchange where the property and the consideration are not delivered or exchanged at the same time. If contracts, in which either party is to perform his obligation either continuously or at some future time, could not be made and enforced, the exchanges which are the lifeblood of national civilization could not be performed, and society with terrible throes and horrible suffering would relapse at once into a state of comparative savagery. The obligation of a contract is therefore well established as a folk-custom fundamental to the social phase of our folkgroup, and to induce its violation is an immoral act far-reaching in its social consequences. To persuade a purchaser to violate his contract with a competitor, or the employee of a competitor to break his contract of employment, whether by coercion, bribery or other inducement, is to strike a blow at the foundations of business itself. It is true that certain subgroups within the folkgroup who in custom have not progressed beyond a low social phase frequently take action that shows undeveloped moral motives, and when they believe that their economic interests are

injured by contracts into which they have entered sometimes make efforts to evade or disrupt them. Cases where a buyer endeavors to escape from his obligation to receive a purchase on a falling market or a seller to avoid the obligation to deliver the merchandise on a rising one, or where an employer tries to discharge an employee before his term of employment has expired, or an employee to escape from the conditions of his employment, are instances of a breach of good faith between parties who have entered into an engagement upon the validity of whose type the structure of social life is founded. With the vast bulk of possible contractual infractions statute law is unable to cope; and so beneath the law there is an ever changing assemblage of contractual rules or folk-customs, which in the main prove efficient for their regulation.

Look back for a moment at the picture of organized society and see how completely the functioning and life of each of its parts is dependent upon the fulfilment of the functions of each of its other parts. If in the human body the heart, the lungs, or the digestive tract fails to perform its functions, the body dies because the co-ordination of its organs fails. Just so a society, whose organic parts are co-ordinated by the contractual relations which each has assumed toward the others, must die or degenerate unless that co-ordination, that service which each part performs for all the others, endures. And it is by contract—that is to say by mutual agreement for

Contract,
the co-
ordinating
element
of the
subgroups
in the
social
structure

The validity of contracts conditioned by social welfare

the benefit of each to the advantage of the whole—that the constant growth of this mutual service and of this co-ordination is maintained. Society, therefore, sets a high value upon the validity of contracts; except when it can be proved that they are in conflict with its welfare. And this class the law rejects, not because they are not contracts, but because they are *contra bonos mores*—and therefore immoral in themselves.

Inferences

The inferences which this sketch has endeavored to present are these:

Evolution a continuous process

That biological and social evolution are parts of one process, interconnected in a thousand ways, only a small part of which are here pictured. There may be a closer identity between contiguous sequences of this process, as for instance between a man and an ape, or between an instinct and a folk-way, than there is between different members of a single class or genus, for instance between the lower and higher mammals, or between the diverse nurtureways of different peoples.

Without society the individual must perish—without morals society must disintegrate

That individuals are incapable of survival except in groupal association, so that individual conduct must conform and be subordinate to social conduct, which at all costs ensures the welfare of the group. Social morals, class or group morals and trade-morals are alike founded upon this group principle.

That the irreducible group, or social cell or atom,

at the beginning of the twentieth century and in our civilization is the monogamic family.

That these social cells or atoms form themselves into groups or classes, which are essential organs of relations of social activity, and without which life on our plane of culture could not proceed, or even exist.

That competition between groups is one, and co-operation another of their modes of manifestation, both in like manner essential to their evolution and survival. Adjustment of group life to environment is effected by the ebb and flow, the varying interchange of competition and co-operation.

That conflict is the expression of a lack of adjustment between the organism and a constantly changing environment, and may be either biotic, between the orders of life; social, between groupal phases of mankind; economic, between industrial interests, or moral, between modes of conduct approved by common consent.

That conflicts are the outcome of a series of conditions or concurrent causes and not of one simple cause, the complexity of each conflict-situation being in direct ratio to the evolutionary plane on which it occurs; and in this sequence, biotic, social, economic, or ethical.

That the presentation and understanding of morals, the system of sentiments and rules of action derived from the study and classification of conduct can only be accomplished through the consideration of *all* acts by which animals and men endeavor to

Antagonism and
concurrency
equally
necessary to
evolution

Conflict the
expression
of imperfect
adjustments

Moral
conflicts
developed
daily

adjust their lives to their environments, and so fit themselves to survive.

That moral conflicts, i.e., between modes of behavior and conduct—between natureways and nurtureways—are continually arising, growing out of unequal evolutionary development in characters, groups, feelings, customs and societies. If uncontrolled by an opposite effort for harmony they would speedily make social and individual existence difficult if not impossible. By the balance of conduct effected by the principles of conflict and co-operation the life of the folk-group is adjusted to its environment, and to its structure.

Human
volition

That conduct is regulated by intelligent and conscious volition, the functional medium of choice.

That human volition is a part of, and is inextricably interwoven with biological evolution, and that conduct is a part of, and inevitably connected with, social evolution.

Folk-
feeling
a means of
adjustment

That folk-feeling is an expression of the cumulative experience of the race, a combination of the memories of many generations, and affords a means for an approximate adjustment of all moral conflicts.

That the perfection or imperfection of this adjustment is the criterion for the estimation of all conduct.

That the foregoing considerations form the necessary foundation of the study of the science of ethics; and are preliminary to the correct understanding of the subject and to its pursuit as a branch of human knowledge.

That all the groups of which our complex society is composed are interdependent, so that it is equally incumbent upon the individual and his group to refrain from the pursuit of individual or class welfare at the expense of folkgroup welfare, and for the folkgroup neither to overtax nor to starve any of its subsidiary components, all of which are necessary to effect its continued adjustment to environment, and to fit it for survival.

That business men in the twentieth century are peculiarly situated, in a whirl of conflicts arising from a most extraordinary process of rapid social and, economic development and evolution; that as groups they form a system of functional organs of society itself, instrumental to a degree heretofore undreamed of in effecting the exchanges by which the life of modern civilization is maintained; that the necessity of conforming their conduct to that of the social group in which they live and work is imperative; that a conformity to ancient and outworn methods sometimes places them in antagonism to the group; and being a part thereof it is a condition of their survival and of social vigor that conflicts arising from such antagonisms be speedily adjusted.

We have now completed our impressionistic picture of the evolution of the social structure, of its standards of conduct, of the development of business, by which its exchanges are made and which like the lifeblood, courses from group to group supply-

Inter-
dependence
of sub-
groups and
folkgroups

The
adjustment
of the
business
groups
to the
folkgroup

Conclusion

ing subsistence, strength, the means of growth and satisfaction to each of the interests arising from the great motive forces of hunger, love, vanity, fear and pity. The moral forces arising from the first four of these motives are expressed in folk-custom, or those common modes of conduct which the group has connected with its ideals of groupal welfare; while the moral forces arising from the last developed motive force, that of pity or compassion, are expressed in the ideals of individual welfare as adjusted to groupal welfare which we have studied under the name of humanistics. From these two modes of thought and action are drawn ethical principles from which may be deduced rules of right action applicable not only to the affairs of business, but to all other phases of human conduct—to the better fitting not only of the individual and of his group, but of human society itself for survival in the struggle for existence. The struggle for existence and the survival of the *fittest*—which means not proximately but eventually of the *best*—are indefinitely continuing processes forming one chain of evolution which links all life and conduct together; men and animals, civilization and savagery, volitions and instincts, conduct and behavior in a universe of elemental motion and change. “All was others, all will be others.”

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
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